Gustavo de Arístegui,
April 24, 2026
I. BRIEF INTRODUCTION
The week of April 23-24, 2026, concludes a week in which the international system has confirmed two lessons that this analyst has been arguing for months: first, that “variable temperature” diplomacy —that diplomacy mediated by Islamabad, Abu Dhabi, and Washington—can prolong the containment phase without resolving it; second, that the paradox of decapitation continues to operate with unsettling precision at the apex of the Iranian jihadist oligarchy, whose military triumvirate—Vahidi, Zolghadr, and Rezaei—blocks the appointed negotiators to such an extent that Donald Trump himself, in his extension of the ceasefire on April 21, had to explicitly invoke the fracture within the Iranian government as a reason for granting more time.
The geopolitical headline of the day, however, comes from the US president himself, with an order reintroducing the legitimate use of force in the Strait of Hormuz: the instruction to the Navy to “shoot and kill” any Iranian vessel laying mines in the strategic waterway through which 20% of the world’s oil passes. The decision, made after the capture of the Greek vessel Epaminondas and the Iranian attack on three merchant ships—including two flying the Indian flag—demonstrates that Washington is not willing to allow Tehran to use the ceasefire as a pretext to strengthen its leverage over the global economy. Brent crude closed at $105.07 per barrel; the market, which is always late but never lies, has already priced in the fact that the current phase—a contained systemic fracture, which I have been describing in these reports—is not over.
But the news that has literally shaken European foreign ministries today is the revelation, by Reuters, of an internal Pentagon email that considers, as punishment options for allies who did not support the war against Iran, the suspension of Spain from NATO and the reassessment of US diplomatic support for British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. The memorandum, produced in Pete Hegseth’s “War Department” and circulating at the highest levels, identifies access, base, and overflight rights—ABOs—as an absolute threshold for the Alliance; and makes the refusal to grant them grounds for sanctions. That Madrid appears at the top of that list is no accident; it is the inevitable result of years of a foreign policy that this analyst has already described as militant neutrality bordering on strategic irresponsibility . Alongside this transatlantic front, three secondary scenarios demand analytical attention: the extension of the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire for three weeks announced by Trump from the Oval Office; the hardening of the Chinese position in the South China Sea—with the material blockade of Scarborough Shoal and the announcement of construction on more than eleven thousand islands and reefs, which must be read as the largest cartographic fait accompli offensive of this century—; and the persistent fracture of the Iranian leadership that blocks the second round of Islamabad talks.
II. MOST IMPORTANT NEWS OF THE LAST 24 HOURS
1. Trump orders the Navy to “shoot and kill” any Iranian vessel that mines the Strait of Hormuz
Facts
On April 23, President Donald Trump publicly announced, through Truth Social and in subsequent statements, that he had ordered the U.S. Navy to “shoot and kill” any Iranian vessels engaged in laying mines in the Strait of Hormuz. The order followed an attack by an IRGC speedboat on April 22 against the Greek freighter Epaminondas —using automatic weapons fire and rocket-propelled grenades that caused significant damage to the bridge—as well as attacks on two Indian-flagged vessels (including the VLCC Sanmar Herald ) and the Iranian seizure of three merchant ships that same day. Central Command (CENTCOM) has reported that, since the start of the naval blockade on April 13, 31 vessels have been forced to turn back or return to port; and that early Thursday morning, U.S. forces boarded a sanctioned oil tanker carrying Iranian crude in the Indian Ocean. Trump also announced that he is tripling demining operations and that full reopening could take up to six months.
Implications
The presidential order marks a qualitatively higher step in the US doctrine of “rules of engagement” in the Strait of Hormuz: for the first time in this crisis, the use of preventive —not reactive—lethal force is authorized against naval units of a state with which a formal ceasefire is in place. The legal implication is significant: Washington interprets the laying of mines as, in itself, a resumption of hostilities that suspends the protection of the ceasefire. This interpretation, which this analyst considers legally defensible, also sends a direct deterrent signal to the Iranian military triumvirate. For the jihadist oligarchy, now reduced to the capacity for asymmetric harassment with small, fast boats after the destruction of a large part of the IRGC fleet, mines were the last vector of economic coercion on global oil markets.
