Gustavo de Arístegui,
July 1, 2026
I. INTRODUCTION
Three assassinations and a narrow strait explain the day’s events, and it’s best to state it bluntly, because therein lies the key to what I’ve been describing. In Tehran, the regime announces the funeral of its assassinated leader for July 4—four months after his death—while real power is concentrated in the hands of its most ruthless general. In Doha, American envoys arrive for negotiations that Qatar doesn’t confirm and that Iran denies at the same time. In the Strait of Hormuz, paradoxically, oil prices plummet instead of soaring. And in Caracas, the tragedy of the earthquakes forces the remnants of Castro-Chavismo—the regime of the infamous and sinister Rodríguez brothers (a regime that remains as dictatorial, execrable, and illegitimate as it was before the US intervention)—to confront its ineptitude, incompetence, willful failure to provide aid, arrogant dictatorial tactics, and an undisguisable folly. Added to all this is a Ukraine that is turning the tide of war and bringing it to Russia’s rear.
The thread that connects these issues is a single one, and I name it because it dictates the report: the lack of leadership —the absence, where it is most needed, of an authority capable of making decisions and, above all, of guaranteeing those decisions. This lack exists in Tehran and, for opposite reasons, in a Europe with a weak and mediocre political class. What follows is based on facts verified in recent hours and corroborated by multiple sources; projections are reserved for the scenarios section, and attributions are left to their authors.
II. THE MOST IMPORTANT NEWS OF THE LAST 24 HOURS
1. Doha: The denial that portrays the lack of leadership in Iran
Facts.
The United States and Iran are holding technical talks today, July 1, in Doha, but separately —each delegation with mediators from Qatar and Pakistan—and without a direct high-level meeting between the two sides. Qatari government spokesman Majed al-Ansari confirmed this unequivocally: there are no high-level meetings between Iranians and Americans “under the adopted negotiation mechanism,” although technical contacts—both direct and indirect—continue following the meetings in Switzerland. The day before, envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner met in Doha with the Qatari prime minister. The Iranian delegation is focusing its interest on the unfreezing of funds—Qatar holds approximately $12 billion of Iranian dollars, of which $6 billion would be released in the first phase of the memorandum signed on June 17 at the behest of the United States. The sequence of events contradicts President Trump, who on Monday had prematurely proclaimed that Iran had “requested” a meeting. This is compounded by the warning from the Speaker of Parliament, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who told state television that direct talks will not lead to a final agreement until the terms of the memorandum are fully implemented, and warned that Iran is “prepared for war” if “the dialogue is not implemented.”
Implications.
The double standards are not accidental: they are symptomatic of an ongoing power struggle in which the various factions refuse to acknowledge defeat. Currently, the one who appears to have the upper hand is the ruthless General Ahmed Vahidi, commander-in-chief of the Revolutionary Guard. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and its Critical Threats Project document that mediators are forced to deal separately with the diplomatic channel and the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), an unmistakable sign that the two sides are neither coordinating nor reaching internal consensus; the IRGC itself even told the negotiating team that it “does not speak” on its behalf. When Mohamed B. Zolghadr—embedded in the delegation tasked with monitoring orthodoxy—accuses Minister Araqchi of overstepping his bounds by showing flexibility regarding terrorist proxies, what emerges is a leadership vacuum : Washington can sign with a negotiator, but no one in Tehran guarantees that the signatory will actually be in charge. The fact that even Ghalibaf—considered the most pragmatic and simultaneously the most marginalized figure in the establishment—is now brandishing the threat of being “prepared for war” reveals the extent to which the maximalist line dictated by General Vahidi has colonized even the discourse of supposed moderates. It is no small detail that CNN itself counted at least thirty-eight occasions, between March 23 and June 9, when Trump announced that an agreement was “imminent.” Military planning and execution, a ten; geostrategic planning, a zero.
Perspectives and scenarios.
I’ve set the benchmark scenario at 40%: neither a full agreement nor an outright rupture, but rather the continuation of a limbo of conditional truce, punctuated by meetings that are announced and then denied. The negotiation will remain hostage to those who control the power but shirk the responsibility of fulfilling their commitments.
