In Atalayar, the diplomat and analyst examines the key geopolitical and legal factors, as well as the political responsibilities, behind the crisis on the southern border

By Gustavo de Arístegui, as published by Atalayar, 10 August, 2026

Coverage of irregular migration flows and the protection of the external borders of the European Union generate constant debate on the public agenda. Within the framework of the presentation of the report El Espigón de Europa (Europe’s Breakwater), published in the journal Atalayar, diplomat and international analyst Gustavo de Arístegui examines in depth the crisis that unfolded in Ceuta. Throughout this broadcast conversation, he analyses the responsibilities of various political actors, the role of European institutions, and the complexity of the diplomatic framework with Morocco.

The need for a rigorous and objective analysis

Ceuta, 30 July 2026: anatomy of a foretold collapse. The responsibilities of the Government of Spain, the abdication of the European Commission, the rationale of Schengen partners, and Morocco’s outstanding debt. This is the subtitle of your work. If you agree, we can follow your outline. First chapter: “The truth without anaesthesia”.

Yes. I believe that the main problem we face all too often is that our analyses are clouded by feelings, sympathies, antipathies, or information that is frequently self-serving, manipulated, or simply half-truths. And those are the worst kinds of lies: telling part of the facts but not all of them, and interpreting certain things partially. That carries a very high cost.

We live in a world where information is hyper-abundant and, precisely because of that, the quality of information is far more important. The more information there is, the more essential rigorous analysis becomes, and it is no easy task.

This report, which spans 41 pages, I began writing when I was in London in the midst of the crisis, on 29 July. I have produced six versions of it, incorporating issues as I noticed that the arguments presented in the media were, at times, completely absurd. Or even that some analysts were making statements worthy of better mention.

One must not be one-sided on this issue. We need a broad and as objective a view as possible. That is to say, if at any point we keep quiet or refrain from criticising some of the most complex angles of this matter, we will be lying to ourselves, which is the worst lie of all.

I am currently finalizing a book on 21st-century geopolitics that attempts to follow this same philosophy: a general photograph where everyone has to explain and assume their responsibilities and the consequences.

The factors of the collapse: lack of resources, legislation, and pull factor

Moving on to the next chapter, Gustavo: “A foretold catastrophe: legal trigger, pull factor, and 20 years of ignoring the Guardia Civil”.

I believe these are the three fundamental elements. There are others, but these are the primary and most important ones. Let us not forget that for 20 years Spanish borders have been completely neglected in terms of human and material resources, ignoring the demands and requests made by the State Security Forces and Bodies, particularly the Guardia Civil and the National Police.

Then, obviously, there is the pull factor, which is textbook. When it is announced that half a million people will be regularized, and we were already at 1.2 million and heading towards 1.5 million, the trafficking networks do not know if there is a cutoff date or specific requirements. They say: “Spain is regularizing, let’s go there.” Even regular immigrants from France, Italy, Germany, or Denmark heard the rumour and went to Spain purchasing forged documents to claim false residency ties.

And thirdly, I listened to someone I hold dear and respect greatly, Federico Trillo. He said it was impossible for trafficking networks or migrants to read or interpret a judgment from the Supreme Court that even legal experts fail to understand. But there is a very simple thing that everyone understands, which was all over social media, and denying it seems very serious to me.

What social networks spread about the Supreme Court ruling —and this is what must be taken into account— was that if you swim to Ceuta or Melilla, you cannot be summarily turned back. It was an invitation. This came out in late June, and the Government did nothing for a month.

It was entirely predictable that this would have a pull factor. It was predictable that they would need to reinforce the borders of Ceuta and Melilla with physical barriers. They could have raised the fence or the buoy line much higher. The Supreme Court clearly stated —and this can indeed be read by the Government of Spain, if not by the gangs or street rumours— that if someone jumps over a barrier erected by the Spanish Government, at that moment they can be turned back on the spot.

If a migrant swims past and jumps over the red buoy, they are already fulfilling the condition set out in the Supreme Court’s ruling. It is not serious. Claiming that it was impossible for the ruling to have a pull factor does the Government a favour, because it exculpates them from their responsibility. That is what is surprising about Federico Trillo’s statements.

Institutional inaction and shared responsibilities

The role of the Spanish Government: a migration crisis, a security crisis, a humanitarian crisis with over a hundred deaths. What is the role of the Government outlined in the report? Its inaction is called into question.

