Gustavo de Arístegui,
May 8, 2026
I. BRIEF INTRODUCTION
The day that closes this week, in this analyst’s opinion, presents itself as one of those pivotal days in which several pieces shift simultaneously, leaving the casual observer unable to discern whether what they are witnessing is a true turning point or merely a waiting period between two episodes of tension. On the Persian front, the ceasefire between the United States and Iran hung by a thread yesterday, with active exchanges of fire around the port of Qeshm, in Bandar Abbas, and at the naval checkpoint of Bandar Kargan, while Donald Trump, without batting an eye, declared that “the ceasefire is still in effect—I’ll let you know when it isn’t” and warned that, if the memorandum is not signed, “there will be a lot of pain.” Diplomacy, paradoxically, is proceeding on the edge of a cannon.
Meanwhile, Secretary of State Marco Rubio met yesterday for more than two hours with Pope Leo XIV at the Apostolic Palace, in a clear attempt to ease tensions between the White House and the Holy See following Trump’s repeated personal attacks against the first American pontiff in history. Institutional diplomacy attempts—to use the phrase coined by Jesuit Antonio Spadaro— to “cool the rhetoric ,” an arduous task when one of the protagonists stubbornly insists that the other “endangers millions of Catholics.” Add to this the confirmation, via The Economist , of a secret plan by the Russian GRU to supply Iran with fiber-optic drones intended for use against US troops; the spectacular results from Rheinmetall, which confirm with figures—and not just speeches—that German rearmament is real and sustained; Putin’s tank-less parades on Red Square on May 9; and the collapse of the ceasefires with Kyiv. And the anticipated cordial but ambivalent meeting between Trump and Lula at the White House. We are, once again, facing wars of varying intensity whose threads intertwine in a single day.
1. Top News of the Last 24 Hours
1. US and Iran exchange fire in the Strait of Hormuz; Trump says the ceasefire “is still in place” and warns of “much pain” if the agreement is not signed
Facts.
According to reports from Reuters, Fox News, and CNN that circulated throughout the day, US forces attacked Iranian military targets on Thursday in the port of Qeshm, on the Strait of Hormuz, as well as in Bandar Abbas and the naval checkpoint of Bandar Kargan in Minab. The Iranian state news agency IRNA confirmed air defense activity in western Tehran and in the Chitgar neighborhood. Mehr News reported crossfire exchanges across the southern province of Hormozgan, in Bandar Abbas, Bandar Khamir, Sirik, and on Qeshm Island itself. These attacks came just two days after Iran launched fifteen ballistic and cruise missiles at the Emirati port of Fujairah. Despite all this, President Trump declared from the Lincoln Memorial Reflecting Pool: “They played us, we pulverized them,” adding immediately afterward, “I’ll let you know when the ceasefire ends, otherwise you’ll see a big glow coming out of Iran.” The president reiterated his call for Tehran to sign the fourteen-point memorandum: “The talks are going very well, but they must understand that if it is not signed, there will be much pain; it could happen any day, but it might not. I believe they want the agreement more than I do.”
Implications.
The situation constitutes what I have been calling in my reports a variable-geometry ceasefire : formal hostilities remain suspended, but sporadic kinetic exchanges—”below the threshold of retaliation,” in the words of General Dan Caine, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—are accumulating at such a rate that the Pentagon has recorded more than ten Iranian attacks against US forces since the signing of the April 8th agreement. The Trumpian doctrine combines, with paradoxical effectiveness, selective military pressure, a permanent naval blockade, and diplomatic negotiation via Pakistan; a combination that, in the hands of a Marco Rubio or a Steve Witkoff, could lead to a historic success, but which, in its presidential oscillations, dangerously resembles the brinkmanship that the Cold War taught us to avoid. The paradox of decapitation —that mechanism by which a successful military operation but lacking a plan for the day after ends up leaving a vacuum that is filled by the worst actors of the regime itself—continues to loom: any agreement that leaves the ultraconservative troika of the IRGC intact (General Vahidi, Secretary Zolghadr and advisor Rezaei) and blocks the reformist wing of Pezeshkian will be doomed from its inception.
Perspectives and scenarios.
Three scenarios are emerging on the horizon for the next ten days. The first, optimistic, envisions the signing of the fourteen-point memorandum in Islamabad or Geneva before the Trump-Xi summit on May 14-15, allowing the US president to present an extraordinary diplomatic trophy on the eve of the midterm elections . The second, intermediate and, in this analyst’s opinion, the most likely, anticipates successive technical extensions of the ceasefire while the Iranian oligarchic-jihadist regime buys time and reorganizes—”Operation Trust Me Bro failed,” quipped spokesman Ghalibaf—with the aim of preserving its enrichment program as much as possible. The third, catastrophic, begins with a collapse of the mediation process, which would reactivate Operation Epic Fury “at a much higher level,” in Trump’s own words. It is worth remembering, with the prudence that the profession demands, that we have already seen other truces collapse in the same region —notably, the Easter ceasefire of a month ago— and that terrorist regimes do not sign agreements: they take advantage of them.
