Gustavo de Arístegui,
July 9, 2026
I. INTRODUCTION
Two epicenters shaped the day, and both—not by chance—overlapped in time and illuminated each other: Ankara, where the Atlantic Alliance was holding the summit meant to demonstrate that the Hague commitment—5% of GDP for defense by 2035—was not just empty rhetoric but a verifiable roadmap; and the Strait of Hormuz, which was once again ablaze while the heads of state and government posed for the family photograph. The coincidence is cruel and, at the same time, extraordinarily revealing: the summit that was supposed to project firmness was overshadowed by the erratic behavior of President Trump—Greenland, the new attacks against Iran announced during the summit, the threat to sever trade with Spain—and by capabilities that, examined dispassionately and without the anesthesia of allied propaganda, are, at best, mediocre. And while in Ankara they were applauding the delivery of yet another tanker plane, in the Strait of Hormuz a missile from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) set fire to a Qatari gas tanker, the vessel of the country that has been the very architect of peace. For weeks now, I have been describing a “leadership vacuum” that runs along both shores: that of Tehran, where General Ahmed Vahidi rules by force but does not mediate, and that of a Europe that continues to fail to take its own defense, its own security, and its own destiny seriously. Today I dedicate this report, in depth and without summarizing, to these two events.
II. MOST IMPORTANT NEWS OF THE LAST 24 HOURS
1. The Ankara summit: mediocre capabilities, presidential swings and the Spanish humiliation
Facts
The NATO summit was held on July 7 and 8 in Ankara, with the thirty-two heads of state and government meeting in the first credibility test of the framework set in The Hague last year: 5% of GDP in 2035, broken down into a minimum of 3.5% for nuclear defense spending (personnel, equipment, operations, maintenance and military R&D) and up to an additional 1.5% for security in a broad sense (cyber defense, critical infrastructure, resilience and military mobility), with an interim review in 2029 and “clear, credible and concrete” annual national plans.
At the Defense Industry Forum —the so-called “big reveal” (which should have been called the “big fairy tale”)—, Secretary General Mark Rutte presented three key decisions on aviation.
First: the delivery of the tenth Airbus A330 MRTT (multi-role refueling and transport aircraft) to the multinational fleet, which currently has nine aircraft in service and a stated target of twelve, with Finland joining as the ninth participating country. To put this lamentable self-promotion into perspective, only Israel (not the 30 European NATO states) has eight. NATO 30 (excluding the USA and Canada) has 10 – Israel has 8.
Second: the launch of a high-visibility multinational project around the Airbus A400M —Belgium, Croatia, France, Poland, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom— under the logic of “pooling and sharing”.
Third, the acquisition of up to ten Saab GlobalEye airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft, valued at approximately $4.5 billion—between $400 and $450 million per unit—to replace the fourteen venerable E-3A Sentry (AWACS) aircraft that will be retired around 2035; the Swedish system was chosen over the Boeing E-7. This was in addition to the purchase of up to five MQ-4C Triton drones for maritime surveillance and intelligence (ISR), and contracts worth around $50 billion.
A lot of noise for very little substance.
On a broader scale, Rutte celebrated what he called “the Trump trillion”: an additional $1.2 trillion in cumulative spending between 2016 and 2026 by European allies and Canada. Regarding Ukraine, the allies pledged €70 billion in military aid by 2026 and a level “at least equivalent” by 2027. But the summit was marred by the outbursts of the US president: the Greenland controversy, the announcement during the summit of new attacks against Iran after declaring the ceasefire “over,” and, above all, the verbal attack against Spain, which Trump called a “lost cause” and a “terrible NATO ally” because “they neither participate nor pay,” even threatening to “completely cut off” bilateral trade. Spain is coming in with 2.1% of spending —the only ally that expressly rejects the 5%—, and Rutte, in an exercise of defensive diplomacy, came out to protect Madrid by recalling that “it has taken a great step” by exceeding the 2% threshold.
Implications
Let’s examine the three “great revelations” without the fanfare of a triumphant announcement, because presenting them as a resounding success is an act of optimism unworthy of a serious political leader. The tenth MRTT is, quite simply, one more tanker aircraft in a fleet that doesn’t even reach its own modest target of twelve: we’re talking about plugging a hole, not jumping to a new league. The A400M is an extraordinary machine—the best in its class—but creating a shared fleet from aircraft already in service doesn’t even come close to resolving the structural deficit in European power projection; to claim that the solution lies there is, at the very least, an illusion. And the GlobalEye, mounted on a Bombardier Global 6500 business jet fuselage with Saab’s Erieye radar, is a modern and sensible system—certainly preferable to pretending the E-3 could keep flying forever—but an executive jet AEW&C system at $400 million per unit, above the Boeing E-7, isn’t in the champion league of platforms available today. Okay, it’s not bad; but let’s not confuse reasonable with outstanding.
Beneath the overall, triumphant figure lies a three-speed Alliance. The eastern flank is advancing steadily—Poland is above 4.2% and will reach 5.5% in two years, the Baltic states leading the way—; the northwest and north are accelerating; and the south, with Spain as an extreme case, uses creative accounting of capabilities as an alibi for not paying the bill.