I believe there is a grave responsibility. And I want to be very clear: I am not just talking about the Spanish Government’s lack of action over the last eight years, as that would only implicate the current administration. I am talking about the lack of action by Spanish governments over the last 20 years, which implicates three executives: Mr. Zapatero’s, Mr. Rajoy’s, and President Sánchez’s.

Many people have never been to the Spanish autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla; I have. I was the sole Government representative who attended the 500th anniversary of the founding of Melilla. Later, I returned for a conference of various police trade unions during the years I served in the Ministry of the Interior. I know both cities very well, and Ceuta in particular.

Consequently, it is very important to state that the actual responsibility of the governments is there. The real migration crisis began, on a much smaller scale, between 1994 and 1996. The first genuine reinforcement of the physical borders was carried out under José María Aznar’s Government, when the double fence and later the triple fence were installed.

That was one of the most controversial points between Aznar’s Government and the opposition of Felipe González first, and Zapatero later, when they claimed that concertina wire was inhumane. What is inhumane is failing to defend the border, because when the border is not defended, a pull factor occurs. And with human tides, hundreds of deaths occur.

Figures vary, but on the Spanish side there were at least 100 fatalities, and there will be dozens on the Moroccan side. Every single one of them is a tragedy, a broken family, and an irreplaceable life. That is what we must remember. Without ever forgetting the fundamental premise for the Schengen Area to function.

The position of the European Commission and regional relations

Let us move on to the role of the European Union, then.

The role of the European Union is self-evident. It seems to me that the European Commission speaks with two voices: the voice of good sense, which is the Commissioner responsible for Migration and Asylum, and the somewhat mellifluous and shifting voice of the President of the European Commission.

One cannot swing from outrage at the Spanish Government’s irresponsibility to claiming that things were handled well. Nobody can argue that things were done properly before, during, and after the migration crisis of 30 and 31 July. That is unacceptable.

Undoubtedly. What about the role of Morocco, Gustavo? “Neither proven orchestrator nor innocent partner”, as you title it.

That is an obvious point. In a country like Morocco, under the management of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Morocco, if there is a gathering of 80,000 people, it is visible. And there were surely more, because 80,000 crossed, but many remained on the other side. We are talking about tens of thousands of people assembling over several days, and that has consequences.

There was an attempted human surge of 1,500 to 2,000 people two days earlier that was successfully stopped. I believe that was indeed a political challenge to President Sánchez’s trip to Algeria. Even so, one cannot demand that a neighbouring country refrain from dealing with another neighbour. A country must maintain cordial relations with all its neighbours.

Spain has lost presence as an influential European country in the Maghreb. We no longer have the leverage we once possessed in Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, or Mauritania. And frankly, I believe there was an obligation on Morocco’s part to do more.

However, talking about the conspiracy mentioned by some regarding an “invasion” is not rigorous. These were people leaving because they wanted to reach a country with better living conditions, drawn by the prospect of healthcare and education.

Since the city of Ceuta has 85,000 inhabitants and is completely enclosed, when 80,000 people enter, they must be transferred to the mainland. An illegal immigrant can only be detained for 40 days; after that, they must be returned to their country or released. People know this perfectly well, so the excuse of double control does not hold water.

This leaves a lesson: Ceuta possesses a deeply Spanish feeling, shared also by its Muslim inhabitants. It is a very clear message to those who believe Ceuta can be taken by Morocco. That cannot happen because the people of Ceuta and Melilla do not want it, and history, law, and reason do not support it either.

Political risks and the price of frivolity

To conclude, Gustavo, you speak of the angles no one wants to look at: scenarios, outlooks, and the price of frivolity.

I believe it is a clear report where everyone must take responsibility, explain it, and take measures to ensure it does not happen again. Primarily to prevent the far right or the far left from manipulating the situation and attempting to pit Spain and Morocco against each other in an irresponsible and dangerous manner.

Neighbourly relations must be built on mutual respect, not on propaganda or populism. This applies to Spain and to other European nations neighbouring Morocco, such as France, Portugal, Italy, or Malta.

In many of these countries, there are far-left forces employing the irresponsible open-doors policy and the idea that “you cannot put gates on an open field”, alongside the rhetoric of the far right. And that is the reality of the matter.