By Gustavo de Arístegui,
April 20, 2026
I. BRIEF INTRODUCTION
Sunday, April 19, and the early hours of Monday, April 20, concluded with a day of high volatility that, in just a few hours, dispelled the fragile optimism cultivated throughout the previous week. The central focus of the international scene remains the so-called—and analytically apt— variable-temperature war between the United States and Iran, a conflict that allows neither a clear victory nor an acceptable defeat. This weekend, in barely forty-eight hours, it shifted from stock market enthusiasm over the presumed reopening of the Strait of Hormuz to the dread provoked by the sight of the US Navy boarding an Iranian cargo ship in the Gulf of Oman after firing on its engine room. The bilateral truce, agreed upon on April 7 under the mediation of Pakistan, Egypt, and Turkey, expires this Tuesday, April 21—and it does so with markets reopened and up seven percent, with Brent crude once again above $95 a barrel, and with President Trump publicly threatening to resume the bombing campaign.
Meanwhile, the Russian-Ukrainian war of attrition reaches its 1,516th day with a new wave of Ukrainian attacks on the Russian oil and drone industries; Israel continues its operations in southern Lebanon despite Washington-led diplomacy; the Indo-Pacific is being covered with the start today of the Balikatan 2026 exercises with full Japanese participation—a historic first; and Venezuela confirms—with Delcy Rodríguez as de facto president and Jorge Rodríguez at the head of the National Assembly—that the process of free elections remains blocked by the old guard of Chavismo. In the Gulf, the “open-close-board” sequence in the Strait of Hormuz confirms what I have been describing as a contained systemic fracture : neither side wants—nor can afford—a full-blown escalation, but neither is willing to concede on the essentials. The result is continuous low-intensity skirmishes with explosive potential.
II. MOST IMPORTANT NEWS OF THE LAST 24 HOURS
1. The US Navy boards an Iranian cargo ship in the Gulf of Oman, and the price of crude oil skyrockets.
Facts.
President Donald Trump confirmed on Sunday that the Marines had taken control of an Iranian-flagged cargo ship in the Gulf of Oman after the Navy fired warning shots—including one that hit the engine room—at a vessel that, according to the White House, was attempting to circumvent the naval blockade imposed on April 13. This is the first capture and the first vessel fired upon since the maritime quarantine was established. On Saturday, an oil tanker was fired upon by gunboats of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and a container ship belonging to the CMA CGM shipping company received warning shots. Brent crude jumped 5.8% to $95.42 a barrel, and West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude rose 6.4% to $87.90; Dow Jones futures fell more than 400 points, and European natural gas rose as much as 11%. The human pipeline of diplomacy is cracking: Iran says —via IRNA (Islamic Republic News Agency)— that it will not attend a second round in Islamabad while the blockade persists.
Implications.
The weekend’s sequence—Trump announces the opening of the Strait, Brent crude plunges 11%, Araqchi qualifies the announcement, Tehran closes it again and fires back, Washington intervenes—is a pure display of variable-temperature warfare : the conflict ignites and extinguishes in cycles of hours, not weeks, with real economic costs for the rest of the world. The Iranian dictatorial and mafia-like oligarchy, deprived of its original leadership after Khamenei’s death on February 28, seeks to demonstrate—to its own regime base and its proxies—that it retains the capacity to inflict damage; the United States, for its part, cannot allow the Strait to become a revolutionary tollbooth without definitively eroding its regional credibility. The capture of the cargo ship sets a precedent—the first since the beginning of the blockade—that will have a disciplining effect on the rest of Iran’s phantom fleet.
Perspectives and scenarios.
Three plausible paths in the next three to five days.
First , a de facto extension of the truce—Pakistani, Egyptian, and Turkish mediators say there is an agreement in principle to extend it beyond April 22—with a second round of talks in Islamabad in the middle of this week, a hypothesis that is currently less likely but not yet ruled out.
