Gustavo de Arístegui,
September 1, 2026
I. INTRODUCTION
Today, three fronts converge that should be analyzed with the rigor that current events demand, without succumbing to background noise. Washington is intensifying two parallel mediation efforts vying for the same presidential attention: the Ukrainian one, low-intensity but with renewed diplomatic momentum, and the Iranian one, which yesterday resumed hostilities after a month of tense calm. The Strait of Hormuz is once again the scene of an exchange of blows between the United States and Iran, with immediate consequences for the price of crude oil, which today exceeds $91 per barrel of Brent. Simultaneously, Bishkek—not Tashkent, as the initial working note stated; this should be corrected before it spreads—is hosting the 26th summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, with Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, Narendra Modi, and the Iranian president himself, Masoud Pezeshkian, sharing a table on its 25th anniversary. Three stories, one same backdrop: the international order continues to readjust under the simultaneous pressure of the war in Ukraine, the Gulf crisis, and the consolidation of a Eurasian axis that we observe with the vigilance it deserves.
II. MOST IMPORTANT NEWS OF THE LAST 24 HOURS
1. Witkoff and Kushner’s mediation seeks to revive the peace process in Ukraine
Facts
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy held a telephone conversation on Sunday with Donald Trump’s special envoys, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, which he described as detailed and constructive. According to a Telegram post, both sides discussed ongoing coordination between the US and Ukrainian negotiating teams, and a date is being considered for a visit by the envoys to Kyiv, which could be followed by a trip to Moscow. Zelenskyy briefed his interlocutors on the state of the front, where, in his own words, Russian advances are negligible and are being achieved at a disproportionate human cost. The Ukrainian president indicated that September could bring substantial changes to the course of the war, although he added that Ukrainian and allied intelligence suggests that the Russian leader wishes to prolong the conflict, despite the fact that the majority of the Russian population would support a cessation of hostilities along the current line of contact. This rapprochement comes in a context of fatigue: the Russian invasion is now entering its fifth year without any of the multiple rounds of mediation — Abu Dhabi, Geneva, Miami, Riyadh — having resulted in a lasting ceasefire agreement.
Implications
The pattern repeats itself with almost liturgical regularity: contacts described as constructive, announcements of imminent visits, and a persistent absence of tangible results on the ground. None of this detracts from the diplomatic effort—which we wholeheartedly support in the face of any attempt to resolve a territorial dispute by force—but it does raise the question of whether Moscow has any real incentive to negotiate while it retains, even marginally, the military initiative. The fact that Witkoff and Kushner must divide their attention between Ukraine and the Iranian crisis, which is much more acute at the moment, does not help the Ukrainian cause nor does it convey to Moscow the sense of urgency that would be desirable.
Perspectives and scenarios
The most favorable scenario is that the announced visit to Kyiv, followed by another meeting in Moscow, will finally resolve the sovereignty issues over Donbas and the demarcation line, which have stalled the process from the outset. The more likely scenario, however, is another cycle of diplomatic gestures without a substantive agreement, while Russia continues to slowly erode relations. The risk we must be wary of is negotiating fatigue in Kyiv and European foreign ministries if Washington ends up subordinating the Ukrainian issue to the Middle East crisis, which today demands increasing diplomatic and military resources.
2. Washington and Tehran resume military standoff in the Gulf; oil prices soar
Facts
After a month of tense calm, the United States and Iran resumed direct hostilities on Sunday. US forces attacked Iranian rocket launchers and marine drones on Larak Island, in the Strait of Hormuz, after detecting preparations to mine the waterway. Iran responded with ballistic missiles and drones against the US bases of Al Hussein and Al Azraq in Jordan, and with a drone strike against the United Arab Emirates. Amman confirmed the interception of eight missiles without damage, while Tehran reported two military personnel and one civilian casualties from the initial US attack. President Trump promised a strong response—”we’re going to hit them hard,” he declared—and even shared on his Truth Social network an AI-generated video that purportedly showed the destruction of Kharg Island, Iran’s main oil terminal. It should be emphasized that there is no evidence of an actual attack on that facility, so the video should be interpreted as a threat, not as a confirmed attack. The US Central Command (CENTCOM), for its part, dismissed as pure disinformation the claim by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) that it had mined a supertanker in the southern Strait. The military and security command currently directing the Iranian escalation—headed by General Ahmad Vahidi at the helm of the IRGC and, since this month, by Mohsen Rezaei at the head of the Supreme National Security Council—is operating according to a power dynamic that we analyze in Section III of this report. As an immediate consequence of the escalation, Brent crude oil surpassed $91 per barrel today, with a cumulative increase of over 9% in the last month.
