By Gustavo de Arístegui,
March 27, 2026
I. BRIEF INTRODUCTION
The Middle East war enters its 27th day with a deeply ambiguous negotiating dynamic, dominated by contradictory messages emanating equally from Washington and Tehran. President Trump has extended for the second time—now until Monday, April 6—his ultimatum not to attack Iranian energy facilities, claiming that the talks are “going very well,” while Tehran simultaneously denies that any negotiations are taking place and turns the Strait of Hormuz into a lucrative tollbooth charged in yuan. Financial markets, intolerant of uncertainty, have responded with their biggest drop since the start of the conflict: the S&P 500 fell 1.74 percent and the NASDAQ 2.4 percent. Public support for the war is waning in the United States, Japan is performing its usual balancing act between transatlantic loyalty and its own strategic interests, and the International Olympic Committee has made a historic—and healthy—decision regarding women’s participation in elite sports. Six news items that, viewed together, paint a picture of a world in which strategic clarity is becoming increasingly scarce, at the same rate as the price of oil is rising.
II. MOST IMPORTANT NEWS OF THE LAST 24 HOURS
1. Popular support for the war is waning in the United States
(Sources: The Economist, YouGov, Pew Research Center, Marist Poll, Emerson Polling)
Facts
The latest Pew Research Center survey, conducted between March 16 and 22, 2026, among a sample of 3,524 American adults, reveals that 59 percent of respondents believe the decision to launch a military attack against Iran was wrong, compared to 38 percent who support it. Forty-five percent believe the operation is not progressing well, while only 25 percent consider it successful. The partisan divide is stark: 90 percent of Democrats disapprove of Trump’s handling of the situation, compared to 69 percent of Republicans who support it. The Emerson poll from mid-March shows 47 percent opposition versus 40 percent support. The Economist/YouGov poll is even more stark: only 33 percent support the war, while 56 percent oppose it, and 61 percent prioritize ending the conflict “as soon as possible” over achieving all the stated objectives. A particularly worrying fact for the moderate wing of the Republican Party is that only 52 percent of Republican-leaning independents approve of the handling of the conflict, compared to 45 percent who disapprove.
Implications
The internal political fallout represents formidable pressure on the Trump administration, especially with the midterm elections on the horizon. The official narrative that victory is already a done deal—”in a sense, we’ve already won,” Trump himself declared in his Fox News interview—clashes head-on with a public opinion that perceives a war without clear objectives, with tangible economic costs at the gas pump, and with thirteen confirmed American military casualties. Independents, the true touchstone of any election outcome in the United States, are distancing themselves from the presidential position at a rate that should worry Republican strategists. The absence of a solid plan for the aftermath—the major shortcoming of this entire operation—becomes prime political ammunition for the Democratic opposition, which has so far not forced a vote on war powers in Congress but is keeping that possibility in reserve.
Perspectives and scenarios
The trend points to increasing pressure on Trump to expedite any negotiated agreement, however suboptimal, before the political cost becomes unsustainable. The most likely scenario is that the administration will intensify its narrative of success—however much the facts on the ground contradict it—while seeking an off-ramp that allows it to present some kind of agreement as a decisive victory. The alternative scenario—a military escalation aimed at forcing the opening of the Strait before the political fallout becomes irreversible—cannot be ruled out, but it would be risky on every level: military, legal, economic, and diplomatic.
