Gustavo de Arístegui,
June 3, 2026
I. BRIEF INTRODUCTION
The events of June 2nd and 3rd, 2026, marked a dangerous convergence of fronts: Tehran’s jihadist oligarchy severed communications with its Pakistani mediators while launching missiles at Kuwait and Bahrain—intercepted, but of enormous symbolic and intimidating value—provoking a targeted US military response against Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) installations on Qeshm Island. On the Ukrainian front, Moscow unleashed its largest drone and missile attack in months—73 missiles and 656 drones in a single night—killing at least 22 civilians and striking Kyiv, Dnipro, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhzhia, in a deliberate escalation that Putin exploited to bolster his negotiating position. In the eastern Mediterranean, the paper truce that Trump hastily announced in Lebanon is unraveling in the face of the Israeli ground advance south of the Litani River and Hezbollah rocket fire against Israeli tanks in Hadatha, highlighting the fragility of a presidential phone-based diplomacy lacking any real guarantees. In Europe, the European Union is finalizing its most significant migration reform since the 2024 Asylum Pact, legalizing “return hubs” outside EU territory and accelerating the deportation of rejected asylum seekers. This confluence of crises—none resolved, all interconnected—defines this morning’s geopolitical moment with a clarity that defies euphemism.
II. MOST IMPORTANT NEWS OF THE LAST 24 HOURS
1. Iran cuts off communications with mediators and launches missiles; US responds with attacks on Qeshm
FACTS:
The Iranian news agency Fars, citing sources close to the regime, reported on Tuesday, June 2, that Tehran had gone “several days” without exchanging messages with Washington through Pakistani mediators. President Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio publicly rejected this version of events, stating that talks were ongoing, with contacts taking place that same Tuesday. Rubio appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and clearly outlined the American position: Iran must reopen the Strait of Hormuz—announcing this “clearly”—commit to not firing on ships, and agree to deactivate the mines it had planted, as a non-negotiable precondition for any lifting of sanctions or naval blockade. Meanwhile, the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) reported that Iran had fired missiles toward Kuwait and Bahrain; the projectiles aimed at Kuwait disintegrated in flight, while U.S. and Bahraini forces shot down those targeting Bahrain. In response, CENTCOM carried out precision strikes against an IRGC ground control station on Qeshm Island, near the Strait of Hormuz, where a desalination plant is also located.
IMPLICATIONS:
Tehran’s behavior follows a logic this analyst has been describing since the early days of Operation Epic Fury: the jihadist oligarchy, deprived of the arbiter Khamenei embodied and trapped in what we have called the decapitation paradox—the IRGC triumvirate (IRGC chief General Vahidi, National Security Council Secretary General Zolghadr, and General Rezaei, advisor to the leader of the Islamic Revolution)—these and other regime leaders individually lack the ideological authority, hierarchical rank, and dominant personality necessary to impose the internal discipline required to accept concessions in negotiations—alternates between gestures of détente and provocations calibrated to gauge the American response and buy time. The missiles against Kuwait and Bahrain were not intended to cause casualties, but rather to send a signal that Iran retains projection capabilities and that the Gulf front remains active. It is estimated that it still has around 1,000 missiles. The American response in Qeshm—surgical and limited—confirms Hegseth and Caine’s threshold policy: not to escalate to a full-blown conflict, but not to ignore the provocation. The nuclear clock continues to tick during the diplomatic impasse.
PERSPECTIVES AND SCENARIOS:
Scenario A (probability: 55%): Talks resume in the coming days through the only effective channel, Qatar, with the Strait of Hormuz as the initial pivot and the nuclear program deferred to a second phase, following the plan Rubio outlined before the Senate. The IRGC would accept a minimal modus vivendi that allows it to present the ceasefire internally as a “victorious resistance.”
Scenario B (probability: 40%): Iran continues with escalating provocations—more missiles, minor naval incidents, activation of proxies in Iraq—aimed at forcing concessions prior to the opening of the Strait of Hormuz. Trump, pressured by Congress and energy markets, might accept “work in progress” compromises that the jihadist oligarchy would exploit for propaganda purposes.
Scenario C (probability: 5%): Total breakdown and resumption of large-scale military operations, accompanied by a complete closure of Hormuz, with a catastrophic impact on oil prices and the global economy.