Second, that President Trump authorize limited strikes—energy infrastructure, not nuclear—to force Tehran back to the table, following the pattern of measured escalation that I have been describing.
Third, a major accident in the Strait—the sinking of an Asian flag-of-convenience tanker or an Iranian attack on a US vessel—leading to a limited conventional clash, a scenario I still consider the least likely but not impossible. The price of Brent crude is the best indicator: as long as it remains below $100, the diplomatic margin survives; above that, economic pressure on Washington and its Asian partners will force decisions.
2. One week has passed since the Islamabad talks failed: the truce expires on Tuesday and Pakistani mediation returns to Tehran
Facts.
After 21 hours of negotiations on April 11 and 12 in Islamabad—chaired by Vice President JD Vance for the US and Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Baghr Ghalibaf for Iran— the truce agreed upon on April 7 expires on Tuesday, April 21. Pakistani Army Chief of Staff Field Marshal Asim Munir traveled to Tehran in recent days carrying a new US proposal centered on a three-page Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) leaked to Axios: a “voluntary” moratorium on uranium enrichment (Washington demands 20 years, Tehran offered 5, and the mediators are working toward a compromise), the transfer of part of the stockpile of 60% enriched uranium—approximately 450 kilograms—to a third country, and the release of up to 20 billion dollars in frozen Iranian assets. President Trump has written on Truth Social that he “will not change hands,” a statement that contradicts the wording of the MoU but fits his negotiating style. Pakistani, Egyptian, and Turkish mediators met on Friday with Saudi officials in the “Turkey Quartet” format.
Implications.
The core of the disagreement remains the same: Washington demands verifiable assurances that Iran’s nuclear program is dismantled; Tehran demands to maintain—even if only as a legal fiction—the right to enrich uranium for civilian purposes. What is striking about the current situation is the dual nature of the Iranian interlocutor. The delegation negotiating in Islamabad ultimately answers to the IRGC quartet—Ghalibaf, Speaker of Parliament but former IRGC general; Ahmed Vahidi, IRGC commander-in-chief; Mohamed Zolghadr, former IRGC general and head of the Al-Quds Brigades, and secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC); and Rezaee, military advisor to the Supreme Leader—four ultraconservatives who have blocked the reformist wing of Pezeshkian. Ghalibaf, the speaker of the Iranian parliament—subordinate to Vahidi—continues to appear in official statements as a formal interlocutor, and his characterization of the US blockade as a “thoughtless and ignorant decision” marks the public limits of Iranian flexibility. Herein lies the paradox of the decapitation : with the original leadership eliminated, the regime is less monolithic but also less capable of making decisive decisions; it negotiates haltingly and needs to systematically return to Tehran to validate each concession.
Perspectives and scenarios.
My prediction is that the agreement in principle to extend the truce will be formalized—late, poorly, and with fine print—within the next thirty-six hours, driven by the turmoil in the energy markets and Iran’s evident negotiating fatigue. But the extension will be short—probably ten to fifteen days—and will not resolve the structural problem: Iran will not hand over its 2,000 kilograms of enriched uranium without guarantees that Washington cannot offer without projecting an image of extreme weakness to its regional terrorist proxies. The second round in Islamabad, if it takes place, will have as its more realistic objective a freeze-for-freeze formula—Tehran halts enrichment to 60%, Washington releases an initial tranche of assets—which resolves nothing but buys time. As Kissinger so often warned, in the Middle East, time is the scarcest commodity and, at the same time, the only currency no one wants to pay.
3. Israel continues its offensive in southern Lebanon despite the historic dialogue in Washington
Facts.