2. Secretary Rubio meets for more than two hours with Pope Leo XIV in an attempt to ease the historic tension between the White House and the Holy See
Facts.
The meeting, held Thursday at the Apostolic Palace—on the eve of the first anniversary of Leo XIV’s pontificate—lasted more than 45 minutes privately, followed by a meeting with Cardinal Secretary of State Pietro Parolin and Archbishop Paul R. Gallagher. According to official statements from the Vatican and the U.S. State Department, the talks covered the war against Iran, the conflict in Lebanon, the African crises, and the situation in Cuba. The Holy See described the meeting as “cordial” and emphasized “the need to work tirelessly for peace.” The Pope, who on Tuesday had declared that the Catholic Church “has been speaking out against all nuclear weapons for years,” gave Rubio a pen made of olive wood—”the plant of peace,” he said—; the Secretary, the son of Cuban immigrants and a practicing Catholic, presented the Pope with a crystal American football bearing the seal of the State Department. The meeting comes after weeks of harsh personal attacks by President Trump against the first pope born in the United States, whom he accused of “endangering many Catholics” because of his positions on Iran and his rejection of the use of nuclear weapons, as well as after the public defense of the pontiff by Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, which Trump called “unacceptable”.
Implications.
The rift between the White House and the Holy See is not an anecdotal episode; in diplomatic terms, it constitutes an unprecedented anomaly since the end of the Cold War. That the first American pope in history has become one of the most visible critics of Trump’s foreign policy—and that the president, in response, has personally attacked him—reflects a profound tension between two worldviews: the universalist morality of the Church in defense of migrants, refugees, and peoples subjected to the suffering of war, versus a Trumpian realism that prioritizes national security and geopolitical balance, without the humanist nuances that were also a hallmark of Ronald Reagan. The defense that Prime Minister Meloni—leader of Brothers of Italy, a center-right party until recently a natural ally of Trump—made of the pontiff illustrates that the cultural and moral battle between the two poles does not respect traditional partisan divisions. It is worth remembering that the pontiff has denounced as “truly unacceptable” the presidential threat to “eradicate Iranian civilization,” an expression that no diplomat with common sense would have endorsed.
Perspectives and scenarios.
Marco Rubio’s ability to “return the confrontation to a more serene, institutional register”—to use the words of Jesuit Spadaro—constitutes one of the most delicate tests of his tenure as Secretary of State. The internal poll showing the erosion of Catholic support for the president, coupled with the enormous personal popularity of Pope Leo XIV, should temper the president’s mood; recent experiences, however, urge caution. The Gordian knot lies in the Iranian issue: if the fourteen-point memorandum is ultimately signed, the Holy See can rightly present itself as one of the voices that helped avert the worst-case scenario; if war reignites, the distance between Washington and Rome will widen. As committed Atlanticists and Catholics by family and tradition, we advocate dialogue and diplomacy without stridency. It is to be hoped that institutional prudence will prevail over the presidential outburst, and that the two most influential American figures in the world—the president and the pontiff—will find some common ground. Peace is, also, a political virtue.
3. Arms manufacturers confirm with figures that German rearmament is real: Rheinmetall presents record results and forecasts 45% growth by 2026
Facts.
German giant Rheinmetall yesterday published its first-quarter 2026 report with figures that far exceeded even the most demanding analytical expectations. Consolidated sales grew 8% year-on-year to €1.938 billion, operating profit increased 17% to €224 million, and the operating margin climbed from 10.6% to 11.6%. The order backlog reached a record €63.8 billion, 36% higher than the previous year. The company, led by CEO Armin Papperger, maintains its forecast of a 40% to 45% increase in sales for the full year 2026—to €14.5 billion—and emphasizes that it is “preeminently positioned to help the United States replenish its missile stockpiles” following the depletion experienced during Operation Epic Fury . Germany’s rearmament program, in terms of its national agenda, entails a budgetary effort that will increase from €86 billion in 2025 to €152 billion by 2029, with the goal of reaching 3.5% of GDP in defense spending before the end of the decade. Rheinmetall has just finalized the acquisition of Naval Vessels Lürssen (NVL) and has become a comprehensive supplier—land, naval, air, cyber, and space—to the Bundeswehr. The Reuters Breakingviews commentary states unequivocally that “arms manufacturers see that German spending is real.”
Implications.