2. Japan, on the tightrope between Washington and Tehran
(Sources: The Economist, RSIS, CSIS, Japan Times, Council on Foreign Relations, The Diplomat, FDD)
Facts
Japan, which imports more than 90 percent of its crude oil from the Middle East, is facing its worst energy crisis in decades. Since the start of hostilities on February 28, the Japanese government has released 80 million barrels from its strategic reserves—equivalent to 45 days of national consumption—as part of the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) coordinated operation to release a total of 400 million barrels. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi met with Trump on March 19 at the White House, where she declared that she believed “only you, Donald, can achieve world peace,” although she refused to commit Maritime Self-Defense Force vessels to the active conflict zone, citing legal constraints under Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. The Iranian Foreign Minister, after meeting with his Japanese counterpart, urged Tokyo to “confront Washington and Tel Aviv resolutely.” Singapore’s RSIS published an analysis on March 18 —“Japan’s Balancing Act in the Iran War”— highlighting Tokyo’s strategic dilemmas, and Washington’s CSIS precisely detailed Japan’s energy exposure: 254 days of national reserves, 100 days of mandatory private reserves, and 4 million tons of liquefied natural gas (LNG) in storage.
Implications
The Japanese dilemma clearly illustrates the risk of war without sufficient prior diplomatic planning: US allies are forced into a conflict they did not request, bearing the energy and economic costs themselves, and facing Trump’s veiled threat that “non-contributing” countries do not deserve American protection. The RSIS warns that the conflict signals “deeper dilemmas for Japan as it tries to reconcile loyalty to the alliance with diplomatic independence.” The CSIS emphasizes that the war is accelerating Japan’s internal debate on nuclear energy—Japan has fifteen reactors in operation, with three ready to be restarted—and on its structural energy dependence on the Persian Gulf. Currency instability—the yen fell to its lowest level in twenty months, with the finance minister warning of possible intervention—adds domestic economic pressure that Prime Minister Takaichi cannot ignore.
Perspectives and scenarios
Tokyo will continue its policy of “calculated ambiguity”: rhetorically supporting Washington while avoiding direct military commitments. The possibility that Takaichi might authorize the deployment of minesweepers in the region constitutes a political and constitutional red line, the crossing of which would open a domestic debate with unpredictable consequences. Japan’s true leverage lies in its ability to coordinate the management of crude oil reserves in East Asia and its usefulness as a discreet intermediary with Tehran, thanks to diplomatic relations carefully maintained for decades. As the Japan Times points out, Japan is also emerging as an “energy security anchor” in the Indo-Pacific, while Washington remains focused on the Gulf.
3. Iran turns the Strait of Hormuz into a “toll booth”
(Sources: Financial Times, Foreign Policy, FDD, Lloyd’s List Intelligence, Bloomberg, Fortune)
Facts
Tehran’s jihadist oligarchy has transformed the Strait of Hormuz into what Lloyd’s List Intelligence—the leading authority on maritime intelligence—calls a “Tehran Toll Booth”: Iran charges fees of up to two million dollars per vessel to allow transit through its territorial waters, with payments demanded in Chinese yuan. According to Lloyd’s List data confirmed by Bloomberg, between 10 and 20 ships have already transited this corridor since mid-March, representing between 10 and 20 percent of all traffic through the strait since the start of the war. The Iranian Parliament is advancing legislation to formalize these fees permanently. On March 26, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi announced that ships from five countries—China, Russia, India, Iraq, and Pakistan—would be allowed to transit freely. On that same day, Israel announced the killing of Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) navy and directly responsible for the strait blockade operations, as well as the head of naval intelligence, Rear Admiral Behnam Rezaei. Iran did not immediately confirm the casualties.
Implications
What Iran has discovered—as Foreign Policy brilliantly points out—is that the Strait of Hormuz is its “real nuclear option,” cheaper, more immediate, and more devastating than any atomic weapon. The jihadist oligarchy has transformed its asymmetric control of the planet’s most strategic maritime corridor into a source of revenue, an instrument of diplomatic pressure—selecting who can pass and who cannot—and a demonstration of de facto sovereignty over international waters that flagrantly violates the law of the sea. The payment in yuan is no small detail: it is a strategic statement aimed at the dollar system and a deliberate nod to Beijing. The elimination of Tangsiri, meanwhile, will have to demonstrate whether it truly affects the operational capacity of the IRGC—which has spent forty years decentralizing its command precisely to withstand this type of targeted killing—or whether it is, as so often happens, a symbolic blow with limited tactical impact.