Brent crude closed the April 23 session at $105.07 per barrel—a rise of approximately 3% in a single day—and WTI at $95.85. The consensus among investment banks places the scenario of a prolonged Strait closure at $120 per barrel for the third quarter (Goldman Sachs), although the bank itself has cut its baseline forecast for the second quarter to $90 due to the reduction in the immediate risk premium. In short, volatility has not disappeared; it has become institutionalized.
Perspectives and scenarios
Scenario A—the most likely in the short term (next two weeks): persistence of the status quo. Iran continues its selective harassment of ships in the Strait of Hormuz; the United States maintains its blockade of Iranian ports; Pakistan continues its mediation efforts without securing authorization from Vahidi’s triumvirate for Ghalibaf to return to Islamabad. Brent crude fluctuates in the $100-$110 range.
Scenario B—of increasing probability if Tehran carries out a major provocation: limited resumption of kinetic operations. Trump’s order opens the door to an immediate response that, by design, does not require new political authorization. A single US kinetic action against IRGC vessels could precipitate a further escalation of Iranian retaliation against Gulf bases, Saudi or Emirati infrastructure, or Israeli interests in third countries.
Scenario C—low probability but systemically serious: a negotiating implosion. If Khamenei Jr. (Mojtaba) fails to impose a unified line in the next ten days—and so far he hasn’t—the ceasefire extended by Trump will be devoid of practical content, and the White House will return to its menu of kinetic options regarding Iranian energy and communications infrastructure. This is what this analyst has been describing as the paradox of decapitation in its purest form: eliminating Ali Larijani—the architect of the strategy of stalling by using gas centrifuges while simulating diplomacy—didn’t open the door to moderates; it closed it. Those who remain, led by Vahidi, prefer continued confrontation to concessions.
2. Trump extends the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire for three weeks in a second round of talks in the Oval Office
Facts
On April 23, following the second round of direct talks between the Israeli and Lebanese ambassadors in Washington (Yechiel Leiter for Israel; Nada Hamadeh Moawad for Lebanon), moderated by Secretary of State Marco Rubio and State Department Counselor Michael Needham, with the subsequent participation of President Trump and Vice President Vance in the Oval Office, both sides agreed to extend for three weeks the ten-day ceasefire that had taken effect the previous week. Trump, writing on Truth Social, stated that the meeting “went very well” and that “the United States will work with Lebanon to help it protect itself from Hezbollah,” a terrorist organization he explicitly referred to as “the problem.” Netanyahu and Lebanese President Joseph Aoun will meet with Trump soon. Hezbollah, through Wafiq Safa, a member of its political council, publicly rejected the framework for the negotiations and announced that it would not abide by the agreements. The day was overshadowed by the death of Lebanese journalist Amal Khalil, of the Al-Akhbar newspaper , in an Israeli attack in southern Lebanon, and by the launching of several rockets from Hezbollah positions towards Israel as talks began in Washington.
Implications
The key political and strategic fact is that, for the second time in a decade, a Lebanese government is sitting down in direct contact with Israel—on US soil and with the personal mediation of the US president—and it is doing so despite Hezbollah’s veto. This marks a profound turning point in Lebanese politics: Beirut is willing, for the first time since the May 17, 1983, Agreements, to formalize a bilateral process with Israel. The presence of Ambassador Mike Huckabee and Leiter’s characterization of the first meeting as a “resounding victory over Hezbollah” send a message with a clear recipient: Tehran.
JD Vance’s statement that “the problem isn’t Lebanon, the problem isn’t Israel, the problem is Hezbollah”—a position this analyst wholeheartedly endorses—confirms that the Trump administration has internalized the correct interpretation of the conflict: Hezbollah is a terrorist organization, a proxy for the Iranian jihadist oligarchy, not a “militia,” not a “resistance movement.” Any serious analysis of the region must begin with this premise, or it is not serious at all.
Perspectives and scenarios
In the next three weeks, three issues will be played out simultaneously: (i) the Israeli withdrawal from the so-called “buffer zone” in southern Lebanon, as demanded by Prime Minister Nawaf Salam; (ii) the release of Lebanese prisoners; and (iii) the nuclear issue of Hezbollah’s effective disarmament, demanded by Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar. These three issues are interconnected, and none can be resolved unilaterally. Hezbollah still possesses terrorist capabilities—as demonstrated by Thursday’s rocket fire—and will continue to draw Tehran into any renewed conflict. The key will be whether the Lebanese government dares to formally request US support to force disarmament, or whether it settles for a de facto normalization of the status quo. In the first case, this process has the potential to be historic; in the second, it will be yet another episode of the unstable ceasefire that has plagued us since November 2014.