We are witnessing the shift from rearmament rhetoric to budgetary reality; from wishful thinking to a tangible, signed backlog . The fact that Rheinmetall has more than quintupled its market capitalization in three years, that its backlog is equivalent to more than six years of sales, and that it plans to quadruple its revenue to €50 billion annually by 2030, illustrates the structural change that Atlanticist Europe has been postponing for decades. Friedrich Merz’s Germany—despite political frictions with the Trump administration and the recent withdrawal of 5,000 US troops—is becoming, in industrial terms, the engine of European rearmament. This validates the thesis I have been arguing for years in my columns: the only serious European defense is one that combines sustained investment, industrial integration, and progressive strategic autonomy, without relinquishing the transatlantic link. The German defense industry—Rheinmetall, Diehl, Hensoldt, Krauss-Maffei Wegmann—is finally showing the way forward for the rest of the continent. Italy, with Leonardo, and the United Kingdom, with BAE Systems, complete the basic industrial triangle; France, with Dassault and MBDA, expands it. And Spain? Spain, once again, is conspicuous by its lack of a coherent industrial plan.
Perspectives and scenarios.
The crucial question for the coming months is whether Rheinmetall’s accelerated growth will be replicated across the rest of the continent with the speed the urgency demands. Data from the Stoxx 600 Aerospace and Defense index, which has increased fivefold since February 2022, reveals a market outlook consistent with a new industrial era. CEO Papperger’s statement—”Germany must not develop an inferiority complex toward the United States if it wants to become a reliable partner for Washington”—perfectly captures the spirit I have been advocating for Europe as a whole. The NATO summit next June will be decisive; the 5% of GDP defense target agreed upon last summer, currently a distant goal for most of the continent, must become an operational roadmap with deadlines, industrial responsibilities, and coordination mechanisms. The European defense industry is demonstrating that it can do this. European policy, unfortunately, continues to lag far behind. And Spain, it is worth emphasizing, has a historic decision to make: either it joins the leading group of Atlanticist rearmament, or it will be condemned to the strategic irrelevance that its government seems, paradoxically, to consider a virtue.
4. Victory Day ceasefires collapse as a secret Russian GRU plan to supply fiber-optic drones to the Tehran regime is revealed
Facts.
The unilateral ceasefires declared by Vladimir Putin—for May 8 and 9, around the 81st anniversary of Victory Day—and by Volodymyr Zelensky—from May 5 to 6—have practically collapsed before even taking effect, with escalating shelling by both sides and the explicit Russian threat of a “massive missile attack on the center of Kyiv” if Ukraine disrupts the Red Square parade. The Russian Ministry of Defense itself issued an evacuation order to diplomatic missions in the Ukrainian capital. For the first time in nearly two decades, the Moscow military parade will take place without tanks, missiles, or armored vehicles. A Russian ballistic missile attack on Merefa, in the Kharkiv region, has left seven civilians dead and dozens wounded, including a two-year-old child. Meanwhile, The Economist has exclusively published documentation of a secret tripartite plan by the GRU—Russia’s military intelligence service—to supply Iran with two drone models, including the fiber-optic drones that have transformed the war in Ukraine due to their immunity to electronic countermeasures, along with corresponding training programs for their use against US troops. This plan follows a pattern documented by the Associated Press, the Washington Post, and the Wall Street Journal, according to which Moscow has already sent Tehran upgraded versions of the Shahed drone equipped with jet engines, anti-jamming devices, artificial intelligence platforms, and Starlink-compatible kits.
Implications.
The revelation of the GRU plan constitutes one of the first tangible proofs of the Sino-Russian-Iranian axis in its kinetic and operational dimension, no longer merely diplomatic. The proliferation of fiber optic drones—whose tactical advantage lies precisely in their immunity to defensive electronic warfare, making them almost impossible to neutralize—represents a technological transfer of extraordinary strategic gravity. It is worth recalling that pro-Iranian terrorist militias in Iraq have already used fiber optic drones to target a US Black Hawk helicopter and an air defense radar near Baghdad. If the Iranian oligarchic-jihadist dictatorship does indeed acquire this technology, Western defenses in the Persian Gulf—which already employ Patriot interceptors at a cost of four million dollars each compared to Iranian Shahed drones costing thirty thousand dollars—will face a devastating economic and operational asymmetry. The idea, embraced by some Trumpian commentators, that Russia could play a mediating or constructive role in the region crumbles in the face of evidence that Moscow is openly supplying offensive weaponry intended to kill US troops. Recall that the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has driven Brent crude well above $90 a barrel, generating an estimated $40 billion in annual profit for Russia: the Kremlin not only has no incentive to mediate, but every incentive in the world to prolong the instability.
Perspectives and scenarios.