Perspectives and scenarios
The most troubling scenario, precisely outlined by the FDD, is that the “tollbooth” becomes the new permanent fixture of the Strait even after a potential ceasefire: a militarily weakened Iran will have every rational incentive to retain this instrument of extortion and power projection. It is urgent that the Trump Administration—with European support, conspicuously absent thus far—devise a strategy for the full reopening of the strait that does not depend solely on Iranian will. The proposal by academic Richard Haass for an “Open for All or Closed to All” policy, which would establish a defensive line in the Gulf of Oman to prevent Iranian vessels from reaching their final destinations until Tehran unconditionally reopens the strait, deserves urgent attention.
4. Trump extends the deadline to attack Iranian energy facilities until April 6.
(Sources: Reuters, CNBC, Bloomberg, Axios, The Hill, AP, CBS News, Irish Times)
Facts
On Thursday, March 26, President Trump posted a message on his Truth Social platform declaring an extension of the “period for the destruction of power plants” until Monday, April 6 , at 8:00 p.m. Eastern Time, “at the request of the Iranian government.” This is the second extension since he threatened on Saturday, March 22, to “obliterate” (destroy) Iranian power plants if Tehran did not reopen the Strait of Hormuz within 48 hours. The first extension was for five days, granted on Monday, March 23, “following very good and productive talks” that Iran denied having held. At the Cabinet meeting on Thursday, Special Envoy Steve Witkoff confirmed that the United States had delivered a 15-point peace plan to Iran—through Pakistan as an intermediary—and that Pakistan, Egypt, and Turkey had also offered to mediate. In an interview with Fox News, Trump clarified that Iran had requested a one-week extension, but he granted ten days “because they gave me ships”—referring to the ten oil tankers that, according to Trump, Iran allowed to transit the strait as a “gift.” Iran publicly rejected the American proposal and presented its own counterproposal of five conditions, including recognition of “Iranian sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz”—an unacceptable condition for any American administration. Envoy Witkoff acknowledged to the Cabinet that Iran has “repeatedly rejected everything we’ve asked for” in the negotiations.
Implications
The second extension confirms that Trump’s ultimatum regarding the energy plants has all the characteristics of what is known in negotiation strategy as a “discounting signal”: a threat that is repeated without being carried out loses its deterrent effect exponentially with each new extension. Tehran’s jihadist oligarchy has perfectly understood this mechanism and exploits it skillfully. By denying any direct negotiations while admitting—through intermediaries—that it is “reviewing” the American proposal, Tehran maintains pressure on the oil market, legitimizes its position in the eyes of its domestic public, and forces Washington to reveal its hand. Iran’s condition of recognizing its sovereignty over the Strait is, of course, unacceptable, but its inclusion serves to raise the bar for any agreement and buy time. The threat to attack civilian power plants also raises a serious legal and moral objection: international experts in humanitarian law have pointed out that it would constitute a war crime under the Geneva Conventions, something the Administration is well aware of and which structurally reduces the credibility of the ultimatum.
Perspectives and scenarios
The most likely scenario before April 6 is a third extension or, alternatively, a controlled and surgical escalation aimed at regaining deterrent credibility without targeting civilian infrastructure—for example, a more intense attack on IRGC facilities or the Strait’s minefield. Turkey’s participation as a mediator is strategically relevant but introduces Ankara’s own interests into the equation—a variable that Rubio and Witkoff should manage with extreme care. In any case, April 6 is the next high-tension date, and the markets are already pricing it in.