The Israeli army continues its ground and air operations in southern Lebanon—with five divisions deployed, including the 36th, 91st, 98th, 146th, and 162nd—and announces its intention to “overwhelm” Bint Jbeil. On April 8, hours after the ceasefire with Iran was declared, “Operation Eternal Darkness” struck more than 100 targets in 10 minutes, with over 357 deaths reported by Lebanese authorities and a total toll of over 2,500 dead and 7,000 wounded since the beginning of March. On April 14, Secretary of State Marco Rubio chaired the first direct meeting between Israeli and Lebanese envoys in more than three decades in Washington; Israeli diplomat Ariel Kahana declared that both sides “are on the same side” against Hezbollah. However, Hezbollah refuses to disband, and Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem said he does not recognize either the government negotiating with Israel or the outcome of the negotiations. Hezbollah MK Hassan Fadlallah denounced the negotiations as a defeat and a “concession” to Israel.
Implications.
The division of the chessboard between an “Iranian front” subject to a truce and a “Lebanese front” that Netanyahu claims is a “separate skirmish”—in Trump’s own words—allows Israel to continue the operation on the ground that matters to it: the physical dismantling, kilometer by kilometer, of Hezbollah’s terrorist infrastructure—which is, let us never forget, a jihadist terrorist organization, not a “militia” or a “resistance movement,” but an arm of the Tehran regime with tens of thousands of deaths on its conscience. The formula is militarily effective but politically dangerous: it fuels the narrative that Washington is granting Tel Aviv unlimited “license to hunt” and provides Tehran—which continues to demand a cessation of operations in Lebanon as a condition of the agreement—with an inexhaustible propaganda argument. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s suspension of defense cooperation with Israel is a sign that European patience is running out.
Perspectives and scenarios.
The ten-day truce between Israel and Lebanon announced by Trump on April 16 is formally in effect, but the rift between the Lebanese government of President Yousef Aoun—determined to capitalize on Hezbollah’s weakness to restore national and institutional sovereignty—and Hezbollah itself, which rejects any disarmament, makes a new outbreak foreseeable within a week or two. The real question is whether Lebanon will manage—for the first time in forty years—to become a fully sovereign state with a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. My assessment is that there is a narrow, and probably brief, historical window of opportunity that requires much stronger Western support than has been forthcoming so far.
4. Ukraine strikes again at Russia’s oil and drone industry; Moscow rejects Easter truce
Facts.
On the night of April 18-19, Ukrainian Defense Forces simultaneously struck four key Russian energy infrastructure facilities: the Novokuibyshev and Sizran refineries (Samara region), the Vysotsk Lukoil-2 oil terminal (Leningrad region), and the Tikhoretsk pumping station (Krasnodar region), as well as the Atlant Aero drone manufacturing plant in Taganrog. In an amphibious assault in Crimea, three Russian warships—including the large landing ships Yamal and Azov—were hit. President Zelenskyy estimated losses for the Russian oil industry in March alone at $2.3 billion. On the 1,516th day of the invasion, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry reported 153 engagements, 68 airstrikes, 216 guided bombs, 9,360 kamikaze drone strikes, and 3,404 enemy bombings, with an additional 1,070 Russian casualties—bringing the official Ukrainian tally to approximately 1,318,220 Russian soldiers killed or wounded since February 2022. On the diplomatic front, the Kremlin—through Peskov—rejected the Ukrainian proposal for an Easter truce; Ukraine, in turn, agreed to cooperate with Hungary by reopening the Druzhba oil pipeline in exchange for Budapest lifting its blockade on the €90 billion European loan.
Implications.
The balance sheet for the first quarter of the year is, paradoxically, more favorable to Kyiv than is acknowledged in foreign ministries. Between March 3 and March 31, Russia lost 12 square miles of Ukrainian territory—equivalent to half of Manhattan—a reversal of the pace of advance that, while modest, is significant. The systematic campaign of deep strikes against refineries, terminals, and drone factories—made possible by the accelerated development of the Ukrainian long-range drone industry—is eroding the Russian war economy at a rate that no conventional analysis predicted. Peskov’s rejection of the Easter truce—an essentially symbolic truce—reveals a fundamental truth: the Kremlin is not interested in loosening its grip, because any freeze on the front would solidify the “Ukrainian success” of recent months and prevent it from presenting the war as a victory to its own public.