2. Israel digs in southern Lebanon and the US Congress gives up on mediating for its withdrawal
Facts.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited the security zone in southern Lebanon yesterday and reiterated that his forces will not withdraw until the threat posed by the Hezbollah terrorist organization is eliminated. He issued an “unwavering directive” to the troops: if they identify a threat, “act; don’t wait.” The order comes just days after the framework agreement reached on Friday between Israel and Lebanon—brokered by Washington—which stipulates a gradual Israeli withdrawal contingent upon the verified disarmament of Hezbollah. On the ground, however, attacks continue—the Israeli army killed a member of the terrorist organization in Manzala—and the Lebanese Ministry of Health reported on Tuesday that at least 4,278 people have been killed by Israeli airstrikes since March 2. Meanwhile, the US House of Representatives on Tuesday rejected a war powers resolution—the second one sponsored by Representative Rashida Tlaib—aimed at cutting off US logistical and intelligence support to Israeli operations against Hezbollah. Even the Democratic leadership opposed it, reaffirming that Hezbollah is a terrorist organization. Rashida Tlaib ‘s actions are an unspeakable disgrace. She seeks to aid a terrorist organization that has caused tens of thousands of deaths since its founding in 1982 through terrorist attacks, political assassinations, and conflicts in which it intervened on behalf of despicable dictatorships, such as the Syrian civil war, serving as the vanguard forces of the murderous Al-Assad regime.
Implications.
The scene encapsulates the Lebanese crossroads and its dangerous connection to the Iranian issue. We are, as always, unequivocally opposed to Hezbollah—Tehran’s terrorist arm in Lebanon and Syria—and in favor of diminishing its capacity to inflict harm; but two things must be made clear. First: the repulsive and shameful resolution of the pro-Hamas representative and Hezbollah friend Rachida Tlaib, an exponent of the ultra-radical left wing of the Democratic Party—the misnamed Democratic Socialists of America and the self-styled “Squad”—systematically minimized the role of the terrorist organization and deserved the condemnation it received. Second: an open occupation without a political horizon risks repeating the pathology we have been denouncing—militarily outstanding; In the architecture of the day after, a zero—and to perpetuate precisely the lever that Iran and Hezbollah wield to keep the Gulf agreement hijacked, since Tehran conditions the end of the war on the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. The knot is symmetrical: Israel will not leave until Hezbollah disarms; Hezbollah will not disarm; and, as in Tehran, there is no guarantor to answer for anyone. None of this will be possible if the Lebanese Armed Forces are not seriously supported with resources, funds, weapons, training, and political and institutional backing.
Representative TLAIB must be reminded that a terrorist organization is never a victim; it is the perpetrator. It is shameful that a representative elected by the people of the United States, who have suffered hundreds of direct casualties from Hezbollah and thousands more from the combined actions of Hezbollah and its Iranian backers, should be accused of this. This is a shameful stigma that we cannot allow to fade into oblivion.
Perspectives and scenarios.
The only viable solution is the effective deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in the pilot zones, but this depends on two major unknowns: the Lebanese Army’s actual capacity to relieve Israel and Hezbollah’s willingness—currently nonexistent—to surrender its weapons. As long as both persist, the Lebanese front will remain the spark capable of igniting the fragile truce in the region, and above all, it will condemn the Lebanese to remain hostages subjected to the barbarity of Hezbollah and Iran.
3. Hormuz: Crude oil plunges as Tehran litigates toll and the market deludes itself
Facts.