Implications
The incident confirms the definitive failure of the memorandum of understanding signed in June to reopen commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz: the US naval blockade of Iranian ports remains in place, and Tehran maintains its threats of tariffs, detention, and confiscation against vessels transiting without its authorization. Vahidi’s consolidation of power at the head of the IRGC—following the death in combat of his predecessor, Mohammad Pakpour—confirms that the paradox of decapitation continues to operate in Iran: each slain commander is replaced by a more hardline figure, more committed to escalation, never by one willing to negotiate. Meanwhile, energy markets are already showing signs of nervousness: Asian shipping companies—China, Japan, South Korea—are seeking alternative suppliers as far away as Argentina to compensate for supply losses in the Middle East, and the US strategic petroleum reserve is nearing operational minimums due to increased crude oil exports.
Perspectives and scenarios
The immediate risk is a fluctuating escalation of tensions, with sporadic exchanges of blows that, while not escalating into open warfare, maintain the strait in a state of chronic instability, with the consequent cost to global trade. An effective—this time real—attack against Kharg cannot be ruled out if Tehran persists in its provocations against maritime traffic. It is essential that the Gulf allies, with Western support, strengthen a naval coalition capable of guaranteeing freedom of navigation, rather than relying solely on unilateral US deterrence.
3. The SCO certifies in Bishkek – not in Tashkent – the consolidation of the Eurasian axis
Facts
The 26th Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit is being held these days—August 31 and September 1—in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan, and not in Tashkent, as the initial list of topics for this report indicated. This clarification is important because the error could easily be carried over into subsequent analyses. The summit, commemorating the organization’s 25th anniversary under the theme “25 Years of the SCO: Together for Sustainable Peace, Development and Prosperity,” brings together Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, Narendra Modi, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, among other leaders of the ten member states, which together represent more than 40% of the world’s population. The adoption of the so-called Bishkek Declaration is expected, along with other documents on the organization’s future development. Kyrgyzstan hands over the rotating presidency to Pakistan, which will hold it until the 2027 summit. Putin holds separate bilateral meetings with Xi and Pezeshkian on the sidelines of the summit, while Uzbekistan actively promotes the so-called Trans-Afghan Corridor and advances—although still without a defined structure—the project of a development bank of its own for the SCO.
Implications
The summit serves, once again, as a showcase of cohesion for a Eurasian bloc that Beijing and Moscow systematically employ to project the idea of a multipolar order alternative to the one led by the West. It is important, however, not to exaggerate its internal strength: the SCO lacks the binding commitments of a military alliance or an economic union, and tensions between its members—India and Pakistan over Kashmir, India and China over the Himalayan border—remain unresolved despite gestures of rapprochement. Pezeshkian’s presence, while his regime wages open war in the Gulf with the United States, illustrates Tehran’s attempt to seek in Eurasia the diplomatic cover it cannot find in the West. Russia’s economic dependence on China, exacerbated by Western sanctions stemming from the invasion of Ukraine, continues to deepen, and projects such as the Trans-Afghan Corridor or the North-South International Corridor are quietly expanding Chinese and Russian influence in Central Asia, a region we continue to monitor with particular attention given Beijing’s well-known pattern of controlling routes, raw materials, and rare earths.
Perspectives and scenarios
The Bishkek Declaration is expected to feature multipolar rhetoric with veiled criticism of the West, though this should not translate into firm operational commitments. It will be important to observe closely whether and how the final text explicitly addresses the war in Ukraine or the conflict between the United States and Iran, as well as the actual progress made on the planned SCO development bank, which, if established, could become an additional instrument for the partial dedollarization of trade among its members.