Perspectives and scenarios.
The decisive variable in the coming weeks is the €90 billion European loan backed by frozen Russian assets, whose release depends—unusually—on Hungary’s vote. If Brussels manages to unblock the issue, Ukraine will have guaranteed resources until well into 2027; if not, the financial pressure on Kyiv will become suffocating in the third quarter. The question for Europe—which concerns us so much—is whether this time its leaders will understand that they are not financing someone else’s war but rather paying for their own security at the lowest possible price. As the great Raymond Aron wrote, “There are scenarios in which neutrality is impossible; the only options are to resist and capitulate.”
5. China intensifies pressure on Taiwan and the South China Sea; Balikatan exercises begin today with Japan as a full partner
Facts.
The People’s Republic of China has issued airspace restriction notices over large swathes of maritime territory for up to 40 days—an unusually long period, characteristically longer than that of conventional exercises—and has deployed thousands of fishing vessels organized into formations more than 200 miles long in the East China Sea. In the South China Sea, Reuters satellite images from April 10 and 11 show the deployment of a new floating barrier at the entrance to Scarborough Reef, with a reinforced presence of Chinese coast guard vessels and naval ships. Today, April 20, the annual Balikatan 2026 exercises between the United States and the Philippines begin, with Japan participating for the first time as a full member—a historic break in the Indo-Pacific security architecture. On Friday, April 17, the Japanese destroyer Inazuma transited the Taiwan Strait — the fourth passage by ships of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force and the first since Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi took office.
Implications.
Tokyo has abandoned—it seems definitively—the strategic ambiguity that characterized its policy for the past four decades. Takaichi’s public reference to a “Taiwan contingency” in the Japanese Diet last November, coupled with Japan’s accession to the Balikatan as a full member, the passage of the destroyer Inazuma through the Taiwan Strait, and the rare earth agreements with France, outline an explicit Japanese doctrine: the Taiwanese status quo is of vital interest to Japan. This is a Copernican shift. Beijing is responding through familiar means—economic coercion against Tokyo, restrictions on dual-trade exports, maritime harassment—and through a new approach that is beginning to dominate: prolonged airspace restrictions that normalize the Chinese military presence as an everyday reality. Chinese expansionism in the Pacific, the Maldives, Sri Lanka, Africa, and Latin America is advancing with the same gradualist logic: taking irreversible steps that will be too costly to reverse.
Perspectives and scenarios.
The Balikatan exercises—which will continue until May 8, with the deployment of the Japanese destroyer Inazuma during the naval operations phase—will constitute a major test of Western deterrence. I expect minor incidents of friction—minor blockades, interceptions, coast guard harassment—but no escalation. The real turning point will come toward the end of the year, when Beijing assesses the new US administration’s position on Taiwan and President Trump’s operational return to the Asian stage after the end—if it comes—of the Iranian cycle. Meanwhile, Europe remains absent, as so often before. Without a credible European presence in the Indo-Pacific—which requires expeditionary naval capabilities and coordination with Tokyo, Seoul, and Canberra—old Europe effectively relinquishes any voice in the emerging world order.
6. Venezuela: Rodríguez entrenches the old Chavismo; Machado and Rubio press for elections
Facts.
Four months after Nicolás Maduro’s capture by U.S. special forces on January 3, 2026, the tandem formed by Vice President and now interim President Delcy Rodríguez and her brother, the sinister psychiatrist-repressor Jorge Rodríguez—president of the National Assembly—is consolidating its control of the Chavista apparatus through a combination of cosmetic openings and the obstruction of a substantive democratic transition. In March, full diplomatic relations between the United States and Venezuela were restored; the Assembly passed an amnesty law for political crimes committed by the Chavista regime between 1999 and 2026—which releases political prisoners but also shields the ruling elite—and mining legislation that opens gold and rare earth mining to foreign capital. Jorge Rodríguez has ruled out any elections in the short term in an interview with Newsmax. Opposition leader María Corina Machado —Nobel Peace Prize laureate, with 67% of the vote intention compared to Rodríguez’s 25% according to the Gold Glove poll— is maintaining a diplomatic offensive in Washington and a public demand for elections within nine to ten months.