3. Pezeshkian blocked; Ghalibaf disavowed: Iranian rift paralyzes Islamabad’s second round
Facts
The second round of Islamabad talks, initially scheduled for April 21-22 under Pakistani mediation, never took place. Vice President JD Vance already had Air Force Two on the tarmac at Joint Base Andrews when Trump announced the extension of the ceasefire “indefinitely,” explicitly citing the “serious fracture” within the Iranian government. The Institute for the Study of War has documented an open confrontation between Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf—Speaker of Parliament and head of the Iranian delegation in the first round—and General Ahmed Vahidi, commander-in-chief of the IRGC: Ghalibaf favors participation in negotiations; Vahidi opposes it. Ghalibaf’s advisor, Mahdi Mohammadi, publicly disavowed the US-imposed ceasefire extension, calling it a “ploy to buy time for a surprise attack.”
The Trump administration attributes Iran’s silence to the lack of consensus on uranium enrichment and the stockpile of enriched uranium, and suspects that the new Supreme Leader, Mokhtaba Khamenei, is not giving clear instructions to his subordinates. Masoud Pezeshkian, from the reformist wing, remains systematically blocked; Ghalibaf himself reports to Vahidi, not the president.
Implications
Readers who have been following this report for weeks will recognize the paradox of the decapitation in full swing: the elimination of Ali Larijani—on February 28, along with Ali Khamenei—did not open the way for pragmatists, it closed it. Iranian diplomacy is now suspended between a young Supreme Leader, lacking consolidated authority, and an ultraconservative military triumvirate that has made resistance its defining characteristic. Ghalibaf, who would like to negotiate, no longer has sufficient political authority to compromise the regime; Pezeshkian, who would also like to, doesn’t even get to the negotiating table.
Perspectives and scenarios
The necessary—but not sufficient—condition for a negotiated agreement is the emergence of an Iranian interlocutor with decision-making authority. That interlocutor does not exist today. The diplomatic window, however, is not closed: Pakistan—the duo of Shehbaz Sharif and Field Marshal Asim Munir—is keeping the channel open with both sides and has already secured two extensions. The real question is whether Mojtaba Khamenei, in the next two or three weeks, will manage to impose internal discipline and appoint a plenipotentiary with a mandate. If he does, an agreement is attainable. If he does not, the outcome will be as predicted in scenario B of the previous news item: a limited—or not so limited—resumption of kinetic operations.
4. China effectively blocks Scarborough Shoal and announces the militarization of eleven thousand islands: the South China Sea is closed
Facts
Satellite images from April 10 and 11—confirmed by Vantor (formerly Maxar Technologies) and corroborated by Jay Tarriela, spokesperson for the Philippine Coast Guard—reveal the deployment of a floating barrier and multiple Chinese vessels (four fishing boats, one naval or Coast Guard vessel, and six maritime militia vehicles inside the shoal with three more outside) obstructing access to Scarborough Shoal (Masinloc Shoal), located within the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone. On April 22, the People’s Daily —the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party—published an article attributed to the Ministry of Natural Resources announcing that Beijing will “build more” on “more than 11,000 islands” it considers its own, as part of its strategic “maritime power” project. The declaration coincides with the start of the Balikatan (United States-Philippines-Japan) military exercises from April 20 to May 8, with Tokyo participating for the first time as a full partner, and with the Chinese blockade of Scarborough Reef that cuts off access for Filipino fishermen.
Implications
The sequence is unequivocal. First, Beijing declared the Scarborough Shoal a “national nature reserve” in September (domestic legal cover). Then it moved to a physical blockade with covert civilian forces (maritime militia) backed by the Coast Guard and naval units (plausible deniability). Now it is announcing, with partisan fervor, a construction campaign across eleven thousand geographical features ( cartographic fait accompli ). It is the same “salami slicing” strategy implemented on the Spratly Reefs since 2014, escalated and formalized. Xi Jinping stated it in his April 21st call to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman: “The Strait of Hormuz must remain open to normal navigation.” Beijing demands freedom of navigation for others but closes its own. The double standard is so blatant it is almost provocative.