2. Russia launches its biggest drone and missile attack in months against Ukraine; at least 22 dead
FACTS:
In the early hours of Tuesday, June 2, Russia launched 73 missiles and 656 drones (mostly Iranian-made Shahed drones) against Ukraine, in one of the largest airstrikes since the start of the invasion in February 2022. Ukrainian air defenses—commanded by General Oleksandr Syrsky—shot down 40 missiles and 602 drones, according to the Ukrainian Air Force. The main targets were Kyiv, Dnipro, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, and Poltava. At least 22 civilians were killed—six in Kyiv and 11 in Dnipro, including a child—and more than 100 were wounded. Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko described the attack as “massive.” In Dnipro, a residential building was completely destroyed. President Volodymyr Zelensky urgently appealed to his Western allies to unblock the supply of missiles for the Patriot systems, noting that the shortage of air defense — partly attributable to the diversion of American stockpiles to the Iranian front — leaves civilians exposed to the hypersonic Oreshnik ballistic missiles that Russia is using with increasing frequency.
IMPLICATIONS:
The scale of the attack is not operationally accidental: Putin needs “positive news” from the front at a time when Ukrainian drones are crippling Russian supply lines in the occupied territories and attacking refineries in the Krasnodar region. The aerial escalation serves three simultaneous purposes: to wear down the Ukrainian civilian population, to pressure Western allies into accepting negotiations on terms advantageous to Moscow, and to demonstrate domestically that Russia maintains the strategic initiative. Zelensky’s complaint about the Patriot missile shortage points to a real tension: the war in Iran has consumed American reserves that, under normal circumstances, would have flowed to Ukraine. Washington faces a dilemma of prioritizing arsenals, a dilemma its adversaries are cleverly exploiting.
PERSPECTIVES AND SCENARIOS:
The continuation of Russia’s massive air campaign is virtually inevitable in the coming weeks, especially as the diplomatic front with Tehran consumes Washington’s attention. The possibility that Europe—through NATO’s PURL mechanism—will accelerate the delivery of anti-ballistic missile munitions represents the only variable that could alter the balance of Ukrainian air defense in the short term. Foreign Minister Syriy Sybiha demanded new sanctions against Moscow and progress in EU accession negotiations, two instruments that operate on timescales far too long for the operational urgency of the battlefield.
3. The “ceasefire” in Lebanon is collapsing: Israel is advancing in the south and Hezbollah continues its attacks
FACTS:
President Trump announced on Monday, June 1, via a direct phone call with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and indirect contacts with Hezbollah through intermediaries, that both sides had agreed to a partial ceasefire in Lebanon, with the withdrawal of Israeli troops advancing toward Beirut. Netanyahu confirmed that the units heading to the Lebanese capital had halted their advance. However, Netanyahu himself specified that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) would “continue operating as planned in southern Lebanon.” Throughout Tuesday, Israel carried out airstrikes against at least four towns around Nabatieh, wounding two Lebanese Army soldiers, while an Israeli drone flew low over Beirut. Hezbollah, a terrorist organization aligned with the Tehran regime, claimed responsibility for a rocket attack against an Israeli tank in Hadatha, southern Lebanon, stating that it was fighting “the advance of Israeli forces.” The IDF reported intercepting two projectiles launched from Lebanon without suffering any casualties.
IMPLICATIONS:
What Trump sold as a ceasefire is, in reality, a unilateral tactical pause to prevent the Israeli offensive on Beirut from definitively derailing negotiations with Iran—the nuclear objective of American diplomacy. Netanyahu has not abandoned his efforts to consolidate a permanent exclusion zone north of the Litani River with a continued IDF presence, which effectively amounts to a new line of territorial control. Hezbollah, a terrorist organization financed and directed by Tehran’s jihadist oligarchy, takes advantage of every pause to rearm and regroup. Iran, which demands that any agreement with Washington include a cessation of operations in Lebanon, uses the Lebanese front as a bargaining chip in negotiations over the Strait of Hormuz: the two conflicts have merged into one, to Tehran’s tactical advantage.
PERSPECTIVES AND SCENARIOS:
The current dynamic points toward a “temperature-shifting war”—a low-resolution but highly destructive conflict that neither side can win or afford to lose—in southern Lebanon, with intermittent lulls managed by American pressure and violent eruptions led by Hezbollah. The prospect of a permanent Israeli security zone north of the Litani River, with or without a formal UNIFIL mandate, is the most likely scenario within the next six months. The risk of escalation toward Beirut remains as long as Hezbollah’s command centers south of the capital remain active.