A point of intellectual honesty is in order here: the criticism of Rutte for his excessive deference to Trump—which he deserves—must be weighed against an uncomfortable fact. When the United States contributes nearly $900 billion in defense spending compared to around $550 billion from all the other allies combined, and when its percentage of GDP—around 3.2%—weighs more in absolute terms than that of all the other allies combined, it is simply very difficult to serve as NATO Secretary General against the will of the president of the nation that pays the bills. Acknowledging this is not justifying subservience; it is understanding the arithmetic of power. Meanwhile, Poland, the Baltic states, the Nordic countries, and Greece are already considering spending levels of 5%, and even 5.5%, before the 2029 review: the gap, therefore, is not only between the United States and Europe, but also between those Europeans who take deterrence seriously and those who do not.
Regarding Spain, allow me to speak as a career diplomat as well as an analyst. Trump’s threat to sever bilateral trade is, literally, very difficult to carry out: our trade is protected by agreements signed by the European Commission, which holds exclusive competence over the common trade policy, so a US president cannot punish Spain without Brussels’ involvement. However—and herein lies the real danger—non-tariff barriers can be extraordinarily effective, and we must not forget the reduction in intelligence and police cooperation that has already been hinted at as a warning. Spain is thus moving, as I have been arguing, “from irrelevance to suspicion” : a self-inflicted wound resulting from the lowest defense spending in the entire Alliance.
Perspectives and scenarios
Baseline scenario: the credibility of the Hague framework survives Ankara, capitals submit their national plans, and the 2029 review confirms—albeit belatedly and unevenly—the upward trajectory. Scenario B, which I set at 40%: political fatigue and friction between Washington and Europe—Greenland, the attacks on Iran, the trade war—erode cohesion, the south falls behind, and the gap between rhetoric and actual capacity widens dangerously. For Spain, the outlook is one of increasing isolation and bilateral reprisals through non-tariff measures and intelligence gathering, precisely the flanks where Brussels can offer the least protection.
2. Hormuz burns again: the Qatari gas tanker, the IRGC’s blackmail, and the paradox of decapitation
Facts
In the early hours of July 7, the Qatari gas tanker Al Rekayyat—owned by the state-owned shipping company Nakilat and carrying liquefied natural gas (LNG)—was struck by a projectile at the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz, while sailing along the route close to the Omani coast. The impact caused a fire in the engine room, forced the safe evacuation of the crew, and left the vessel at risk of explosion. It is the first Qatari LNG carrier attacked since the start of the war. Almost simultaneously, the Saudi supertanker Wedyan was damaged, and in less than 24 hours, the IRGC struck a third merchant ship; some accounts put the number of vessels hit in 48 hours at four. Qatar condemned the attack in the strongest terms, calling it an “unacceptable act of aggression” against international shipping and holding Iran “fully and legally” responsible for any consequences.
The pattern is unmistakable: the Iranian regime demands that ships transit the northern route, hugging its own coast, and punishes those using the southern corridor, near Oman, managed with US support; the IRGC’s maritime radio even warned merchant ships that “our missiles and drones are ready to fire.” Washington’s response was immediate: it revoked the license it had granted Tehran to sell oil, reimposed sanctions on its crude exports, and Central Command (CENTCOM) launched a wave of attacks against Iranian military installations in the vicinity of the Strait, with the president warning of further action. Brent crude rose to around $73, European gas prices climbed by up to 6%, maritime authorities raised the risk to “severe,” and the UK and France announced the imminent deployment of a mission to secure the Strait of Hormuz. All this comes after the conclusion last week, without any progress, of the latest round of indirect negotiations, and within the framework of a fragile sixty-day ceasefire.
Implications
These attacks are neither an accident nor the overzealousness of a local commander: they are the material expression of what I have been calling the paradox of decapitation . The paradox lies not in the elimination of moderates—none were—but in something more unsettling: General Ahmed Vahidi, commander-in-chief of the IRGC and subject to an Interpol red notice for the 1994 AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires—which left eighty-five dead—has already established himself, de facto, as primus inter pares of the Revolutionary Guard’s triumvirate. But a primus inter pares is not an absolute arbiter in the manner of Khamenei: his primacy rests on force, fear, and fanaticism—it is, by far, the worst of the options, as fanatical as the others but infinitely more ruthless and brutal—not on the ideological, institutional, and religious authority that allowed the previous leader to impose internal discipline and extract concessions from the apparatus. The paradox, therefore, intensifies rather than resolves itself: the regime now has a dominant figure, but lacks a reliable guarantor of its own commitments. Hence the chaotic intermittency of Hormuz: the one in charge can steer and control the negotiations, but cannot—and will not—guarantee obedience.