Perspectives and scenarios
Manila has three options, all costly. First: diplomatic escalation with explicit invocation of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States (the most favorable scenario for the Indo-Pacific coalition). Second: de facto acceptance of the blockade with formal protests (the worst scenario, because it consolidates the precedent). Third: internationalization in multilateral forums (ASEAN, UN, ICJ). The Marcos administration has thus far opted for a combination of the first and third. The Philippines’ status as a treaty ally of the United States is a card that Beijing does not want to push—but is prepared to calibrate millimeter by millimeter. Japan’s presence at Balikatan 2026 introduces a novel, far-reaching variable: Tokyo has crossed a historic red line by sending troops to bilateral US-Philippine exercises, and has done so without stirring up domestic controversy. That, in itself, is strategic news of the highest order.
5. The Pentagon is considering suspending Spain from NATO in retaliation for its refusal to support the war against Iran.
Facts
Reuters published an exclusive report today, April 24, by Phil Stewart, based on an internal Pentagon email—now the “Department of War”—outlining potential punishments for NATO allies that, in Washington’s view, failed to provide operational support to the United States during the Iran-Iraq War. The memo, circulating at the highest levels of the administration, includes three specific measures: (i) suspending Spain from the Alliance; (ii) removing “difficult” countries from important or prestigious positions within NATO; and (iii) reassessing U.S. diplomatic support for traditional European “imperial possessions,” with explicit mention of the Falkland Islands, administered by the United Kingdom and claimed by Argentina, whose libertarian president, Javier Milei, is a declared ally of Trump. The core concept of the document is that access, base, and overflight rights—”ABO”—represent “the absolute threshold of NATO.” Any reluctance or refusal to grant them is interpreted as punishable strategic disloyalty. Pentagon spokeswoman Kingsley Wilson, responding to a Reuters inquiry, did not deny the email’s authenticity: “The War Department will ensure the president has credible options to get our allies to stop being a paper tiger and do their part.”
When asked by Reuters on April 1 about a possible US withdrawal from NATO, Trump himself replied, “Wouldn’t you if you were me?” The memorandum, according to the source, does not propose leaving the Alliance or closing bases in Europe, but it does not explicitly rule out reducing troops stationed on the continent. Questioned today at the European Union leaders’ summit in Cyprus, convened to discuss—among other things—NATO’s mutual assistance clause, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez downplayed the matter with a brief but revealing statement: “We don’t work with emails. We work with official documents and government positions, in this case, the United States government.”
Implications
The first thing to say is that, strictly speaking, NATO does not have a formal suspension mechanism; the 1949 Washington Treaty does not include one, and Reuters itself acknowledges that it could not determine this. The direct material consequence, therefore, is limited: Spain is not going to be expelled from the Alliance because of an internal Pentagon email, however widely it circulates at high levels. But the political, strategic, and symbolic implications are extremely serious and, above all, send an unequivocal message to the Sánchez government: Washington’s patience has run out. This is not the first time Trump has personally suggested Spain’s expulsion—he did so in October, calling it a “very low payer”—nor is it the first time he has threatened trade reprisals. It is, however, the first time the US military apparatus has formalized a menu of punitive options that nominally includes Madrid.
The combination of Spain’s exceptional status regarding the 5% of GDP commitment agreed upon in The Hague in June 2025—Madrid was the only allied capital that did not formally commit to the 2035 target, accepting the collective commitment only in exchange for softening the language from “we commit” to “allies commit”—with the refusal to grant full ABO rights during Operation Epic Fury has produced this predictable outcome. The inconsistency between operational military reality—Rota and Morón functioning as air-naval logistics hubs for the US deployment in the mid-Atlantic, as the backbone of the Sixth Fleet’s replenishment, and as a stopover station for the P-8A Poseidon—and a government political discourse that presents Spain as a neutral-critical country in the face of US action in the Strait of Hormuz, was bound to explode. And it has. The only element of surprise, if any, is the inclusion of the Falkland Islands in the same punitive package, which points to a broader US offensive against the “European imperial legacy” and exposes London—a traditionally trusted ally—to unprecedented diplomatic sanctions. For the United Kingdom, the fact that an Atlanticist ally like Starmer is being treated in the same package as the Sánchez government is a wake-up call.
Perspectives and scenarios
Scenario A —highly likely: persistent diplomatic tension without formal sanctions. The email serves as a warning, Madrid continues its public discourse of distancing itself, and Washington responds with selective irritation (extended tariffs, exclusion from high-level meetings on Ukraine and the Middle East, withdrawal of targeted diplomatic support). This is the line the White House has been following for months.