Implications.
The Chavista narco-dictatorial regime—which President Trump has aptly described as a mafia organization dedicated to cocaine trafficking, protecting the Cartel of the Suns and the Tren de Aragua gang, and exporting terrorism—has not fallen. It has simply changed its face. The sinister Rodríguez brothers, the hard core of Chavismo from the very beginning, have managed to present themselves as Washington’s “reliable partners” in managing Venezuelan oil, at the price of a tacit pardon for the massacres and brutal repression of the last 27 years and a blank check for the continuation of the repressive structure. Secretary of State Rubio’s priority—he has reiterated the “stabilization, recovery, transition” framework—has both an optimistic and an alarming interpretation. The optimistic one: to buy time until Venezuelan oil starts flowing and internal popular pressure makes the clan’s continued rule unsustainable. The alarming thing is that the Trump administration—satisfied with the “success” of capturing Maduro and the flow of crude oil—no longer wants to stir up the hornet’s nest and that the “transition” is postponed indefinitely .
Perspectives and scenarios.
The Gordian knot is the Venezuelan Army: General Padrino López and seven other high-ranking officers have been removed, but twenty-five years of Chavista indoctrination cannot be reversed with four dismissals.
Three scenarios:
First, a negotiated transition with an electoral calendar in 2026-2027, Machado victorious with guarantees of no persecution for the Rodríguez family;
Second, an indefinite Chavista entrenchment with an apparently friendly facade towards the US and elections postponed indefinitely ;
Third, internal implosion and a new power vacuum—the least likely but the most feared. It is crucial that Washington not confuse the short-term stability of the Rodríguez clan with the strategic interests of the United States and the hemisphere. Tolerating a mafia-like dictatorship disguised as a trading partner is, by any serious standard, immoral and a betrayal of the millions of Venezuelans who are the primary victims of this despicable regime.
III. MEDIA RACK
Leading Anglo-Saxon newspapers . The New York Times and the Washington Post lead with the Marines’ capture of the Iranian tanker in the Gulf of Oman and with analysis of the fragility of the agreement before April 21; both underscore the pressure from Republican hawks against any release of Iranian assets. The Wall Street Journal focuses on the impact on the markets—Brent at 95, Dow futures down 0.82%—and reports that Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent is considering a temporary extension of the waiver on Russian crude to alleviate energy shortages. The Financial Times headlines on the boarding and the evident internal divisions in Iran; The Times of London highlights “Trump’s frustration” and the European decision to let Washington carry the negotiating weight. The Telegraph publishes a scathing editorial against the Iranian dictatorial oligarchy; The Guardian reiterates its criticism of Netanyahu for his actions in Lebanon.
The European continental press . Le Monde and Le Figaro both highlight the diplomatic confusion of the weekend and publish parallel reports on Pakistan’s mediating role—”unexpected but effective”—. Libération maintains its critical stance toward the Israeli operation in southern Lebanon. Le Point , L’Express , and Le Nouvel Observateur dedicate editorials to “European weakness.” The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung emphasizes the losses for the Russian oil industry—2.3 billion in March—and the implications for German energy markets. Die Welt and Die Zeit delve into the debate on frozen Russian assets. In Italy, Corriere della Sera reports on Italy’s suspension of defense cooperation with Israel; L’Osservatore Romano publishes Pope Leo XIV’s message of the 19th expressing “solidarity” with Ukraine and condemning the escalation of violence against civilians. La Croix echoes this same papal appeal.