The tank-less parade on Red Square, announced for tomorrow, May 9, is the perfect symbol of the geopolitical reality we live in: a Russia weakened on the conventional front but extremely dangerous in the realm of variable-temperature warfare , capable of supplying lethal technology to a terrorist state while simultaneously displaying a cosmetic version of its own military pride. The financial sustainability of the Russian war effort, artificially prolonged until now by the energy windfall derived from the war against Iran, will depend critically on what happens in the coming weeks on the Persian front. As I have been describing for months, the war in Ukraine and the war in Iran are two sides of the same systemic conflict that successive “ceasefires” cannot conceal. The Trump administration has in this case—that of the Sino-Russian-Iranian axis and the transfer of offensive weaponry—one of its decisive tests. The president’s pragmatic and realistic foreign policy, defensible when implemented prudently, cannot ignore the fact that his counterpart in Moscow is, while they are talking, arming their common adversary. We unequivocally defend the Ukrainian cause and reject any solution that rewards territorial aggression.
5. Trump confirms the withdrawal of 5,000 troops from Germany and warns of “much larger” cuts in Europe, with Spain, Italy and other allies in the crosshairs
Facts.
Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell announced last Friday the withdrawal of approximately 5,000 US troops stationed in Germany, a decision made by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth after a “comprehensive review” of the force posture in the European theater. The following day, President Trump himself declared from Florida that the reduction would go “far beyond” that number. The measure—which will leave just over 30,000 US military personnel in Germany—comes after several weeks of tension with Chancellor Friedrich Merz, who had declared that the United States was “humiliated” by the prolonged conflict in Iran. Internal Pentagon documents leaked to Time and the Financial Times reveal that the US administration is even considering suspending Spain from NATO—an unprecedented measure—in retaliation for Pedro Sánchez’s refusal to allow the use of the Rota and Morón air bases for Operation Epic Fury . Republican senators such as Roger Wicker (Mississippi) and Congressman Mike Rogers (Alabama), respectively chairman of the Armed Services Committees of both Houses, have expressed their “deep concern” about the decision.
Implications.
The announced withdrawal is, above all, a political message: Washington believes that Europe must finally assume the main burden of its own conventional defense, while the United States reorients itself toward the Indo-Pacific. The Colby philosophy—referring to Under Secretary Elbridge Colby, the principal architect of this policy—is on full display here. Beyond the symbolism, what is truly worrying are the underlying factors already being analyzed by the Council on Foreign Relations: the depletion of precision-guided munitions stockpiles—particularly Patriot and HIMARS interceptors—consumed massively during Operation Epic Fury , which will delay deliveries to Ukraine, the United Kingdom, Poland, and Lithuania. This is a critical point: Allied conventional deterrence relies on industrial margins that the war against Iran has exposed, and it is precisely these margins that Rheinmetall’s record figures are beginning to fill, albeit with a structural delay. Spain, for its part, lives in a clear contradiction: while the government closes its airspace to the United States and prohibits the operational use of its bases—invoking Article 63 of the Constitution and the 1953 bilateral agreements—the operational reality of Rota and Morón remains central to the allies. This inconsistency between public discourse and military reality is, it must be said clearly, the defining characteristic of the current Spanish government’s position: a neutrality that borders on irresponsibility and that, paradoxically, places Madrid in a more hostile position toward Washington than toward Tehran.
Perspectives and scenarios.
The Europe that looks at itself in the mirror today is the same one I have been persistently criticizing in these pages and in my analyses for La Razón and El Debate : a Europe that invests late, invests poorly, and invests in a fragmented way. The German promise to reach 3.5% of GDP in defense by 2029 is welcome—and, as Rheinmetall confirms today, it is being realized with verifiable data—as is the aggregate European spending plan that is to double to $750 billion annually by 2030. But industrial reality reveals the project’s flaws: twelve different main battle tank models in Europe compared to just one in the United States, eighty percent of European purchases historically directed outside the continent, and an almost chronic inability to coordinate joint procurement processes. As staunch Atlanticists, we cannot help but lament that the Old Continent has delegated its security to its American ally for so many decades without developing the strategic autonomy essential to being a credible partner. The NATO summit in June will be crucial. Spain, for its part, will have to decide whether it wants to be part of the problem or part of the solution; there are no middle grounds at this point.
6. The ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon is collapsing in the south with the most intense escalation since its signing
Facts.
Violations of the ceasefire agreed upon on April 16 between Israel and Lebanon—extended on April 23 for an additional three weeks following President Trump’s announcement—intensified alarmingly this week. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has described the attacks of the past week as “the most intense since the truce began.” Israeli airstrikes on Majdelzoun, in the south of the country, left several dead and caused mass displacement, while Hezbollah—despite the Lebanese government’s formal ban of March 2—maintains its refusal to lay down its arms and accept direct mediation with Israel. The Lebanese government, led by a weakened administration, demands an Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon; Tel Aviv conditions the consolidation of the Israeli presence on the effective neutralization of the Shiite terrorist organization’s weapons. More than 2,000 people were reported dead in Lebanon and more than one million were displaced by mid-April.
Implications.
