By Gustavo de Arístegui, as published by La Razón.
11 January 2026
From an offensive realism perspective, the idea has internal logic and solid precedents. In 1867, the U.S. Department of State already explored the possibility of acquisition; in 1946, the Truman administration formally offered Denmark 100 million dollars in gold for the island.
What Trump applies is shock maximalism: demanding the impossible in order to break the status quo and force a new negotiating framework. By placing extreme options on the negotiating table — even hinting at economic coercion or military intervention — Washington shifts the Overton Window. Suddenly, alternatives that were previously unthinkable, such as a Free Association Treaty similar to those the United States maintains with Palau or the Marshall Islands, appear moderate.
Under such a model, Greenland could obtain formal independence from Denmark and receive a massive direct subsidy from Washington to replace the Danish subsidy. In exchange, Greenland would cede exclusive powers over defense and security, closing the island to Chinese influence and investment and to Russian bases.
For Trump’s team and strategists such as Secretary of State Marco Rubio, this is not nineteenth-century colonialism, but rather the application of the Monroe Doctrine to the Arctic. The objective is not to govern Inuit peoples, but to deny territory to systemic rivals: a continental-scale area-denial operation.
Pituffik: The Radioactive Trauma and the U.S. Shield
For the United States, Greenland is the first line of defense of the continent. This reality is condensed into one geographical point: Pituffik Air Base (formerly Thule), the northernmost military installation of the U.S. Armed Forces.
Since the Cold War, ballistic logic has been relentless: the shortest path for an intercontinental missile launched from Russia toward Washington passes over the North Pole and Greenland. Pituffik hosts the Space Force’s Early Warning Radar. If it ceases to function, the United States is left blind to a nuclear attack for crucial minutes.
However, the relationship is marked by deep scars. On January 21, 1968, a B-52 bomber from the Chrome Dome mission crashed near the base. Four B28 thermonuclear bombs fragmented; although there was no nuclear detonation, the explosion of conventional detonators scattered plutonium and uranium across kilometers of ice and sea. The incident exposed “Thulegate”: the Danish government had lied to its population, secretly allowing the transit of nuclear weapons while publicly maintaining a policy of a nuclear-free zone.
Today, distrust persists. When Washington speaks of shared security, many in Nuuk recall Project Iceworm — a secret plan to build nuclear silos beneath the ice — and wonder whether they are partners or merely a strategic dumping ground.
The Shock Doctrine: Trump and Transactional Maximalism
In this context, Donald Trump’s proposal to “buy” Greenland deserves analysis beyond easy mockery. From an offensive realism standpoint, the idea has coherence and historical precedent.
By proposing extreme measures, Washington seeks to reshape negotiations and redefine acceptable outcomes. What once appeared impossible becomes plausible, and what was plausible becomes insufficient.
Europe Facing the Mirror: Sovereignty or Irrelevance?
Europe’s reaction to these developments reveals a profound crisis of strategic identity. While Washington plans and Moscow militarizes nuclear icebreakers, Brussels issues Arctic Strategies centered on sustainability, social inclusion, and climate research. Laudable objectives — but irrelevant when what is at stake is control of ocean access routes.
Greenland is the definitive test for the European Union. Denmark is an EU member state, and although Greenland left the EEC in 1985, it remains linked through Copenhagen. If the United States were to pressure Denmark with a take-it-or-leave-it offer, or encourage a dollar-sponsored Greenlandic independence, does the EU have the capacity to offer a credible alternative?
Is Europe willing to invest in strategic Arctic mining to break dependence on China, or will it continue blocking projects due to environmental regulations while importing the same raw materials from far more polluting Chinese mines?
The uncomfortable reality is that Europe has outsourced its security in the North Atlantic to the United States for 75 years. The Pituffik base protects Europe as much as it does America. Now that Washington presents the bill and demands more direct control, Europe’s moral indignation rings hollow.
The most likely outcome is a reinforced security condominium: not a literal sale, but an architecture in which Danish sovereignty is nominally maintained while U.S. military, intelligence, and economic presence expands dramatically, with veto power over foreign investments.
Europe faces a brutal dilemma. In the geopolitics of melting ice, there are no power vacuums. If Brussels and Copenhagen do not fill Greenland’s strategic space with real commitment, investment, and hard power, others will. Whoever controls Greenland controls the breathing space of the North Atlantic. Europe must decide whether it wants a seat at the table — or to be part of the menu.
Gustavo de Arístegui is a diplomat and served as Ambassador to India, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka (2012–2016).
gustavodearistegui.substack.com
Greenland: “We Do Not Want to Be Americans”
All five Greenlandic parliamentary parties reaffirmed this Friday night a joint and forceful message regarding their national identity:
“We do not want to be Americans, we do not want to be Danes, we want to be Greenlanders.”
Hours earlier, Donald Trump insisted that his administration will do “something” with Greenland, whether “by good means or by bad,” amid pressure to annex the autonomous territory of Denmark, citing U.S. national security reasons.