4. The EU approves the toughest migration reform in its history: accelerated deportations and centers outside the bloc
FACTS:
The European Union has formally adopted a comprehensive reform of its migration policy that introduces mechanisms unprecedented in the bloc’s history: “return hubs” in third countries outside the EU—following the model of the Italian-Albanian agreement—extension of detention periods for irregular migrants, expedited deportation procedures, and, controversially, authorization for law enforcement to conduct warrantless home searches in certain circumstances. Only 28% of rejected asylum seekers currently return to their countries of origin; the reform aims to reverse this statistic. Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Greece are already negotiating with African countries to establish the first return hubs. The Commission’s Executive Vice-President, Nicolas Ioannides, justified the measure by stating that the current situation “seriously erodes public confidence in our common migration policies.” Human rights organizations such as Amnesty International have denounced the reform, comparing it to the Trump administration’s deportation policies, and have warned of the risk of “accountability gaps” in third countries.
IMPLICATIONS:
It has taken Europe a decade to reach this point, after the 2015 migration crisis exposed the structural limitations of the Dublin system and the electoral rise of right-wing parties in the Netherlands, Austria, Germany, and France forced traditional parties to adopt positions they had previously relegated to the periphery of the debate. The reform comes as irregular arrivals to Europe have declined substantially in 2025 and 2026, suggesting that the decision responds more to internal political pressure than to an immediate migration emergency. The irony—not without significance—of the EU adopting mechanisms that European leaders themselves criticized in Trump when he implemented them in the United States reveals the gap between European values and electoral pragmatism.
PERSPECTIVES AND SCENARIOS:
The effective implementation of return centers will depend on the EU’s ability to negotiate bilateral agreements with countries that do not always have incentives to accept the return of their nationals. A legal challenge before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is virtually inevitable, given the conflict between some elements of the reform and the existing Return Directive. On the political front, the reform will likely curb the rise of ultranationalist parties in several member states in the short term, although the long-term effect will depend on whether governments demonstrate operational capacity for implementation—something that has historically been the Achilles’ heel of the EU bureaucracy.
5. South Korea holds local elections amid regional tensions with North Korea
FACTS:
South Korea is holding its ninth simultaneous local elections in its democratic history this Wednesday, June 3, in which voters will elect 17 governors and metropolitan mayors, 226 municipal mayors, and thousands of provincial councilors. The election, dubbed a “mini general election” by the local press given the institutional scale of what is at stake, is taking place against a backdrop of persistent geopolitical tension: Kim Jong-un is maintaining a steady pace of missile tests—including eight consecutive days of launches in April—while his nuclear forces are constantly modernizing, and he continues to promote his teenage daughter, Kim Ju-ae, as a potential successor before the military establishment. Meanwhile, President Lee Jae-myung—elected in June 2025 following the impeachment of Yoon Suk-yeol—faces his first major electoral test, with the credibility of his Democratic Party at stake. The results of these elections will shape the candidates for the 2030 presidential election.
IMPLICATIONS:
South Korea’s internal political stability is a strategic asset of paramount importance within the Indo-Pacific alliance system. A significant defeat for the ruling party could weaken Seoul’s negotiating position with Pyongyang and complicate relations with a Trump administration that views the bilateral alliance primarily through transactional lenses. The regional context—with China conducting simulated blockade military exercises against Taiwan, North Korea increasing its tests, and Japan bolstering its defense budget—makes South Korea’s institutional strength a factor of paramount geopolitical significance.
PERSPECTIVES AND SCENARIOS:
The outcome of the Korean local elections will have a direct impact on Indo-Pacific regional politics, depending on who controls the major metropolitan areas—Seoul, Busan, and Incheon—and the provincial administrations that manage, among other things, civil defense budgets. The analysis of these results, which will be released throughout June 3, will determine whether Lee Jae-myung consolidates his leadership or whether, on the contrary, the conservative opposition begins its recovery in the lead-up to the parliamentary elections.
6. Rubio appears before the Senate: he outlines Washington’s red lines with Iran and defends Operation Epic Fury
FACTS:
Secretary of State Marco Rubio appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Tuesday, June 2, in a session lasting more than two hours, accompanied by reinforced security protocols due to the presence of protesters. Rubio articulated, with a clarity rarely seen in Trumpian diplomacy, the strategic logic behind Operation Epic Fury: Iran had built a “conventional shield” of missiles, drones, and naval capabilities to protect its nuclear program from any external action, a position of “immunity” that Trump chose to deny. Rubio assessed the operation as “highly successful” in reducing Iran’s missile capabilities , although he acknowledged that Tehran “still has many drones” due to their ease of production. The Secretary of State established the three non-negotiable components of the agreement: the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, a formal commitment to naval non-hostility, and mine clearance; nuclear negotiations would be addressed in a second phase. Regarding Cuba, Venezuela, and regime change in Iran, Rubio remained ambiguous in the face of persistent questioning from several senators.