5. Financial markets plummet amid war uncertainty
(Sources: Reuters, Bloomberg, CNBC, CBS News, Axios, Irish Times, OECD)
Facts
On Thursday, March 26, the main US stock market indexes registered their biggest drop since the start of the Iranian conflict: the S&P 500 fell 1.74 percent—its biggest daily loss since early 2026—while the NASDAQ lost 2.4 percent. Asian markets also fell in the early stages of trading. Brent crude traded around $107 a barrel—after briefly approaching $108—although it moderated slightly after the announcement of the Trump administration’s extension. Brent has accumulated its biggest monthly gain in recent oil market history in March, after reaching $126 at the height of the conflict on February 28. Iran is keeping approximately eight million barrels of oil out of circulation each day, which the OECD—which maintained its global growth forecast at 2.9 percent for 2026 but lowered its outlook for Europe—already considers a systemic risk factor. The price of gasoline is approaching nine dollars per gallon in California.
Implications
Financial volatility is the starkest expression of the true cost of a poorly planned war. Markets surgically discount what official rhetoric attempts to conceal: the lack of a credible exit strategy and the contradictory messages between Trump and Iranian negotiators generate a geopolitical risk premium that penalizes the entire global economy. The price of gasoline—the most immediate political barometer for the average American—is both the most visible cost and the most powerful argument for those in Congress demanding an urgent negotiated solution. Europe, which has not sent a single ship to the Gulf, suffers the energy consequences without having had any say in the original decision: the OECD has already lowered its outlook for the continent, and the LNG shock—in which Asia competes fiercely—is particularly affecting southern European countries.
Perspectives and scenarios
As long as the Strait of Hormuz remains under de facto Iranian control, energy markets will maintain a structural risk premium that will not be mitigated by mere words. A negotiated reopening before April 6 would produce an immediate and substantial rally in the markets; a further escalation would push Brent crude toward $120 or even $130. Europe, which Secretary Rubio harshly criticized at the G7 foreign ministers’ meeting in Vaux-de-Cernay—”the war in Ukraine is not America’s war, but we are contributing more than anyone”—would pay the highest price in relative terms if the conflict drags on.
6. The IOC prohibits transgender women from competing in the female category
(Sources: IOC, CNN, Washington Post, NPR, Time, BBC)
Facts
On Thursday, March 26, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) announced from Lausanne a new eligibility policy for women’s Olympic events, effective from the 2028 Los Angeles Games. The rule stipulates that participation in any women’s event is restricted to biological females, determined by a single genetic test: the SRY gene test (Sex-Determining Region Y), which detects the onset of male sexual development in utero. IOC President Kirsty Coventry stated that “the decision protects the fairness, safety, and integrity” of women’s sport, adding that “it is absolutely clear that it would not be fair for biological males to compete in the women’s category.” The policy is not retroactive and does not affect recreational or grassroots sport. Several international federations—including World Athletics, the International Ski Federation, and the International Boxing Federation—had already adopted this same criterion. The decision was the result of a review initiated in September 2024 and included consultations with specialists in sports science, endocrinology, gender medicine, ethics, and law. The test is performed using a saliva sample, a cheek swab, or blood, and is valid for life unless there are indications of an error in the result.
Implications
The IOC’s decision is of historic importance that transcends the sporting sphere: it represents the formal enshrinement, by the highest Olympic body on the planet, of the principle that the biology of sex is an objective fact, irreducible to subjective gender identity for the purposes of elite sports competition. President Coventry is correct that the performance differences associated with male sexual development objectively affect all disciplines that depend on strength, power, and endurance. The attempt by some pressure groups to present this rule as a “thirty-year setback in women’s equality” is, at best, a conceptual misunderstanding and, at worst, political manipulation: protecting the women’s category is protecting women, not attacking them. The IOC is careful to point out that athletes with a positive SRY test can continue to compete in the men’s category, in open or mixed categories, and in any other format for which they meet the requirements.
Perspectives and scenarios
The IOC’s decision will generate intense legal and activist debate in the two years leading up to Los Angeles 2028. Some national federations—especially in Western Europe and the progressive Anglo-Saxon world—may attempt to challenge it. Most likely, however, the rule will stand: the precedent set by World Athletics, the legislative trend in the United States and the United Kingdom, and the overwhelming scientific evidence on the performance advantage associated with male development all point in the same direction. The IOC has acted, for once, with the courage that the defense of women’s sport demanded.
