Geopolitical analysis of the top leadership following the military crisis, the role of the IRGC, and the succession of the Supreme Leader
By Gustavo de Arístegui, as published by Atalayar, 13 August, 2026
Iran’s power organigram in 2026 recorded the most extensive overhaul of its political and military leadership since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The joint Israeli-American offensive in late February (“2026 War”) resulted in a single day — 28 February — in the deaths of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the Commander-in-Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Chief of the Joint Staff, the Defence Minister, and much of the assembled Defence Council.
In subsequent weeks, the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (Ali Larijani), the Intelligence Minister (Esmaeil Khatib), and the Commander of the Basij, among other high-ranking officials, also fell. The result is a political and security leadership reconstituted in record time, characterized by the visible consolidation of the IRGC’s hardline wing across key state institutions, alongside the continuity of President Masoud Pezeshkian and his diplomatic channel with Washington.
Editorial note: Given the high geopolitical volatility and the rapid pace of personnel changes in Tehran, several appointments (such as the leadership of the Basij or the Ministry of Intelligence) lack official confirmation at the closing of this report and are noted as projections under verification.
Supreme core of the Iranian regime
Supreme Leader (Rahbar / Vali-e Faqih)
The Head of State represents the country’s highest political, religious, and military authority, acting as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran and retaining the power to outline domestic, foreign, defence, and nuclear policy regulated before the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Ultimately, all regime institutions are subordinate to the Office of the Supreme Leader. This figure holds absolute power, as all other institutions derive their legitimacy and most appointments from this office.
Since 8 March 2026, the position has been held by Mojtaba Khamenei. Born in 1969 in Mashhad, he is the second son of Ali Khamenei and a mid-ranking Shia cleric. Although lacking prior public office experience, he maintains close personal ties with the IRGC. He was elected by the Assembly of Experts following his father’s death in the 28 February bombings, a period succeeded by a brief Interim Leadership Council comprising Pezeshkian, Mohseni-Eje’i, and Arafi between 1 and 8 March. His succession, lacking dynastic precedent in the history of the Islamic Republic, is questioned by various clerical sectors, while international analysts agree it represented an imposition by the IRGC to ensure hardline continuity.
Assembly of Experts (Majles-e Jobregan)
The Assembly of Experts is composed of 88 clerics elected by popular vote after passing vetting by the Guardian Council. Constitutionally, it holds the power to elect, oversee, and theoretically dismiss the Supreme Leader.
Its level of influence is rated as medium-high, proving decisive during moments of succession, although in practice it tends to ratify rather than deliberate. Notably, its headquarters in the holy city of Qom were targeted in airstrikes during the voting held in March 2026.
Leading this institution is Mohammad-Ali Movahedi Kermani, serving as President since May 2024. At 93, this ultraconservative leader and long-time ally of the Khamenei family backed Mojtaba Khamenei’s election as the new Supreme Leader.
Guardian Council (Shura-ye Negahban)
The Guardian Council is a 12-member body consisting of 6 clerics appointed directly by the Supreme Leader and 6 jurists nominated by the Judiciary and confirmed by Parliament. Its duties include vetting the constitutionality and Islamic interpretation of legislation, alongside veto power over electoral candidates. Its authority is extremely high, as it de facto controls access to elected office in Iran, having disqualified up to half of all aspirants in past parliamentary elections.
The council’s secretariat is led by Ahmad Jannati, who has held the post since July 1992 and has been a founding member since 1980. At 99 and with a pronounced ultraconservative profile, Jannati is considered the primary doctrinal guardian of the Iranian political system.
Expediency Discernment Council (Majma-e Tashkhis-e Maslahat-e Nezam)
The Expediency Discernment Council acts as an advisory body to the Head of State, tasked with arbitrating disputes between Parliament and the Guardian Council, as well as setting broader strategic regime guidelines. While formally advisory, its power is medium-high, exerting significant influence as it includes prominent figures from the Iranian establishment.
The council has been chaired by Sadeq Larijani since December 2018. Former Head of the Judiciary between 2009 and 2019, he is the brother of Ali Larijani (assassinated in March 2026). Despite recent losses, the Larijani clan retains extensive influence within the regime.
Iran’s security, intelligence, and defence apparatus
Supreme National Security Council (SNSC)
The Supreme National Security Council is the top body responsible for coordinating foreign policy, defence, internal security, and nuclear development. Any major international negotiation under United Nations (UN) oversight requires its mandatory approval, with the President of the Republic serving as its formal chair. Following the 2026 military crisis, its very high power is rising, cementing its role as the true gravity centre for strategic war and peace decisions.
Since 10 August 2026, the council’s secretariat has been held by Mohsen Rezaei. At 71, the former IRGC Commander-in-Chief during the Iran-Iraq War assumed the post replacing Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, who had succeeded Ali Larijani following his assassination in March 2026. His appointment solidifies the IRGC old guard at the heart of the state security apparatus.