The fragility of the Lebanese ceasefire was predictable and, in a way, foreshadowed in these reports from day one. Hezbollah is not a militia, nor a political movement with an armed wing: it is—and it bears repeating whenever necessary—a terrorist organization, an organic instrument of the Iranian oligarchic-jihadist regime , financed, armed, and directed by the Quds Force of the IRGC. No agreement will be sustainable as long as Hezbollah retains its residual arsenal south of the Litani River; no Lebanese sovereignty will be real as long as the “state within a state” maintains its parallel command structure. Moreover, this is a deeply personal matter for the person writing these lines: the Lebanon of my family memories, the Lebanon that my father knew in his mediation during the TWA 847 crisis and in his negotiations for the release of Foreign Minister Assad Abdo and GEO agent Pedro Antonio Sánchez Anula, does not deserve to continue being a perpetual hostage of a terrorist organization that proclaims itself the defender of the country but is, in reality, its main source of misfortune.
Perspectives and scenarios.
The stability of the ceasefire depends, paradoxically, less on Beirut or Tel Aviv than on the outcome of the negotiations between Washington and Tehran, mediated by Pakistan. If the Iranian dictatorial and mafia-like oligarchy signs the fourteen-point memorandum—including, as the United States demands, effective restrictions on its support for regional terrorist organizations—Hezbollah will be deprived of the logistical backbone that has sustained it since 1982. If, on the other hand, the mediation fails, the terrorist organization will seek to reignite the confrontation with Israel to maintain its domestic relevance, and southern Lebanon will once again become a scene of tragedy. The Trump administration, which has already designated Hezbollah a terrorist organization for all intents and purposes, has in this case one of its decisive pieces of evidence; it is worth remembering that the paradox of decapitation applies not only to Tehran, but to its entire proxy network: cutting off the head is not enough if the body remains armed.
7. Trump and Lula da Silva hold a cordial meeting at the White House and open the door to renegotiating tariffs after months of frosty diplomacy
Facts.
Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva held a three-hour meeting with Donald Trump at the White House on Thursday, including bilateral talks and a working lunch. The meeting—initially planned to include a joint press conference that was ultimately canceled without public explanation—concluded with cordial statements from both leaders. Trump wrote on Truth Social that the meeting “went very well” and described Lula as “a very dynamic president.” Lula, speaking from the Brazilian embassy, said he was “very, very satisfied” with the talks. The agenda covered bilateral trade, tariffs, cooperation in the fight against organized crime, and access to critical minerals. It is worth recalling the context: last year, Trump imposed 50% tariffs—among the highest ever levied on imported goods—on Brazilian exports, explicitly linking the measure to the legal proceedings against former President Jair Bolsonaro, his political ally, who was later sentenced to 27 years in prison for attempting to overthrow the constitutional order. Trump subsequently lifted most of the tariffs —notably on Brazilian beef and coffee— to contain inflation of consumer goods in the United States.
Implications.
The meeting brings together two populist figures of opposing ideologies who have built their respective political careers by opposing, each in their own way, the established elites. That the dialogue took place in friendly terms despite profound differences on economic policy, international alliances—Lula is one of the most active leaders of the BRICS+ bloc, hostile to the hegemony of the dollar—and human rights, demonstrates that Trumpian realism, when operating under the prudent advice of Marco Rubio, prefers pragmatic agreements to ideological crusades. However, we cannot forget that the Brazilian Workers’ Party and Lula himself have maintained close ties with the Chavista narco-dictatorship, with Havana, and with Tehran, and that Brasilia’s relations with the US administration cannot be fully normalized as long as Brazil persists in this alignment. The discussion on critical minerals—the trade war over rare earth elements is, let us remember, one of the most relevant strategic fronts against Chinese expansionism—is particularly interesting. However, Brazilian sources close to the president acknowledged to Reuters that a formal agreement on the matter is “not expected” in the short term, given that they were unable to even reach a basic memorandum of understanding.
Perspectives and scenarios.
Brazil faces presidential elections in October of this year, in which Lula—80 years old—will seek a fourth non-consecutive term against Senator Flávio Bolsonaro, son of the former president and, according to polls, virtually tied with the current president. Lula’s diplomacy with Washington will be conditioned by this timeline: he needs to demonstrate his capacity for international dialogue without reopening wounds with Bolsonaro and his electoral base. The Trump administration, for its part, is also playing the double game of electoral calculation— midterm elections in November—and hemispheric strategy, which combines a hard line against the cosmically corrupt Chavista narco-state of the sinister Rodríguez brothers with a pragmatic search for balance with Brasília, Mexico, and other regional actors. We wholeheartedly support attacks against drug-running boats in the Caribbean and continued pressure on the hemisphere’s dictatorial regimes; We defend free international trade—in line with the thinking of the unparalleled President Reagan, the best American president of the second half of the 20th century and perhaps of the entire 20th century—and therefore regret the tariff restrictions imposed by the first Trump administration. If this second phase modulates tariffs through bilateral negotiation, so much the better. Diplomacy, when practiced with realism and prudence, remains the best instrument of foreign policy.