III. MEDIA RACK
The Economist
He published an analysis of “wavering support” for the war in the United States, citing the collapse in support among independents and the growing pessimism about the objectives of the conflict. He also analyzed Japan’s “balancing act” regarding the war, highlighting the tension between energy dependence on the Gulf and Atlantic loyalty.
Reuters
It reports on Trump’s second extension on Iranian power plants until April 6, detailing Pakistan’s role as intermediary and the fifteen-point framework presented by Witkoff.
Financial Times
It analyzes how Iran is “cashing in” the Strait of Hormuz, turning its asymmetric control of the corridor into a source of income and diplomatic leverage of the first magnitude.
Bloomberg
It reports on Trump’s extension of the deadline and explains in detail the Iranian blockade mechanism of the Strait, with updated maritime traffic data. It confirms the “toll booth” mechanism with data from Lloyd’s List.
CNBC
It details the evolution of the financial markets —S&P 500 at minus one point seventy-four percent, Brent at one hundred and eight dollars— and includes Trump’s statement in the cabinet about the “ten oil tankers” that Iran let pass as a “gift” to the United States.
Axios
It reveals that the fifteen-point American proposal was delivered through Pakistan and that Turkey, Egypt, and Pakistan have offered to mediate. A source close to the negotiations indicates that Iran “is seeking an honorable way out” but that “the main problem has been Iranian distrust and suspicion that the United States is deceiving them again.”
CBS News
It includes statements by Secretary of State Marco Rubio harshly criticizing NATO for its inaction regarding the blockade of the Strait and British intelligence information about Putin’s “hidden hand” in the Iranian war effort — training and intelligence provided by Russia to Iran before the start of the war.
Al Jazeera
It covers in detail the Iranian announcement of selectively opening the strait to ships from five countries charging in yuan, and criticizes the American proposal to attack civilian plants as a potential war crime under international humanitarian law.
Foreign Policy
He published an in-depth analysis entitled “Controlling the Strait of Hormuz is Iran’s Real Nuclear Option,” arguing that control of the strait is a cheaper and more devastating weapon for the regime than the atomic bomb, and that this lesson will last long after any ceasefire.
CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies)
It publishes a comprehensive analysis of the implications of the Iranian crisis for Japan, detailing strategic reserves, alliance pressures, and the nuclear energy debate. It recommends that Washington work with Tokyo to make Japan an “energy security anchor” in East Asia.
RSIS—S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (Singapore)
He published “Japan’s Balancing Act in the Iran War,” analyzing Tokyo’s dilemma between Atlantic loyalty and diplomatic independence, and warning that the conflict signaled “deeper dilemmas” for Japanese foreign policy.
FDD — Foundation for Defense of Democracies
It analyzes the “Tehran toll booth” and proposes sanctions on Chinese financial intermediaries that process yuan payments as an urgent countermeasure, in addition to supporting the “Open for All or Closed to All” proposal.
CFR—Council on Foreign Relations
An analysis by academic Sheila A. Smith on Prime Minister Takaichi’s dilemma in Washington has been published, highlighting Japanese constitutional limitations and the risk that the Washington-Tokyo alliance will face “one of the most severe crises in its history.”
Pew Research Center
The largest sample survey on American public opinion regarding the war is published —three thousand five hundred and twenty-four adults, conducted between March 16 and 22—: fifty-nine percent consider that attacking Iran was a wrong decision.
NPR / PBS News / Marist Poll
It registers a fifty-six percent opposition to US military action, with only thirty-six percent approving of Trump’s management and fifty-nine percent of independents disapproving of his handling of the conflict.
Time/CNN/Washington Post/NPR
They extensively cover the IOC’s decision on transgender women, the reactions of human rights groups and activists, and the implications for the 2028 Los Angeles Olympic Games.
Japan Times
On March 26, it publishes an analysis of how the war in Iran redefines Japan’s role in Indo-Pacific security and the Taiwan issue, with Japan emerging as a “bridge” between Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security.