Mid-tier American newspapers and think tanks . Axios and Politico are essential reading today for their leaks about the three-page Washington-Tehran MoU. The Hill and USA Today are tracking the pulse of the US Congress: Republican Senators Mike Lee and Rand Paul continue to question the legality of the naval blockade. Bloomberg leads the market analysis; CNBC is publishing roundtables on the price of crude oil. Foreign Affairs is publishing an essay by Karen Young (Columbia) on the “political economy of the Iran deal.” The National Interest —with a relevant article today on Venezuela—warns of the risks of consolidating the Rodríguez regime. Recent reports from the CSIS , the IISS , the RUSI (Royal United Services Institute), and the IFRI (French Institute of International Relations) converge on the interpretation of a “contained systemic fracture.”
Arab, Israeli, and Asian press . Al-Arabiya and Asharq Al-Awsat —which I read with particular attention—reflect Saudi concern about the prolonged blockade and obstruction of the Strait of Hormuz; Arab News and Saudi Gazette insist on the need for an agreement that includes the Gulf States. Al-Jazeera —with its well-known bias—highlights the humanitarian damage in Lebanon and Iran. Yedioth Ahronoth and Jerusalem Post celebrate the progress at Bint Jbeil; Haaretz publishes an editorial critical of the humanitarian cost. The Times of India and the Hindustan Times underscore Pakistan’s role as an “unexpected mediator” and analyze the implications for India. The South China Morning Post and China Daily highlight the rapprochement between Beijing and Tehran; the Yomiuri Shimbun gives extensive coverage to the passage of the Inazuma through the Taiwan Strait and Japan’s entry into the Balikatan. WION , Straits Times , and Daily Jang focus on the mediation of General Asim Munir.
The Latin American, Franco-Swiss, and Eastern European press . Clarín of Buenos Aires, El Mercurio of Chile, and Reforma of Mexico dedicate columns to the “new hemispheric order” following Maduro’s capture. The Tribune de Genève and Helsingin Sanomat cover the Swiss and Nordic diplomatic meetings regarding the future of Europe. Ukrainska Pravda , UKRINFORM , the Kyiv Post , and The Kyiv Independent focus their coverage on the Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries and the reconstruction of drones. Russia Today and TASS —essential reading for understanding the Kremlin’s narrative, but never for taking its claims as fact—insist that the Ukrainian attacks are “Western terrorist provocations.”
IV. RISK TRAFFIC LIGHT
(Legend: ● Red = critical/24-72 h; ● Orange = elevated/week; ● Yellow = monitoring/medium term; ● Green = content/background)
● Strait of Hormuz and Iran: Critical. The naval blockade, the firing on commercial vessels, the boarding of the Iranian cargo ship, and the expiration of the truce on April 21 constitute the most immediate geopolitical risk vector with the greatest global impact. An incident with American casualties or a major sinking in the next 48-72 hours would precipitate a direct military escalation.
● Energy markets: Critical. Brent at $95.42, WTI at $87.90, European natural gas +11%. As long as the Strait remains closed or partially closed, supply chains will continue to be compromised. Risk of a global inflationary shock if the closure lasts longer than 10-14 days.
● Lebanese Front (Hezbollah-Israel): High. The formal 10-day truce announced on April 16 coexists with daily Israeli operations in Bint Jbeil, Jbaa, Mayfadoun, and Tyre. Hezbollah’s resistance to disarmament and its rejection of direct negotiations keep open the possibility of a new wave of violence in 7-10 days.
● Ukrainian front: High. Sustained intensity—1,070 Russian casualties daily, more than 2,300 drones launched by Moscow per week—and the Kremlin’s rejection of the Easter truce. Key risk: Hungary’s blocking of the €90 billion European loan, which would put Kyiv in serious financial difficulties in the second half of the year.
● Indo-Pacific / Taiwan / South China Sea: High. Balikatan 2026 begins today with Japan as a full partner; Inazuma passes through the Taiwan Strait; Chinese airspace restrictions for 40 days; new Chinese floating barrier in Scarborough. Risk of friction incidents in the next 2-3 weeks.