IMPLICATIONS:
Rubio’s testimony before the Senate is the most detailed and structured statement Washington has offered on the objectives and conditions of its policy toward Iran since the beginning of the conflict. His tone—optimistic about the nuclear program, pragmatic about the timeline—suggests that the administration is willing to accept a minimal agreement on the Strait of Hormuz, even if the nuclear component is postponed. This is precisely what Tehran has demanded from the outset, which raises the uncomfortable question—one this analyst poses without a definitive answer—of whether the US has implicitly accepted Iran’s terms, postponing the existential issue of nonproliferation to a moment of less strategic urgency and, therefore, less negotiating pressure.
PERSPECTIVES AND SCENARIOS:
The contained systemic fracture—an analytical category that defines the US-Iran situation: neither full-blown war nor a stabilized peace, with the Strait of Hormuz as an adjustment variable—will continue to frame the bilateral relationship for the coming months. Marco Rubio is Trump’s most valuable asset in this arena: his regional knowledge, his bipartisan credibility in the Senate, and his ability to translate presidential improvisation into articulated doctrine are the only bulwark against the transactional drift that threatens to transform a conflict of historic consequences into a mere public relations exercise.
III. MEDIA RACK
ANGLO-SAXON MEDIA
The New York Times (NYT): Front page dominated by the massive Russian attack on Kyiv; analysis of waning Western support. Extensive coverage of Rubio’s testimony, with a critical profile of Washington’s ambiguity regarding the Iranian nuclear program.
The Washington Post: Highlights the breakdown in Iranian communications with mediators; editorial favorable to Rubio’s approach but critical of the lack of a plan for “the day after.” Extensive coverage of European migration reform.
The Wall Street Journal (WSJ): Emphasis on the impact of the Hormuz impasse on energy markets; analysis of the risks to Asian supply chains. Report on Iranian Shahed drone exports to Russia.
Financial Times (FT): Economic outlook on the Straits crisis; analysis of the implications of European defense budgets post-Iranian conflict. Asia edition: extensive coverage of the Korean elections and their implications for the Indo-Pacific.
The Times (London): Harsh editorial against Washington’s passivity in the face of the Russian escalation in Ukraine; questions about the diversion of Patriot ammunition to the Iranian front at Kiev’s expense.
The Telegraph: Conservative analysis hailing EU migration reform as “late realism.” Criticism of Hezbollah and the naiveté of those who believed Trump’s Lebanese “ceasefire” was more than just rhetoric.
The Guardian: Extensive coverage of NGO criticism of European migration reform. Opinion piece on the risk that Trump’s “phone diplomacy” in Lebanon could create false expectations with humanitarian consequences.
French-speaking media
Le Monde: Editorial on the Iranian “decapitation paradox” without using the term; analysis of the IRGC triumvirate’s difficulties in agreeing on a negotiated solution. Extensive coverage of migration reform: “Europe fully committed.”
Le Figaro: Favorable tone towards Israeli operations in southern Lebanon; criticism of the French government for its lack of a strong response to the attack on UNIFIL peacekeepers in April. Coverage of the Russian attack on Ukraine with emphasis on the inadequacy of air defenses.
Libération: Harsh criticism of the EU’s migration reform; report on conditions in migrant camps in Dunkirk. Coverage of Rubio’s testimony with skepticism regarding his claims about the success of Epic Fury.
LCI / BFM TV: Continuous coverage of the Russian attack; statements by the French Foreign Minister on the need to accelerate aid in anti-aircraft systems to Ukraine.
GERMAN MEDIA
FAZ (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung): Analysis of the implications of European migration reform for German domestic policy; interview with Minister Dobrindt on Berlin’s refusal to accept more asylum seekers. Coverage of the Ukrainian front with an urgent call for increased ammunition supplies.
Die Welt: Hardline editorial on Iran: criticizes American ambiguity regarding the nuclear program; defends the need to maintain pressure until verifiable guarantees of non-proliferation are obtained.
Die Zeit: A lengthy reflection on the “Zelensky moment”: the Ukrainian leader in the role of an ignored Cassandra while Western attention turns to Hormuz. An analysis of the Kremlin’s authoritarian drift in the context of the air escalation.