III. MEDIA RACK
Summary of the editorial lines and dominant approaches in the international press analyzed during the last twenty-four hours, organized by geographical areas and by analytical affinity.
Anglo-Saxon reference
The New York Times and The Washington Post provide extensive coverage of the Rubio-Leo XIV meeting, highlighting the historical peculiarity of the first American pontiff and describing the tension as one of the most striking diplomatic anomalies since the Cold War; the Post notes the “emergence of the pope as a global critic of the war against Iran.” The Wall Street Journal and Financial Times focus on the economic implications of the Rubio-Lula agreement and the Rheinmetall figures; the FT adds detailed information on delays in US deliveries to the UK, Poland, and Lithuania. Reuters publishes its Breakingviews report stating that “arms manufacturers see German spending as real” and maintains central coverage of the exchanges of fire in the Strait of Hormuz. The Economist has the world exclusive on the GRU’s tripartite plan to supply fiber-optic drones to Iran and maintains its cautious analysis of the collapse of the V-Day ceasefires. The Times and The Telegraph emphasize British solidarity with the allied operation in the Gulf. The Guardian focuses on civilian casualties and the legal questions surrounding the blockade. The BBC maintains comprehensive and balanced coverage of all seven main fronts.
US networks and digital media
CNN , CBS , and CNBC —the latter with an economic focus—provide extensive coverage of the Trump-Lula meeting, the Rheinmetall balance sheet, and the renewed exchanges of fire in the Strait of Hormuz. Fox News presents the US attacks on Qeshm as proof of Trump’s effective pressure and underscores the president’s warning of “much pain” if the agreement is not signed. Politico and Axios leak details of the fourteen-point memorandum and report on the administration’s internal dilemmas. The Hill and USA Today focus on the electoral impact of the Trump-Leo XIV confrontation and the Republican division over the German withdrawal. Newsweek , Time , and The Daily Beast highlight the tension with the Holy See as one of the political costs of the president’s style. Bloomberg focuses on the Russian energy windfall and the implications of Rheinmetall for European markets. The National Interest and The Washington Times favor a realistic and pragmatic reading.
Continental European press
Le Monde , Le Figaro , La Croix , Le Point , Le Nouvel Observateur , and L’Express all highlighted the Rubio-Leo XIV meeting; La Croix , from its Catholic perspective, offered the most detailed and thoughtful coverage. Libération , from its progressive perspective, questioned the legitimacy of Operation Epic Fury . LCI , BFM TV , and France Info provided extensive coverage of the Russian withdrawal from the Red Square parade and the confirmation of German rearmament. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung , Die Welt , and Die Zeit offered a subdued assessment of the Rheinmetall figures and reflected the German institutional unease over the troop withdrawal. Corriere della Sera reported on Prime Minister Meloni’s defense of the Pope and the resulting Trump-Meloni tension. L’Osservatore Romano published the Vatican’s official coverage of the Rubio-Leo XIV meeting. La Tribune de Genève emphasized Switzerland’s potential mediating role. Helsingin Sanomat emphasizes the consequences for NATO’s northern flank. Gazeta Wyborcza expresses Polish concern over delays in Patriot deliveries and the transfer of fiber-optic drones from the GRU to Tehran.
Arab world and Israel
Asharq Al-Awsat , Arab News , Al-Riyadh , and Saudi Gazette maintain a cautious stance toward the negotiations, with growing expectations of an eventual agreement. Gulf News (UAE) , Khaleej Times , Al-Ittihad , and Gulf Today strongly condemn the Iranian attacks against the United Arab Emirates. Peninsula Qatar and Gulf News Qatar emphasize Qatar’s mediating role. The Times of Oman acknowledges Muscat’s previous role. Yedioth Ahronoth , Israel Hayom , and the Jerusalem Post express unease about the prospect of an agreement that could leave part of Iran’s nuclear program untouched. Maariv and Haaretz offer nuanced perspectives from opposing viewpoints. Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya maintain their respective positions. Al-Hayat , Al-Quds Al-Arabi , Al-Hayat Al-Jadida , Al-Ayyam , and Felestin address the Palestinian issue. An-Nahar , L’Orient-Le Jour , and the Daily Star express concern about the deteriorating ceasefire in southern Lebanon. The Jordan Times and Al-Rai highlight the Jordanian position. Hürriyet emphasizes Turkey’s discontent with Ankara’s exclusion from the mediation efforts.