III. POWER PROFILE: VAHIDI AND REZAEI, WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF INTERNAL CONSOLIDATION
Facts
On August 9, Supreme Leader Mokhtaba Khamenei appointed General Mohsen Rezaei, 71, who served as commander-in-chief of the IRGC from 1981 to 1997 during much of the Iran-Iraq War, as his personal representative to the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). The following day, President Masoud Pezeshkian appointed him secretary of the Council, replacing Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, who had been in the position for only five months following the death of his predecessor, Ali Larijani, in a bombing in March. Rezaei thus joins Saeed Jalili, another hardliner, as Khamenei’s second direct representative on the body that coordinates the regime’s security and foreign policy. The new secretary, an economics PhD and former vice president for economic affairs under the late President Raisi, is also listed, like General Vahidi, on Interpol’s red notice for the 1994 bombing of the AMIA Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, when he was in command of the IRGC. Since his appointment, Rezaei has made some of the regime’s most belligerent statements: he has threatened to block the flow of a single drop of oil through the Persian Gulf or the Strait of Hormuz if any neighboring country joins the US economic pressure, he has labeled any state that cooperates with Washington on this front an enemy, and he has insisted that the strait will not reopen until the United States withdraws its forces from the region. These positions stand in stark contrast to those of President Pezeshkian himself, who recently defended the agreement reached with Washington in June and warned that Iran cannot remain at war indefinitely.
Implications
The timing of both appointments—Vahidi as head of the IRGC since March, formally confirmed on August 10; and Rezaei as head of the CSSN since August 9 and 10—concentrates the two main levers of Iranian security, military command and strategic coordination, in the hands of two figures whose rise is directly linked to the continuation of the conflict with the United States and who, based on their track record and public statements, represent the faction least interested in a negotiated solution. The contrast with Pezeshkian, an avowed supporter of preserving the June agreement, is not accidental: the longer the hostilities drag on, the greater the legitimacy claimed by the war commanders in the face of a president whose room for maneuver shrinks proportionally. We maintain that both appointments are not simply a matter of managing casualties or vacancies, but rather a perfectly identifiable power dynamic: the war, far from weakening the security leadership, has become the instrument that legitimizes and perpetuates its internal preeminence.
Perspectives and scenarios
As long as Vahidi and Rezaei control the regime’s military and security apparatus, it is unlikely that Tehran will offer any substantive concessions on the Strait of Hormuz or its nuclear program, no matter how intense the Western pressure. It is worth watching whether Pezeshkian manages to regain any political leverage against the Khamenei-Vahidi-Rezaei axis, or whether he is reduced to a figurehead, unable to translate his public defense of the June agreement into action. The scenario that most concerns us is that of a war with variable intensity, deliberately kept below the threshold that would provoke a massive Western response, but above the threshold that would allow for any normalization: not simply as a consequence of the dynamics of the conflict, but as a rational and conscious choice by those who currently govern Iranian security, and who consider the war itself their main source of internal power.
IV. MEDIA RACK
The leading US media outlets—CNBC, CBS, and Fox News—focus their coverage on the exchange of blows in the Strait of Hormuz and its immediate impact on energy markets, paying particular attention to the White House’s prepared response. Ukrainian media—Ukrinform and Ukrainska Pravda—highlight Zelensky’s optimistic tone regarding the conversation with Witkoff and Kushner, presenting it as a prelude to a possible visit by US envoys to Kyiv in September. The official Russian press, on the other hand, emphasizes Trump’s threat to strike hard at Iran as proof of the erratic nature of US foreign policy, in line with its usual narrative of Western disorder. The Indian press highlights the Bishkek summit as an opportunity for New Delhi to deepen its ties with Central Asia in trade, energy, and connectivity, without abandoning its own counterterrorism agenda. Gulf media outlets, finally, insist on the need for the United Nations Security Council to adopt firm and deterrent measures against what they consider a systematic use of the Strait of Hormuz as an instrument of pressure and economic blackmail by Tehran.