Irish Times
It offers the most complete and up-to-date coverage of the conflict, including information that NATO was criticized by Trump for “doing absolutely nothing,” the casualty count—more than 1,900 in Iran, more than 1,100 in Lebanon, 18 in Israel and 13 American military personnel—and the Emirati interception of 15 ballistic missiles and 11 drones on Thursday, March 26.
IV. RISK TRAFFIC LIGHT
🔴 MAXIMUM RISK — Blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and global energy shock
The effective closure of the planet’s most important energy artery—with approximately eight million barrels per day taken out of circulation—and the transformation of the Strait into an Iranian tollbooth constitute the primary systemic risk. With Brent crude at $107 and the S&P 500 falling 1.74 percent, the global economy is absorbing a shock comparable to that of the energy crises of the 1970s, according to the IEA. Without an effective reopening before April 6, the shock will worsen.
🔴 MAXIMUM RISK — Military escalation and threat to Iranian civilian infrastructure
Trump’s threat to destroy Iranian power plants—postponed but not withdrawn—has not been withdrawn, only deferred. Its execution would constitute, according to reputable experts in international humanitarian law, a serious violation of the Geneva Conventions. The lack of a plan for the aftermath remains the major strategic weakness of the entire Operation Epic Fury.
🟠 HIGH RISK — Internal political erosion in the United States
With 59 percent of Americans opposed to the war, 13 military casualties, gasoline nearing nine dollars a gallon in California, and independents distancing themselves from Trump, domestic political pressure for an accelerated agreement—even an imperfect one—is growing week by week. The November midterm elections are the horizon that sets the timeline.
🟠 HIGH RISK — Regional destabilization by Iranian terrorist proxies
The United Arab Emirates intercepted 15 Iranian ballistic missiles and 11 drones on Thursday, March 26—bringing the total intercepted since the start of the conflict to 372 ballistic missiles, 15 cruise missiles, and 1,826 drones. Israel is regularly subjected to missile salvos. Despite the death of Tangsiri, the IRGC maintains full operational capacity for its terrorist organizations—Hezbollah, Houthis, Iraqi militias—and its infrastructure for controlling the strait.
🟡 MODERATE RISK — Negotiations collapse before April 6
Pakistan, Turkey, and Egypt are acting as mediators. Iran has rejected the fifteen-point framework but, through intermediaries, has signaled an interest in negotiating. The risk of a complete breakdown in communication channels exists but is not the primary scenario. Turkish mediation, with its own interests at stake, is the most unpredictable variable.
🟡 MODERATE RISK — Energy impact on Asian allies
Japan, South Korea, India, and China are suffering the most severe consequences of the strait blockade. The crisis will accelerate the debate on nuclear energy in Japan and on the reconfiguration of energy supply chains throughout the Indo-Pacific. China’s position—receiving LNG and Iranian oil and paying in yuan—warrants close geopolitical scrutiny.
🟢 LOW RISK — IOC decision on women’s category
The IOC’s new SRY gene eligibility policy is legally sound, scientifically supported, and politically inevitable in the medium term. The risk of legal challenges exists but is manageable. Legislative trends in the United States, the United Kingdom, and other countries point in the same direction as the Olympic standard.
V. EDITORIAL COMMENT
There are wars won on the battlefield and wars lost at the negotiating table before the dust even settles. Operation Epic Fury has been underway for twenty-seven days, and the symptoms of a Pyrrhic victory loom with each new extension, each watered-down ultimatum, each contradictory message emanating simultaneously from the White House and the Iranian embassy in Geneva. Trump is right that the jihadist oligarchy in Tehran is an existential threat to the stability of the Middle East and to the international order that has guaranteed the relative peace of recent decades. He is wrong—or at least he hasn’t been so far—in the execution of a strategy that seems to have been designed with the tactical equanimity of a tweet and the strategic depth of a Saturday afternoon.