Russian, Ukrainian and Polish press
Russia Today , TASS , and Vesti systematically silenced the Economist ‘s exclusive report on the GRU plan and presented the scaled-back parade as a magnanimous gesture. Ukrainian Pravda , UKRINFORM , Fakty i Kommentarii , Kyiv Post , and The Kyiv Independent amplified the revelation of the Russian technology transfer plan to Tehran as proof of the Sino-Russian-Iranian axis and debunked Moscow’s ceasefire narrative.
Asia and the Indian subcontinent
The South China Morning Post and China Daily focus on the Trump-Xi summit of May 14-15 and Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi’s visit to Beijing. WION , the Times of India , the Hindustan Times , and the Indian Express cover the first anniversary of Operation Sindoor . Daily Jang and the Pakistan Times highlight Field Marshal Asim Munir and Pakistan’s mediating role. The Yomiuri Shimbun , the Tokyo Times , and The Straits Times examine the implications for the Indo-Pacific region.
Latin America and think tanks
Clarín (Buenos Aires) , El Mercurio (Chile) , and Reforma (Mexico) provided extensive coverage of the Trump-Lula meeting, focusing on its regional impact. Reforma also addressed the bilateral tensions arising from the US extradition request for ten Mexican politicians linked to the Sinaloa Cartel. The Mail and the Globe covered the Canadian reaction to the troop withdrawal from Europe. Publications from Foreign Affairs , the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) bulletins , and analyses from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) , the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) , the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI) , and the Economist Intelligence Unit all converged on a cautious assessment of the sustainability of the negotiation process with Iran and warned of the depletion of Western military stockpiles as a structural factor.
IV. RISK TRAFFIC LIGHT
Geopolitical and geoeconomic risk calibration for the next seventy-two hours, according to the usual color convention: red (high risk, probability of materialization), amber (active risk, reinforced surveillance), green (controlled risk, routine monitoring).
● RED — Strait of Hormuz and fragile ceasefire — The blockade remains in full force, and the kinetic exchanges around Qeshm, Bandar Abbas, and Bandar Kargan place the ceasefire at its most fragile. The presidential warning of “much pain” if the memorandum is not signed, along with the prediction of a “great blaze emanating from Iran,” is not mere rhetoric.
● RED — Ukrainian front on May 9 — Cross-truces have crumbled, and Russia’s explicit threat of a massive missile strike on Kyiv in the event of any disruption to the parade puts the risk of a major incident at its highest level. The revealed transfer of the GRU to Iran adds a further strategic dimension.
● RED — Sino-Russian-Iranian axis and proliferation of offensive weapons — The revelation of the GRU’s tripartite plan to supply fiber optic drones to Iran confirms a technology transfer of extraordinary strategic gravity with potential direct impact on US forces in the Gulf and Iraq.
● AMBER — Southern Lebanon and the architecture of the Iranian proxy — The escalation of Israeli bombing and Hezbollah’s refusal to disarm keep the risk of a breakdown in the April 16 ceasefire alive. Its sustainability depends on the Iranian nuclear program.
● AMBER — Transatlantic tension and European defense architecture — The withdrawal of 5,000 US troops from Germany, threats to Spain, Italy and other allies, and delays in the delivery of precision munitions create a scenario of accelerated erosion of the Allied conventional deterrence, partially offset by German industrial acceleration.
● AMBER — Trump-Xi Summit, May 14-15 — Low expectations, high risk. Any misstep regarding Taiwan — particularly on the “principle” versus “policy” of One China — could destabilize the balance in the Indo-Pacific for months.
● AMBER — White House-Holy See Relations — The unprecedented rift between the first US president and the first US pontiff affects both the internal cohesion of the Catholic electorate and the administration’s ability to articulate a foreign policy with global moral backing.
● GREEN — Brazil and the Trump-Lula dialogue — The cordial meeting and the reassuring figures defuse, at least in the short term, the risk of a new tariff escalation against Brazil. Full normalization will require, however, adjustments in Brazil’s alignment with the BRICS+ bloc and the authoritarian regimes of the hemisphere.
● GREEN — European defense industry — Record figures from Rheinmetall and the consolidation of German rearmament show that the industrial transition is finally underway. The risk is shifting from the short to the medium term, pending the NATO summit in June.
V. EDITORIAL COMMENTARY
There are days when international politics resembles that classic figure from the Russian novel who makes grave decisions between two glasses of cognac, barely noticing that lives, fortunes, and, above all, the credibility of nations hang on each one. The day we are analyzing today undoubtedly belongs to that category. That the president of the world’s leading power declares that a ceasefire remains in effect while simultaneously bombarding enemy ports; that an agreement capable of rewriting the balance of power in the Middle East hangs on a fourteen-point document drafted in Islamabad; that the Kremlin, for the first time in almost two decades, forgoes displaying its military pride over Red Square for fear of drones manufactured with off-the-shelf parts while simultaneously supplying fiber-optic drones to the Iranian oligarchic-jihadist regime to kill American troops; that the Secretary of State meets with the Pope to “cool down” the presidential rhetoric; that a German industrialist confirms with figures what European politics had been struggling to believe; And that, amidst all this, two populists of opposing ideological leanings share three hours of cordial conversation in the White House, paints an unflinching portrait of the era in which we live.