● Venezuela and democratic transition: Monitoring. The Rodríguez duo consolidates control; Jorge Rodríguez rules out elections in the short term; Machado exerts pressure with 67% domestic support. The transformed Chavismo seeks international normalization without opening the system. Critical window: next 3-6 months.
● Europe and its strategic absence: Vigilance. Italy suspends defense cooperation with Israel; Spain maintains the blockade of Rota and Morón—with the well-known inconsistency between the operational reality of the bases and the government’s rhetoric; France explores a mediating role; Germany affected by energy prices. Risk of further fragmentation of the European bloc in the face of the Gulf crisis.
● Jihadist terrorism (ISIS, Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, Taliban): Vigilance. The prolongation of the Gulf crisis and the weakening of the Iranian apparatus reduce the operational capacity of Shiite terrorist proxies but may create an opening for Sunni jihadism. Increased vigilance over West Africa and the Sahel.
● South Caucasus and Armenia-Azerbaijan: Content. The agreements promoted by Trump remain in effect; no major tensions in the last 48 hours.
● Cambodia-Thailand Front: Contained. Stabilized following US mediation.
V. EDITORIAL COMMENTARY
There are weekends that, like this one on April 18th and 19th, condense into forty-eight hours what, in conventional terms, would have required months. Friday, enthusiasm: Trump proclaims the opening of the Strait of Hormuz, Brent crude falls 11%, the stock markets celebrate, the most naive analysts begin writing their notes on the “imminent outcome.” Saturday, cynicism: Tehran softens its stance, then closes it again, the Revolutionary Guard fires on a CMA CGM oil tanker and container ship, the Ghalibaf-Vahidi-Zolghadr-Rezaei clan demonstrates its control over Araqchi’s negotiating team. Sunday, clash: the US Navy drills into the engine of an Iranian-flagged cargo ship, the Marines board it, Dow futures plummet 400 points, Brent crude returns to around $96. To put it with the loyalty we owe our readers: this is not “tense negotiations.” This is —I’ve been saying this from the very beginning— variable temperature warfare in its purest form: a conflict that neither side can win and neither can afford to lose, fought by fragmentary means and low conventional cost, but with permanent explosive potential.
It is worth recalling some truths that are unpleasant for the palates of geopolitical relativism. The first: the dictatorial and mafia-like oligarchy that governs Iran—never a “theocracy,” as much of our continental press lazily repeats—is responsible for forty-seven years of systematically exporting terrorism, instability, and nuclear blackmail. The Tehran regime has instrumentalized the religious institutions of Iranian Shiism to shield the effective power of the IRGC and its Al-Quds Brigades; to pretend that what is being negotiated in Islamabad is an “Islamic republic” with a civilian vocation is a naiveté that history will severely punish. The second: the Iranian problem cannot be solved without a serious plan for the aftermath. I have been warning—since the first phase of Operation Epic Fury, launched on February 28 with the elimination of the then Supreme Leader Khamenei—that the Trump administration has not developed a coherent strategy for the “de-Nasdaranization” of the Iranian state. Third: without an Iranian transitional figure with internal legitimacy and effective capacity —the speaker of parliament Ghalibaf is, for now, the only serious candidate, although with the limitations imposed by his subordination to Vahidi—, any agreement will be structurally unstable.
As my regular readers know, I hold a moderately favorable view of the initial US and Israeli attacks against Iran’s nuclear program and terrorist infrastructure—attacks that were legitimate, proportionate, and, in strictly strategic terms, necessary. But my support for the military operation has always been accompanied by a firm and sustained critique of the utter lack of post-conflict planning. “The campaign plan ends with victory,” wrote Clausewitz, “and victory is but the beginning of peace.” Washington entered the war with a clear military objective—to destroy the entire lifecycle of Iran’s nuclear program and decapitate its terrorist leadership—but without a plausible political roadmap for managing the aftermath. The paradox of decapitation —already analyzed in these reports—operates with full force: with the original leadership eliminated, the regime is less capable of making decisions and, therefore, less likely to capitulate; negotiation becomes impossible due to the absence of interlocutors with full authority. Ghalibaf could be such an interlocutor, if he were given the space—and the guarantees—to be one. It has not been given to him.