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC / CGRI)
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps functions as an elite paramilitary force parallel to the regular Armed Forces. It maintains ground, naval, aerospace, and intelligence branches, incorporating the Basij militia and the Quds Force — focused on external operations —, while controlling a vast economic network. Alongside the Supreme Leader, it holds very high power as the regime’s hard core, expanding its political and military weight following the 2026 war.
Its Commander-in-Chief has been Ahmad Vahidi since 1 March 2026, promoted to Major General in August that year. A former Interior Minister, Defence Minister, and Quds Force Commander, Vahidi is the IRGC’s third commander in under a year, following the deaths of Mohammad Pakpour in February 2026 and Hossein Salami in June 2025.
Regular Armed Forces (Artesh) and Joint Staff
The regular Armed Forces comprise the conventional Army, Navy, and Air Force, separate from the IRGC structure. The Joint Staff coordinates combined operations between Artesh and the Guards. They hold medium power, subordinate in prestige, budget, and political weight to the IRGC, though maintaining the bulk of conventional equipment and national air and naval defence.
The Chief of the Joint Staff is Ali Abdollahi, appointed in March 2026 following the death of his predecessor, Abdolrahim Mousavi, during the 28 February strikes. Kioumars Heydari serves as Deputy Chief of Staff.
Basij (Popular Mobilisation Militia)
The Basij militia is a volunteer paramilitary force directly subordinate to the IRGC, serving as the main pillar for public order control and internal dissent suppression. Its internal influence is considered medium-high as a key tool for social surveillance, though carrying less weight in foreign or defence policy formulation.
Its leadership is currently in transition following the death of Commander Gholamreza Soleimani in a strike on 17 March 2026. A permanent successor remains pending confirmation.
Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS / VEVAK)
The Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) serves as the state’s civil intelligence service, historically charged with counterintelligence, dissident repression abroad, and domestic political surveillance.
It retains high power, though in relative erosion due to ground lost to the IRGC’s own intelligence apparatus, which possesses greater autonomy and resources.
The ministerial post remains vacant following Esmaeil Khatib’s death on 18 March 2026, with a permanent successor awaiting public confirmation.
Executive and legislative power
Presidency of the Islamic Republic
The Presidency of the Islamic Republic of Iran leads the Executive and manages daily public administration. However, its constitutional rank remains subordinate to the Supreme Leader, particularly regarding foreign policy, defence, and nuclear matters. It holds medium power, overseeing daily state affairs with electoral legitimacy, though lacking final authority on strategic issues.
The office has been held by Masoud Pezeshkian since July 2024. A surgeon by profession with a reformist and pragmatic profile, he served on the Interim Leadership Council formed after Khamenei’s death in March 2026. His stance supporting diplomatic channels with the US has brought him into direct friction with hardline regime factions.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran executes — though does not ultimately define — foreign policy charted by the Supreme Leader and the SNSC. It acts as Iran’s formal representative to the international community and in diplomatic talks. Its power is medium, serving as the visible interlocutor with Western powers, albeit with a margin constrained by the SNSC.
The ministry has been led by Abbas Araghchi since August 2024. A career diplomat and veteran negotiator of the 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA), he has served as Tehran’s primary contact with international powers throughout the 2026 crisis.
Parliament (Majles-e Shura-ye Eslami)
The Parliament of Iran (Majles) represents the unicameral legislative branch. Legislation passed by the chamber is subject to Guardian Council review and potential veto, while exercising oversight functions over the government. It holds medium power institutionally, but high power through its speakership as a prominent platform for political projection.
The Speaker of Parliament is Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. Former IRGC Aerospace Force Commander and former Mayor of Tehran, he has led key indirect diplomatic contacts with the United States in international forums such as Switzerland and Pakistan, establishing himself as a highly influential public figure within the conservative bloc.
Judiciary
The Judiciary of Iran encompasses the court system, including revolutionary courts, serving as a key instrument for social control and political repression. The Head of the Judiciary is appointed directly by the Supreme Leader, wielding high power due to its punitive capacity and historic role as a stepping stone to top regime posts.
Since July 2021, the Judiciary has been led by Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i, reconfirmed in 2026. A former Intelligence Minister and Prosecutor General, Mohseni-Eje’i served on the Interim Leadership Council following Ali Khamenei’s death in March 2026.
Geopolitical analysis and conclusions
The institutional landscape observed in August 2026 reflects an accelerated restructuring process in which the Supreme Leader, IRGC Commander, Chief of Joint Staff, SNSC Secretary, and Intelligence Minister were replaced in just six months.
The dominant dynamic reveals a concentration of real power within the military-security axis comprising the IRGC, SNSC, and the Supreme Leader’s office, led by figures like Vahidi, Rezaei, and Mojtaba Khamenei. Under this setup, President Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Araghchi retain international diplomatic engagement, operating with an increasingly narrow margin against traditional revolutionary factions. Meanwhile, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf stands as the primary political counterweight and potential rival to Rezaei within the hardline ruling bloc.
Methodology and sources: Analysis prepared from Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), official news agencies, and international media records as of 13 August 2026. Given ongoing developments in the Middle East, periodic verification of positions in transition is recommended.