In the last 24 hours, 32 ships transited the Strait of Hormuz—17 entering and 15 leaving—compared to approximately 110 per day before the war, according to MarineTraffic. Since the blockade was lifted two weeks ago, Iran has exported around 50 million barrels of crude oil, according to TankerTrackers, through a passage also subjected to months of GPS spoofing . Oman has presented Washington and its allies with a proposal regarding the future of the Strait, which envisions shipping companies paying “service fees” —carefully distinguished from “tolls “ —although fundamental disagreements persist, and another regional source denies that Muscat is pushing for a toll system. In fact, Omani Foreign Minister Badr al-Busaidi himself has publicly rejected tolls and referred to international law. And yet, Brent crude closed the second quarter at around seventy-four dollars, with a drop of nearly 30% in those three months—the biggest since 2020—dragged down by the normalization of supply and by the fourth consecutive increase in OPEC+ quotas.
Implications.
Herein lies the contradiction that should set off alarm bells: the market is behaving as if the risk has dissipated when it has barely been postponed. ING analysts—Warren Patterson and Ewa Manthey—have warned of a “complacency” (self-satisfaction, overconfidence) that ignores the upside risk if the supply recovery proves slow or if the price surge returns; Citi, for its part, places Brent crude at $75 for the third quarter and $70 for the fourth. The toll dispute is not merely semantic: whether or not Tehran charges for transit, and whether it does so alone or in collusion with Oman, will determine whether the Strait is governed by international law or by covert extortion. Recall that Trump himself threatened on June 20 to impose a US toll “for services rendered as guardian angel” of the region if peace fails: two powers vying for control of a common good.
Perspectives and scenarios.
As long as Vahidi retains control of the intermittent nature of the oil market, a single serious provocation would be enough to reverse the price collapse within hours and restore the risk premium to the markets. The current calm in the oil market does not reflect the absence of danger, but rather the shortsightedness of those who have chosen to ignore it.
4. Venezuela: from “we’re in charge” to retreat, or decapitation without a plan for democratic transition
Facts.
The double earthquake of June 24—the deadliest in a century—raises the death toll to 1,943 confirmed fatalities and more than 10,500 injured, with over 60,000 missing. The U.S. Geological Survey’s PAGER system warns that the true number could be far higher than the confirmed figure, and the International Organization for Migration estimates that more than six million have been affected, two million of them in Caracas alone—among the European victims are already eighteen Spaniards. The tragedy has sparked an unprecedented diplomatic thaw: some thirty countries are sending aid, and Washington, which recognized Delcy Rodríguez as interim president, is directly coordinating the assistance. The contrast is revealing. After Operation Absolute Resolve on January 3—which captured Maduro and his wife and took them to New York—Trump proclaimed that the United States was “in charge” in Venezuela; Now, faced with the catastrophe, it is merely offering aid and, as The Intercept points out, abandoning that rhetoric. Meanwhile, according to Professor David Smilde (Tulane University and WOLA), of the approximately $8 billion in oil sales this year, only $5.5 million has reached Venezuela; the rest sits in opaque accounts under US control.
Implications.
Compassion should not be confused with amnesia. The Castro-Chavista narco-dictatorship was decapitated with Maduro’s capture, but it remains in the hands of the sinister Rodríguez siblings—Delcy at the head of the Executive branch, under threat of indictment in the United States, and Jorge as president of the inoperative National Assembly. Solidarity with the victims must be total and immediate; a truce with the regime, none. We applaud the dismantling of narco-terrorism—on June 9, a joint operation in Bolívar state killed Humberto “El Niño Guerrero,” founder of the Tren de Aragua, a terrorist organization—but we share the warning of the Council on Foreign Relations (Shannon O’Neil) and Chatham House: this is a decapitation, not a democratic transition, and it lacks a plan for the day after. The fact that opposition leader and Nobel Peace Prize laureate María Corina Machado and President-elect Edmundo González remain far from the levers of power is the litmus test. The same pathology as in Iran: militarily, outstanding; In the architecture of the day after, a zero.
Perspectives and scenarios.
The emergency is a test for Washington: aid can act as a lever for an orderly transition or as a pretext for the regime to entrench itself and whitewash its image. If the United States settles for Chavismo without Chávez and Madurismo without Maduro in exchange for oil, it will have traded a prisoner dictator for two managers of the same machine, just as incompetent, inept, thieving, corrupt, cruel, and fanatical as their predecessors.