ITALIAN MEDIA
Corriere della Sera: Focus on Italy’s role as a “model” for European return centers following the agreement with Albania. Coverage of the Lebanese conflict with a historical perspective on the Italian peacekeepers of UNIFIL.
L’Osservatore Romano: Pastoral reflection on the suffering of civilians in Kyiv and southern Lebanon; call for dialogue and the protection of international humanitarian law. Editorial silence on Iran, consistent with the Vatican’s policy of explicit non-belligerence.
Arab and Israeli Middle East
Al Jazeera: Extensive coverage of the Israeli attack in southern Lebanon, with an emphasis on Lebanese civilian casualties. Analysis of the breakdown in Iranian communications with mediators from a pro-Tehran perspective.
Al Arabiya: Gulf Perspective: restrained but palpable alarm over Iranian missiles against Kuwait and Bahrain; implicit support for the American response in Qeshm. Favorable coverage of European migration reform.
Jerusalem Post / Yedioth Ahronoth: Extensive coverage of operations in southern Lebanon; analysis of the tension between Trump and Netanyahu regarding the advance on Beirut. Internal debate on the limits of the military operation in the context of negotiations with Iran.
Haaretz: Criticism of the Netanyahu government for the advance in Lebanon without a defined exit strategy; opinion piece on the diplomatic cost of the operations in southern Lebanon for the Israeli position in negotiations with Washington.
Asharq Al Awsat: Analysis of the implications of the Iranian-American impasse for the stability of the Gulf; article on European migration reform from the perspective of North African countries of origin.
AGENCIES AND THINK TANKS
Reuters / AP / AFP: Standard factual coverage from all fronts; Reuters highlights the divergence of accounts between Tehran and Washington on the state of negotiations.
RUSI (Royal United Services Institute): Analysis note on the impact of the Iranian conflict on Patriot supplies to Ukraine: estimates that the US has consumed the equivalent of 18 months of PAC-3 interceptor production during Epic Fury.
IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies): Monthly Monitor: Iran retains between 1,200 and 1,500 operational Shahed drones despite losses suffered during Epic Fury, confirming Rubio’s assessment before the Senate.
CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies): Analysis of Lee Jae-myung’s first year in South Korea: an assessment of his defense policy and the implications for the alliance with the U.S. in the context of the local elections.
IV. RISK TRAFFIC LIGHT
The following is an assessment of the main geopolitical risks active as of June 3, 2026:
🔴 CRITICAL RED — Resumption of large-scale US-Iran hostilities / complete closure of the Strait of Hormuz: — Iranian missiles against Kuwait and Bahrain and the breakdown of communications with mediators raise the risk threshold alarmingly. The US response in Qeshm, while surgical, indicates that the ceasefire is not solid. Probability of uncontrolled escalation: moderate-high in the next 72 hours.
🔴 CRITICAL RED ALERT — Russian escalation in Ukraine / exhaustion of Ukrainian air defenses: — The June 2 attack —73 missiles, 656 drones— demonstrates Putin’s willingness to maintain pressure on the civilian population. The shortage of PAC-3 ammunition in Ukraine, a direct consequence of its diversion to the Iranian front, is a major structural vulnerability.
🟠 HIGH ORANGE — Collapse of the fragile Lebanese ceasefire / Israel-Hezbollah escalation toward Beirut: — Trump’s “truce” is a verbal arrangement without operational guarantees. Israel continues to operate in the south; Hezbollah continues firing. The risk of a new offensive on Beirut remains high as long as Iran uses the Lebanese front as leverage.
🟠 HIGH ORANGE — Political instability in South Korea / North Korean nuclear escalation: — The June 3 local elections and continued North Korean missile provocations keep the Korean Peninsula in a high-tension zone with the potential for rapid escalation.
🟡 MODERATE YELLOW — Impact of European migration reform on the bloc’s cohesion: — The adopted reform could generate internal fractures within the EU—especially with southern countries—and litigation before the CJEU. On the political front, it fuels the populist narrative that traditional parties are imitating the far right without its votes.
🟡 MODERATE YELLOW — Energy market risk due to impasse in the Strait of Hormuz: — As long as the strait remains partially blocked or under threat, crude oil prices remain in a zone of structural uncertainty, impacting inflation in Asia and Europe.