Decidedly opposed, then, to the oligarchic-jihadist regime of Tehran and its entire bloody power structure as a terrorist state—and critical of the Western coverage that still hesitates on how to classify Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, the pro-Iranian terrorist militias in Iraq, and the puppets in Central Asia; they are all, by definition, terrorist organizations, and each of their members is an individual terrorist. History—in which Kissinger was right, and Aron was right, and Burke was right—does not forgive either complacency or conceptual laziness. To call Hezbollah’s killers “militiamen” is tantamount to disguising reality in order to avoid taking action.
Europe, meanwhile, remains absent. Italy has made a first symbolic gesture by suspending defense cooperation with Israel. France is tentatively considering a mediating role, which its lack of conventional capabilities prevents it from fulfilling. Germany is suffering from high energy prices without daring to promote an honest and essential debate about its strategic future. And Spain—for here intellectual honesty compels me to speak with the clarity we owe to our fellow citizens—Spain persists in a position of neutrality that borders on irresponsibility. The Sánchez government proclaims “no to war” while, in operational reality, the Rota and Morón bases continue—as always, and as is legitimate within the framework of bilateral agreements—to play their part in the Atlantic security architecture. What we criticize is not cooperation—we defend it—but inconsistency: lying to citizens about what the bases are doing, flattering the Iranian regime in exchange for favors in the Strait for ships flying the Spanish flag, condemning the United States more harshly than the “Ayatollahs” when it is they who sustain a criminal regime. The demand is not maximalist: it is consistency.
Ukraine deserves a separate paragraph. The Ukrainian attacks on the refineries in Novokuibyshev, Sizran, Vysotsk, and Tikhoretsk, coupled with the destruction of the Yamal and Azov landing ships in Crimea, confirm what the most honest analysts—and the reports from the CSIS and the IISS—have been pointing out: Russia’s war economy is eroding at a rate that seemed unthinkable a year ago. Russia is still gaining ground, but at a decreasing pace—the monthly average has fallen from 5.7 to 4.1 square miles per day—and at an unsustainable human and material cost in the medium term. The Kremlin rejects the Easter truce because it knows that any pause seals a failure and paves the way for a Ukrainian counteroffensive. The question for Europe is brutal: will Brussels—due to Hungarian blackmail and German apathy—allow Kyiv to enter the third quarter without the €90 billion loan, or will it, for once, fulfill its historic obligation? The answer will say more about the fate of the Old Continent than a thousand declarations from the European Council.
I’ll close with the Indo-Pacific, which today begins a decisive week. Japan’s participation for the first time as a full partner in the Balikatan is not a mere anecdote: it confirms that Tokyo has crossed the Rubicon of its security policy. Prime Minister Takaichi has understood—before half of Europe—that the Taiwanese status quo is a vital interest of the liberal democratic order, and that deterrence requires action, not just documents. China is responding with forty days of airspace restrictions, floating barriers in Scarborough, and flotillas of hundreds of fishing vessels organized under military command. It’s the same old Chinese expansionism—in the Pacific, in the Maldives, in Sri Lanka, in Africa, and also, let’s not forget, in Latin America through the control of strategic raw materials and rare earth elements—but with greater sophistication and greater speed. Without a credible European presence in the Indo-Pacific, the emerging world order will be shaped without us. And that is perhaps the most serious and at the same time the most avoidable consequence of this era of political mediocrity and strategic shortsightedness. As Tocqueville wrote, “Great nations do not fall through the strength of their enemies, but through the weakness of their will.” At this point in European history, it is worth remembering.