The Iranian “tollbooth” in the Strait of Hormuz is the most eloquent demonstration that Tehran’s jihadist oligarchy has learned something Washington was far too slow to grasp: the sea cannot be conquered solely with missiles and bombers. Forty years of preparing for the asymmetric domination of the planet’s most vital maritime corridor have produced a weapon that, as Foreign Policy’s analysis accurately points out, is “cheaper, faster, and in many ways more devastating than the atomic bomb.” Payment in yuan is not a financial whim: it is a strategic statement aimed squarely at the heart of the dollar system and a deliberate wink to Beijing. The fact that the Iranian Parliament is legislating to permanently formalize these tolls should be setting off alarm bells at the State Department and the Pentagon—and at the same time, the World Bank has announced accelerated financial support for client countries hardest hit by the energy impact of the war, indicating that the international community now assumes this conflict will not be resolved in a matter of days.
The behavior of American public opinion should surprise no one who has studied the history of US military interventions since World War II. The Pew survey is devastating: 59 percent of citizens believe the decision to attack was wrong, 45 percent think the operation is not going well, and there is a gap among independents that Trump cannot afford to lose with the November midterm elections in mind. The “rally around the flag” that usually follows the start of any conflict has evaporated with unprecedented speed, and the reason is as simple as it is painful: Americans see the price of gasoline rising relentlessly, they have no clarity about the objectives of the war, and they are witnessing 13 military casualties that no one was able to convincingly explain to them before the first bomb fell on February 28. This is not unpatriotic; it is the natural reaction of a people who were not consulted before a war was started without a credible plan to win it, or, above all, to manage it once won.
Japan teaches us something important amidst all this noise: that even the most loyal, most disciplined ally, the one most willing to bend to Washington’s demands—with the exception of the Europeans themselves at their best—has its own constitutional limits, its own energy priorities, and its own channels of communication with Tehran that can be valuable if allowed to operate. Prime Minister Takaichi has acted more prudently than her public pronouncements in the Oval Office—”Only you, Donald, can achieve world peace”—might suggest. She has protected the alliance without committing Japanese troops to a conflict that Japanese international law does not permit her to wage, she has kept the diplomatic channel open with Iran, and she has materially contributed oil reserves to the stabilization of the global energy market. This is precisely what a wise ally should do in these circumstances.
Europe’s mediocre political class, on the other hand, continues to be conspicuous by its absence, with the consistency of those who have made strategic irrelevance their defining characteristic. Marco Rubio, at the G7 foreign ministers’ meeting in Vaux-de-Cernay, was not exaggerating when he criticized NATO for not sending a single ship to the Gulf: “Ukraine is not America’s war, but we are contributing more than anyone,” he said. Europe is suffering the energy shock—the OECD has already lowered its outlook for the continent—but Europe has not contributed a single steel rivet to the protection of the energy routes on which its industry and well-being depend. This chronic inability to take its own security, defense, and destiny seriously is the permanent strategic shame of the European Union in the 21st century—a continent that delegates the protection of its vital interests to others and then laments when those others make decisions without consulting it.
Finally, a note of common sense amidst so much geopolitical turmoil: the IOC’s decision to restrict the women’s category to biological females through the SRY gene test is correct, courageous, and necessary. President Coventry has had the courage to state what scientific evidence has been demonstrating for years—that male sexual development confers objective and irreducible performance advantages in all events that depend on strength, power, and endurance—and has acted accordingly. Those who present this rule as an attack on women’s rights are making a fundamental conceptual error that should be pointed out unequivocally: protecting the integrity and fairness of women’s competition is, precisely and without any ambiguity, protecting women. The IOC has reminded everyone that elite sport, with its reverence for the thousandth of a second and the millimeter, cannot be a field of ideological experimentation: it is a space where biology matters, where the rules must be the same for everyone, and where fairness cannot be sacrificed on the altar of any narrative, however well-intentioned it may be.