🟢 GREEN ALERT — US-Iran talks mediated by Qatar instead of Pakistan: — The confirmation by Trump and Rubio that talks are continuing — despite the Iranian denial — is a moderately positive sign. However, the paradox of the IRGC’s decapitation makes Tehran’s decision-making unpredictable at any moment.
V. EDITORIAL COMMENTARY
THERE ARE DAYS WHEN GEOPOLITICS SHOWS ITS MOST HARSH FACE.
June 2, 2026, is one of those dates. While in Washington Marco Rubio was attempting to instill doctrinal rigor into a foreign policy that his own president continues to conduct with the impulsiveness of someone who tweets before thinking, the jihadist oligarchy in Tehran was demonstrating once again that its only coherent response to pressure is calibrated provocation: missiles against Kuwait and Bahrain, a breakdown in communications with mediators, and pronouncements from an admiral about the inevitability of war. This is the IRGC’s pattern, inherited from decades of exporting terror and perfected in the crucible of four decades of sanctions: to move between tactical openness and strategic threat, never to concede the essentials, never to relinquish control of the timing.
The paradox of decapitation—which I have been describing since the first weeks of Operation Epic Fury, and whose canonical definition is worth recalling: it’s not that the moderates were eliminated because there weren’t any; it’s that the surviving triumvirate of the IRGC, composed of radicals who share rank without any arbiter between them, individually lacks the ideological authority to impose concessions on their peers—explains with surgical precision Tehran’s erratic behavior in recent hours. None of the three—not Vahidi, not Zolghadr, not Rezaei—can sign a partial surrender without becoming the scapegoat of a revolution devoured by its own guardians. This governing paralysis is simultaneously the greatest obstacle to peace and the best guarantee that the regime will eventually implode due to its own internal contradictions. The question is how many civilians—Iranians, Israelis, Lebanese, Kuwaitis—will have paid the price before that collapse occurs.
Meanwhile, in Kyiv, residents were removing shattered glass from their destroyed apartments, and firefighters were extinguishing blazes at a car dealership reduced to rubble by Iranian-made Shahed drones—the same Shahed drones that Tehran’s jihadist oligarchy exports to Moscow so Putin can kill Ukrainians while his troops lose ground on the eastern front. The cycle could not be more perverse or more revealing of the parasitic and bloodthirsty nature of the Iranian regime: incapable of winning its own wars, it finances everything with the terror of others. Zelensky, who has been warning about this connection for years without Europe taking him seriously enough, is right when he calls for the release of Patriot missile supplies: every PAC-3 interceptor destroyed in the Persian Gulf is a ballistic missile that has had free rein over a Ukrainian city.
In Lebanon, Trump’s “ceasefire”—delivered at the price of a presidential tweet—has lasted exactly as long as it takes Netanyahu to remind everyone that his military objectives south of the Litani River are not subject to any agreement or any American reprimand. Hezbollah, a terrorist organization down to the last member—not a militia, not an armed group, but simply terrorists—continues firing because that is its only way of existing. Without the terror it projects onto Israel and Lebanon itself, it is nothing: not a legitimate political party, not a regular army, not a diplomatic interlocutor. It is the armed wing of a decaying theocracy that finances its survival with the suffering of two peoples.
The European Union’s migration reform deserves a separate assessment, although it is connected to this broader context. The fact that Europe has taken a decade to accept that functional return policies require extraterritorial mechanisms—something this analyst has defended for years, despite the discomfort of holding unpopular positions in certain circles—is yet another sign of the inherent inability of 21st-century European politicians to make difficult decisions before electoral pressure makes them unavoidable. This is not about xenophobia or Islamophobia—both pathologies are reprehensible and foreign to this editorial line—; it is about the fact that liberal democracies need credible asylum systems and effective return policies to maintain the public legitimacy of welcoming migrants. Without effective returns, there is no sustainable asylum. The European Union has understood this late, but it has understood it.
I conclude with a reflection on Marco Rubio, who is currently the most important figure in American foreign policy—more so than Trump himself, whose intervention in Lebanon was yet another example of impulsive diplomacy with no real operational consequences on the ground. Rubio knows what he’s doing, he knows the region, he understands the logic of non-proliferation, and he understands that a minimal agreement on the Strait of Hormuz without verifiable guarantees regarding the nuclear program is a strategic failure dressed up with the rhetoric of victory. The problem is that he works for a president whose term ends with the next news cycle. Let’s hope that Rubio’s good sense and the American institutional framework prevail over the impulses of the White House occupant. It wouldn’t be the first time that the system has proven more solid and resilient than those who seek to control or subjugate it.