I have been describing, in these pages and in my columns for La Razón and El Debate , the nature of wars with variable intensity and the contained systemic fracture as defining features of our time. Donald Trump’s foreign policy—pragmatic, realistic, capable of diplomatic successes such as those in Cambodia-Thailand, Gaza, or Armenia-Azerbaijan when it operates with the prudence that a Marco Rubio brings—combines undeniable successes with erratic outbursts that test the cohesion of the allied camp. It would be unfair not to acknowledge the former: the pressure on the Iranian regime has produced, thanks to Operation Epic Fury, a structural weakening that no diplomat had achieved in forty years; the dismantling of the nuclear program, if the fourteen-point memorandum is finally signed, will constitute a historic success. The meeting with Lula, too, demonstrates that bilateral diplomacy can work wonders when practiced realistically. But it would be equally unfair to ignore the latter: the complete lack of planning for the day after in Tehran, the impromptu announcement of the withdrawal of 5,000 troops from Germany, the threats about Spain’s suspension from NATO, the personal attacks against Pope Leo XIV, and the 50% tariffs imposed on Brazil just a year ago constitute strategic costs that erode, day by day, the credibility of the American leadership.
The Economist ‘s revelation of the Russian GRU’s plan warrants further reflection, given its significance. Fiber-optic drones are a disruptive technological innovation due to their immunity to electronic countermeasures; transferring them to a state-sponsored terrorist regime is an act of extraordinary strategic gravity. Some commentators, even within the Trump camp, argue that Russia could play a mediating role between Washington and Tehran; the GRU’s tripartite plan dismantles that illusion. Moscow is not a mediator: it is a supplier of offensive weaponry designed to kill American troops. And the energy windfall resulting from the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz—an additional forty billion dollars annually for the Russian Treasury, according to the most recent estimates—paradoxically fuels the war machine that is killing Ukrainians. Defending the Ukrainian cause and rejecting Russian territorial aggression today also requires unequivocally denouncing this military collaboration between Moscow and Tehran.
Let me pause for a moment to consider Spain, my country. The current government’s stance—the closure of its airspace, the prohibition of operational use of Rota and Morón air bases, and a public discourse that places Madrid in a more hostile position toward Washington than toward Tehran—represents a neutrality bordering on irresponsibility. The constitutional invocation of Article 63 and the 1953 bilateral agreements is undoubtedly legally defensible; what is intellectually untenable is the disconnect between rhetoric and the operational reality of the bases, which remain active for our allies. The Rheinmetall figures serve as further warning: while Germany confirms with verifiable data that it is preparing to defend itself, Spain continues to lack a coherent defense industrial plan, a clear strategy for procuring precision munitions, and a shared vision of the country’s role within the allied architecture. The demand of the author of these lines is neither maximalist nor bellicose: it is, simply, a demand for coherence. To claim membership in NATO, to benefit from the Atlantic security umbrella since 1982, and at the same time to act as the moral censor of its main ally when it wages war against a terrorist state—Iran—that has financed the most bloodthirsty terrorist organizations on the planet for forty years—Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis in Yemen, the Iraqi Shiite militias—is a contradiction that history will not forgive. As Atlanticists at heart and staunch Europeans, we demand coherence from Madrid, not maximalism; loyalty, not servility; but above all, clarity.
I conclude with a reflection on the meeting between Marco Rubio and Pope Leo XIV, which deserves a calm assessment. The Church, through its American pontiff, is fulfilling its moral duty: to denounce the suffering of the innocent, to call for peace, and to recall the primacy of human dignity over the calculations of power. The White House, through its practicing Catholic Secretary of State, is attempting to preserve the institutional channel that no realism can allow to be closed. The clash between Donald Trump and Leo XIV is not—let no one be mistaken—a conflict between two politicians: it is a deeper, almost civilizational, tension between the logic of power and the logic of conscience. Catholics by family and by conviction, Atlanticists by strategic analysis, defenders of institutional diplomacy without fanfare, we pray that prudence will prevail. And to conclude, once again, the essential point: we are against dictatorships of any kind, with particular vehemence against the Iranian oligarchic-jihadist regime, against the cosmically corrupt Chavista narco-state of the sinister Rodríguez brothers, against Cuba, against Nicaragua, and against Chinese expansionism. We unequivocally defend representative liberal democracy, the market economy, fundamental rights and freedoms, the values of the Spanish Transition, and the figure of King Juan Carlos I as the architect of our democracy. We tirelessly combat jihadist terrorism in every corner of the planet. Tomorrow there will be new boards, new pieces, new risks. The only constant is the duty to analyze. Good night.