Scenario B —of medium probability: degradation of Spain’s status in the Alliance without formal suspension. Withdrawal of Spanish commanders from relevant NATO positions (operations headquarters, positions in SHAPE, military committee), renegotiation of the cost Spain pays for services provided by Rota and Morón, and direct pressure on European partners to isolate Madrid. This scenario best reflects the internal logic of the memorandum: to punish without breaking the Alliance.
Scenario C —low probability but not impossible: a bilateral Trump-Sánchez summit with reciprocal formal concessions. The Spanish president needs, for domestic reasons, to maintain the fiction of autonomy; the US president needs, for timing reasons (midterm elections in November), a diplomatic trophy. An explicit Spanish commitment to raise military spending to levels closer to the 3-3.5% threshold, along with written guarantees of full ABO (Action Backbone) in future conflicts, could suffice. The problem is that Sánchez depends in Parliament on Sumar and the nationalist partners, neither of whom would approve such a move.
The political conclusion for Spain is harsh but undeniable: the current government has led the country to its first Pentagon blacklist since the 1970s. A country that doesn’t take its own security seriously ends up being perceived for what it is—a free rider —and, from then on, treated as such. The political class that runs 21st-century governments in Europe (with a few honorable exceptions) is mediocre, short-sighted, incompetent, and profoundly irresponsible. The Spanish government is sadly the epitome of this mediocrity, lack of vision, and incompetence.
III. MEDIA RACK
Coverage of Trump’s order regarding the Strait of Hormuz has dominated the Anglo-Saxon economic and political press. CNBC (Kevin Breuninger, April 23) unequivocally headlined “Trump orders Navy to ‘shoot and kill any boat’ laying mines in the Strait of Hormuz” and reported Brent crude closing at $105.07. TIME (April 23 edition) emphasized the estimated six-month duration of the mine clearance. NBC News and The Washington Post agreed that the blockade has solidified as a strategic pivot of the US naval deployment, with 31 vessels redirected and a sanctioned tanker boarded in the Indian Ocean. The Financial Times and Bloomberg have focused on the oil risk premium and Goldman Sachs’ projections ($120 if the Strait of Hormuz is completely closed).
Reuters’ exclusive report on the Pentagon email—signed by Phil Stewart at 7:22 a.m. Washington time on April 24—has been widely picked up by CNBC, the Jerusalem Post, the Times of Israel, the Irish Times, the Cyprus Mail, and Al-Monitor, as well as by the Asian and Latin American financial press. The Business Standard aptly highlights the preceding news sequence: “Turkey says US withdrawal from European security architecture could be ‘destructive’,” “Trump weighs pulling some US troops from Europe amid NATO strains,” “NATO’s Rutte told allies Trump wants Hormuz commitments within days,” “Trump’s anger over Iran thrusts NATO into fresh crisis.” The Spanish press, still without time for a full editorial reaction, has covered the matter from Moncloa Palace with Sánchez’s terse statement. We will have to wait for Saturday’s editions of ABC, La Razón, and El Debate, which are expected to take a critical stance on the government’s ambiguity. El País and La Vanguardia, true to their sensibilities, will try to minimize the scope of the memorandum by invoking the absence of a legal mechanism for suspension.
Al Jazeera and Al-Arabiya, from different perspectives, have highlighted Iran’s refusal to return to Islamabad while the blockade and the fractured Vahidi-Ghalibaf triumvirate persist. The Jerusalem Post and Israel Hayom hailed the second round of Israel-Lebanon talks in Washington as a “historic moment” (in the words of Vice President Vance); Haaretz, with some nuance, tempered the optimism, recalling the ongoing Israeli attacks in southern Lebanon and the death of journalist Amal Khalil. L’Orient-Le Jour and The Daily Star, reporting from Beirut, documented Hezbollah’s explicit rejection—through Wafiq Safa—of the agreement framework, confirming the organization’s terrorist nature and its functional dependence on Tehran.
In Asia, the South China Morning Post has given extensive coverage to the Chinese announcement regarding the 11,000 islands, presenting it as a natural extension of Xi Jinping’s “maritime power” rhetoric—an important understatement to note. Nikkei, Yomiuri Shimbun, and the Straits Times have highlighted Japan’s involvement in the Balikatan project as a historic turning point. The China Daily, unsurprisingly, has relegated the news to a note on “sustainable development of maritime resources.” The Times of India and the Hindustan Times have reported on the Iranian fire on the two Indian-flagged vessels in the Strait of Hormuz and the summoning of the Iranian ambassador by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs: an extremely sensitive episode for New Delhi, which maintains a complex relationship with Tehran over the port of Chabahar.