5. Ukraine reverses the tide of attrition and takes the war to the Russian rear.
Facts.
President Zelensky has ordered a 40-day “influence operation” (a sustained pressure campaign) to force Moscow to end the war, accompanied by one of the largest drone strikes since the start of the invasion—Russia claims to have intercepted nearly 660 drones. The campaign is striking ever farther afield: the Tyumen refinery, over 2,000 kilometers away; the Orenburg gas processing plant, responsible for about 60% of the gas processed by Gazprom; missile component factories in Voronezh; and two military satellite communications centers. Belarus, following a direct warning from Zelensky to Lukashenko, deactivated transponders used to control Russian drones. Despite this, both sides exchanged 160 prisoners, and May was, according to several analysts, the worst month for Russian advances since the end of 2023.
Implications.
Our position is unequivocal: we oppose Russian aggression and the use of force to acquire territory, a principle that applies to Ukraine just as it does to any border. The strategic shift is significant: the war of attrition has been reversed, and it is now Kyiv that is effectively strangling Russian logistics and energy supplies. We are only moderately critical of President Trump regarding his negotiations with Moscow, but we trust that the system and the sound judgment of those around him, with Secretary of State Marco Rubio at the helm, will prevail over instinct.
Perspectives and scenarios.
Next month’s NATO summit will be a test of allied resolve. If European partners back the Ukrainian effort with actions—and not just words—the pressure on Putin could become a negotiating tool; if they falter, they will hand Moscow the time the front lines are no longer allowing.
III. MEDIA RACK
How the leading international press and main analysis centers are covering the day, with attribution to their authors:
- US press (CNN, CBS, CNBC, The New York Times, Axios). They lead with Qatar’s denial about the Doha meeting and with the collapse of oil prices despite the tension; they report on bipartisan skepticism—from Senators Chris Murphy and Tom Cotton—regarding the reliability of Delcy Rodríguez.
- British press and news agencies (Reuters, Financial Times, BBC, The Economist, The Times) highlight the dispute over demining and the Strait toll, and the retreat of the US narrative on Venezuela.
- French press (Le Monde, Le Figaro, AFP, France Info, LCI, BFM). They prioritize Macron’s gesture towards the Sultan of Oman over demining and the curt response received from Tehran.
- Middle Eastern press outlets (Al Jazeera, Times of Israel, Israel Hayom, Asharq Al-Awsat, Arab News, Times of Oman) provide minute-by-minute coverage of the war, Israeli attacks against Hezbollah positions in southern Lebanon, and the announcement of Khamenei’s funeral.
- Russian and Iranian media (TASS, Russia Today, Mehr, Tasnim) reproduce the thesis that transit through Hormuz “requires coordination” with Iran and disseminate maximalist drafts of the memorandum, which reveals—as ISW points out—the hand of the IRGC.
- Ibero-American press (Clarín, El Mercurio, Reforma, El Tiempo, Emol). Dominated by the Venezuelan earthquake and the diplomatic thaw, with increasing attention to the fate of oil revenues.
- Analysis centers (ISW / Critical Threats Project of the AEI, Amwaj.media , Arab Gulf States Institute, Council on Foreign Relations, Chatham House, WOLA, ING, Citi, Costs of War by Brown) provide the day’s analytical muscle: Vahidi’s dominance and his monopoly on access to Mojtaba, the fragility of the new “supreme leader,” the complacency of the oil market, and the absence of a plan for the day after in Caracas.
IV. RISK TRAFFIC LIGHT
● Fragile truce and Doha’s denial (US–Iran). High risk. Double standards threaten to derail the memorandum before substantive negotiations even begin.
● Intermittent and disputed toll collection in the Strait of Hormuz. High risk. A direct consequence of the lack of control over Iran’s terrorist regime; traffic remains at a fraction of pre-war levels.
● Energy market complacency. Medium risk. The Brent crude price collapse ignores the upside risk warned by ING and Citi; a single provocation would be enough to reverse it.