The attack on a Qatari vessel is, moreover, a deliberate and calculated message. Qatar has been the very architect of peace, the indispensable mediator between Washington and Tehran; striking its gas tanker is a provocation of the highest order. And by inference—the logical flip side of punishment—it confirms the existence of a covert toll system: shipowners who “pay up” to the regime transit without risk; those who don’t are burned. This hypothesis is not speculative: during the war, payments of up to two million dollars per ship to cross the strait were documented. This analyst estimates that systematic extortion could bring the regime between $100 billion and $200 billion in extraordinary revenue, which would unequivocally mean more weapons, more power, and more funding for Hamas, Hezbollah—in Lebanon and Syria—the pro-Iranian terrorist militias in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen, as well as a renewed capacity for destabilization in Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and even Qatar itself. I emphasize the terminology because words matter: we are talking about a jihadist, dictatorial, and mafia-like oligarchy, and terrorist organizations—not “militias” or “armed groups.”
And here again, in all its starkness, is the American strategic failure. The three problems that sparked the war remain unresolved. The United States won militarily a conflict it failed to finish, lost the narrative, lost communication, and, from a geopolitical perspective, lost face. The assessment I’ve been applying is now beyond revision: military planning and execution, a ten; geostrategic planning, a zero. Winning a war without planning for the aftermath is sowing the seeds of the next one.
Perspectives and scenarios
We are facing one of those “variable-temperature wars”—low-resolution but highly destructive conflicts that no one can win or afford to lose—and what I call a “contained systemic fracture”: contained, but not closed. I set scenario B at 40%: the intermittent nature of the Strait of Hormuz is prolonged, the covert toll becomes normalized, the regime monetizes the strait, and the risk of a new regional escalation—possibly a new war very soon—rises alarmingly. The Franco-British mission to secure the strait, based on international maritime law, is a welcome exception to European passivity—legitimate, necessary, and long overdue—but it will be insufficient on its own if it is not accompanied by a political framework that addresses the root causes: blackmail, the financing of terrorism, and the absence of a credible guarantor on the other side.
III. MEDIA RACK
The Wall Street Journal revealed it had obtained the radio recording in which the IRGC threatened merchant ships with death and confirmed missile strikes against vessels in transit. Bloomberg described it as the biggest day of attacks since the agreement between Washington and Tehran, with an initially subdued oil market and Brent crude later rebounding. Al Jazeera and The National reported Qatar’s condemnation and its “full and legal” accountability for Iran, with the former documenting payments of up to two million dollars per ship during the war. Reuters provided the identification of the gas tanker Al Rekayyat and the supertanker Wedyan, as well as the announcement of the Franco-British mission. On the Ankara front, Breaking Defense, Daily Sabah, and Aerotime detailed the selection of the GlobalEye—costing around 4.5 billion dollars—over the Boeing E-7, the shared A400M project, and the delivery of the tenth MRTT. El Español and The Objective covered the clash between Trump and Spain and Rutte’s defense of Madrid. In this context, it’s important, as always, to distinguish the symptom from the source: Russia Today, TASS, and Vesti will present CENTCOM’s attacks as aggression and exonerate the Iranian regime; I cite them, therefore, as a barometer of propaganda, never as reliable testimony.
IV. RISK TRAFFIC LIGHT
● Hormuz and risk of new regional war: intermittent attacks, covert toll and escalation — very high risk.
● Consolidation of Vahidi and the IRGC as a dominant power without a guarantor of compliance — very high risk.
● NATO cohesion and US-Europe friction (Greenland, Iran, trade) — high risk.
● Spain: isolation in the Alliance and bilateral reprisals through non-tariff and intelligence means — high risk.
● Sustainability of military support to Ukraine beyond 2026 — moderate risk.
● Energy market: Brent towards $73 and European gas rising due to the Hormuz risk premium — moderate risk.
● Franco-British mission in Hormuz: late but legitimate and necessary European reaction — favorable development, to be confirmed.
V. EDITORIAL COMMENTARY
The West won a war it failed to finish and is losing the peace it failed to forge. That, in a nutshell, is the lesson of this double-header. In Ankara, mediocrity was crowned with triumph: one more tanker aircraft, a shared fleet of existing planes, and a reasonable but second-rate Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) system were presented as the answer to a power projection deficit that is, in reality, structural and political rather than industrial. Europe continues to disregard its own destiny, and Spain leads this abdication with an obstinacy that can no longer be attributed to budgetary prudence, but rather to a strategic myopia that has taken us from irrelevance to suspicion. That Rutte adjusts his rhetoric before those who contribute $900 billion is understandable; that Europeans, by omission, by failing to spend or plan, are proving Trump right is simply indefensible.
And while the family photo was being taken in Ankara, an Iranian missile in the Strait of Hormuz served as a stark reminder of who dictates the rules of maritime traffic in one of the planet’s energy arteries. General Vahidi—the most ruthless and brutal of a triumvirate of ultraconservatives—monetizes the strait, finances his terrorist proxies, and sows blackmail, precisely because he rules by force without the authority or the will to honor any commitments. The paradox of the decapitation has not been resolved: it has worsened. Against this erratic and transactional foreign policy, guided by intuition and impulsiveness, the only hope is that the system and the level-headedness of those surrounding the president—Secretary of State Marco Rubio at the forefront—will ultimately prevail over this impulsiveness. In military planning and execution, a ten; in geostrategic planning, a zero. A leadership vacuum on both shores: that is, today, the most honest and the most uncomfortable conclusion.