V. RISK TRAFFIC LIGHT
🔴 Strait of Hormuz and military escalation between the United States and Iran — high and rising risk.
🟠 Global energy markets — high risk of further price increases in the event of any new incident.
🟡 Ukraine-Russia peace process — stalled, with a window of diplomatic opportunity open in September.
🟡 Moscow-Beijing-Tehran axis and SCO summit — gradual consolidation, without an immediate break with the West.
🟢 Regional stability of the Gulf outside the Hormuz corridor — contained, with no widespread escalation at the moment.
VI. EDITORIAL COMMENTARY
What happened yesterday in the Strait of Hormuz confirms, once again, a pattern we have been pointing out for months: the jihadist oligarchy that governs Iran does not respond to pressure with détente, but with a calculated, constantly controlled escalation. The power structure we outlined in the previous section—Vahidi at the head of the IRGC, Rezaei at the head of the Supreme National Security Council—is not a biographical anecdote, but confirmation that the paradox of decapitation has now extended from the strictly military to the political sphere: each casualty, each replacement, strengthens the faction least interested in any gesture of détente, and weakens to the same degree those who, like Pezeshkian himself, have publicly defended the negotiated path.
We unequivocally support Washington’s hardline policy toward Tehran, and we wholeheartedly endorse the attacks targeting the regime’s military infrastructure. It is also fair to acknowledge what is truly remarkable: the tactical preparation of the campaign has been outstanding, with surgical execution, precision in eliminating targets, and a capacity for anticipation—the preemptive strike on Larak, before the mining of the strait could be carried out, being the latest example—that demonstrate first-rate intelligence and operational planning. The problem, therefore, does not lie at the tactical level, where the United States has demonstrated overwhelming superiority. It lies at the geostrategic level, and there the deficit is simply glaring. Six months into the war, no one in Washington has yet explained exactly what the objective is or how this will end. The day after, which we have been demanding since day one, is no longer an abstract enigma that can be dismissed with vague statements: it is beginning to take shape, and that face is that of a more brutal, more hardened, and progressively more aggressive regime, governed de facto by the bloodthirsty duo of Vahidi and Rezaei, two men who have found precisely in the prolongation of the war the instrument with which to consolidate their power as strongmen of a terrorist state. It is worth asking—and this question is not at all rhetorical—whether sustained military pressure without an accompanying political strategy is not producing the exact opposite effect to that intended: not the implosion of the regime, but its internal purge to the benefit of its most fanatical elements. An AI-generated video threatening to destroy Kharg Island is no substitute for a strategy. Rather, it is a symptom of that erratic and transactional facet of Donald Trump’s diplomacy that we have criticized on other occasions, and we trust that the good judgment of his Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, and the common sense of the system that surrounds him, will ultimately prevail over the outburst and improvisation.
In Ukraine, the goodwill of Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner is not enough on its own to sway the Kremlin’s calculations as long as Moscow retains, even marginally, the military initiative on the ground. We remain, as we must, firmly opposed to any attempt to alter borders by force, and staunchly Atlanticist in our conviction that only a united and sustained Western position can compel Russia to negotiate in good faith. It is, however, difficult not to notice that the European political class continues to neglect its own defense, delegating to Washington—currently distracted by both Ukraine and Iran—a responsibility that should be, above all, its own.
The Bishkek summit, finally, reminds us that the multipolar world that Beijing and Moscow have been proclaiming for years is no longer a mere rhetorical aspiration, but a slow yet steady process of institutional consolidation, from which Tehran—present at the table while waging open war with the United States—intends to benefit as a diplomatic lifeline. We remain vigilant, as we have been insisting for months, regarding Chinese expansionism in Central Asia, now materialized in connectivity corridors and development banks that, behind their technical facade, conceal a far-reaching strategic ambition concerning raw materials, trade routes, and rare earth elements. Faced with this, Europe continues to fail to formulate its own response, comfortably entrenched in the strategic irrelevance that we have consistently denounced in these pages.