● Venezuela: “Madurismo without Maduro” and whitewashing through humanitarian means. Medium risk. The aid could be a lever for transition or an alibi for the Rodríguez brothers to entrench themselves.
● Lebanese front: Israeli occupation and a Hezbollah that refuses to disarm. Medium and structural risk. It threatens to derail the agreement with Iran, which conditions the end of the war on Israeli withdrawal.
● Reversal of the attrition in Ukraine and pressure on the Russian rear. Favorable vector, conditional on the NATO summit translating allied support into action.
● International solidarity with Venezuelan victims. A positive development in humanitarian terms, but one to be monitored in political terms.
Short-term reference scenario (probability set at 40%): prolongation of the limbo of conditional truce in the Gulf —neither full agreement nor open rupture—, with chaotic intermittency in Hormuz as a direct expression of a regime that has a dominant hawk but lacks a reliable guarantor of its commitments.
V. EDITORIAL COMMENTARY
There is a disturbing symmetry between Tehran and Caracas that should not be overlooked, because it illuminates the underlying vice of our time. In both cases, there has been a spectacular decapitation—the Iranian supreme leader killed on February 28; Maduro dragged from his bed on January 3 and put on a plane to New York—and in both cases, what has followed the coup has not been a new order, but a vacuum. The crucial difference is that in Iran, the regime suffered the decapitation, while in Venezuela, Washington carried it out; but the lesson is the same, and I repeat it because it applies to both: militarily, outstanding; in planning for the day after, a resounding failure.
In Iran, this deficiency has a name and a rank. The rise of General Vahidi doesn’t resolve the paradox of the decapitation ; rather, it takes it to its purest form: the regime finally has a dominant figure, but the one in charge is precisely the most ruthless, bestial, and bloodthirsty of the three, a guardian who monopolizes access to a puppet leader who has disappeared—Mukhtaba Khamenei, whose father the regime hasn’t even been able to bury in four months. A primus inter pares who imposes himself through terror can steer the negotiations and dominate his rivals, but he can neither guarantee nor want to guarantee compliance with what has been agreed upon. Hence the chaotic intermittency of the Strait of Hormuz, which is not a whim, but the signature of a power without a guarantor; and hence my warning to the market, which is the central thesis of this report: the fall in Brent crude is not good news, but a dangerous form of wishful thinking that confuses the postponement of risk with its disappearance.
Regarding Tehran, my position remains unchanged and allows for no comfortable nuances: we are resolutely opposed to Iran’s oligarchic-jihadist regime and its bloody power structure as a terrorist state, an exporter of instability through its proxies—the terrorist organization Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria, the Houthi terrorists in Yemen, Hamas, and the pro-Iranian terrorist militias in Iraq. We were willing to reduce its capacity for harm, but highly critical of the glaring absence of a post-war plan. A war won without a post-war framework is not a victory: it is merely a postponement of the problem, and a memorandum as favorable to Tehran as the one from Islamabad, signed with an entity that cannot guarantee it, risks enshrining precisely that postponement.
Venezuela presents the other side of the same moral coin. Compassion for the earthquake victims must be immediate and unreserved; leniency for their perpetrators, none. International aid must serve as a lever for an orderly transition to María Corina Machado and Edmundo González—and not as a pretext for a disguised entrenchment by the Rodríguez brothers—is the line that must not be crossed. If everything boils down to oil flowing into opaque accounts while the Chavista machine survives its leader, we will have mistaken a publicity stunt for a strategic victory.
And then there’s Europe, which is where it pains me most to write. The same lack of leadership that has emptied Tehran’s chair threatens to empty that of a continent incapable of taking its own defense, security, and destiny seriously. An Atlanticist at heart and a staunch European, as I consider myself, I refuse to accept this abandonment: from talent to irrelevance, and from irrelevance to suspicion, there is only one step, and we are taking it with the lowest defense spending in the Alliance and a diplomacy that confuses neutrality with abstention. I trust—and this is not naiveté, but a trust founded on the checks and balances of the system—that common sense will ultimately prevail. But common sense, to be of any use, must arrive in time.