In Europe, Le Monde and Le Figaro have focused their analysis on the Iranian rift and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz; Le Figaro, true to its Atlanticist leanings, approves of the American firmness; Le Monde prefers to emphasize the economic costs. Die Welt and FAZ have published editorials aligned with the German Chancellor’s line, calling on Tehran to “return to the table for the sake of the people”; Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul expressed this sentiment on April 21. Corriere della Sera and Libération have devoted more space to the Asian front. The Times and The Telegraph, in London, maintain their focus on the American naval deployment in the Strait of Hormuz and the fifty-country conference convened by the United Kingdom (April 22-23) on freedom of navigation. The Guardian, with its usual bias, adopts a more critical interpretation of the American firmness. Foreign Affairs and The Economist, in their analytical press, have published converging pieces this month on the systemic fracture described as a descriptive category of the current geopolitical moment—a concept this analyst has been developing since December 2025 in these reports and in his book, A Brief Guide to the New World Geopolitics . The Institute for the Study of War, RUSI, IISS, CSIS, and IFRI all agree in diagnosing the Iranian negotiating impasse as a product of the leadership fracture following the removal of Ali Larijani.
IV. RISK TRAFFIC LIGHT
● Strait of Hormuz / shoot-to-kill order — Extreme risk of escalation in the next 72 hours. A single action against an IRGC vessel could trigger an Iranian response against Gulf bases or allied infrastructure. Brent crude at $105, with plausible scenarios up to $120.
● Internal fracture within the Iranian jihadist oligarchy — Stop. The Vahidi-Zolghadr-Rezaei triumvirate is blocking Ghalibaf and Pezeshkian. Mojtaba Khamenei has not consolidated his authority. The negotiating window is narrow; without a plenipotentiary interlocutor, no agreement is possible.
● Transatlantic Fracture / Spain and the Pentagon Memorandum — Stop. The War Department is considering suspending Spain from NATO and reassessing support for British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. There is no formal legal mechanism for suspension, but the government has the real capacity to downgrade Spain’s status. Spain’s strategic coherence is, as of today, indefensible.
● Hezbollah and the Israel-Lebanon process — Stop. Hezbollah publicly rejected direct Beirut-Washington-Jerusalem negotiations; rockets were launched during the talks themselves. Hezbollah remains the most dangerous Iranian lever in the Levant.
● South China Sea / Scarborough and Balikatan — Medium-high. Chinese physical blockade of Scarborough; announcement of construction on eleven thousand islands; Japan participates for the first time in Balikatan as a full partner. Probability of minor incident high; probability of major confrontation low but increasing.
● NATO / Allied structure and collective credibility — Medium-high. Crisis of confidence in the Alliance following the war against Iran. Rutte summoned to Washington; Turkey warns of “destructive” consequences of a US withdrawal from the European architecture. Collective review: 5% of GDP in 2029, final by 2035.
● Oil markets and risk premium — Medium. Brent $105, WTI $95; structural volatility due to cross-blockade in Hormuz. Goldman projection $120 if prolonged close.
● Jihadist terrorism in the Sahel, Horn of Africa, and Indonesia — Low to medium in terms of its emergence on the agenda in the last 24 hours; however, the structural threat remains intact: Al-Shabab, Boko Haram, ISIS-K, and branches of Al-Qaeda continue to operate with impunity in gray areas. Constant vigilance is required.
V. EDITORIAL COMMENTARY
If anything characterizes the day that has just ended, it is the confirmation that the international order of the 21st century—that order I have been describing as “chaos as the new order”—has normalized the simultaneous occurrence of several wars of “variable temperature” : low in resolution, but high in destruction, wars that no one wants to lose and no one can afford to win. Hormuz, Scarborough, the Levant, and now, NATO’s own internal cohesion are, for analytical purposes, interconnected scenarios of the same phenomenon: an international system incapable of resolving active conflicts, trapped in a growing and perhaps unstoppable systemic fracture, whose main virtue is, paradoxically, that it has not yet imploded.
Trump’s order to fire on Iranian vessels laying mines in the Strait of Hormuz is, in essence, correct. Iran is a terrorist state, its ruler a ruthless, bestial, and cosmically corrupt jihadist oligarchy that has made the export of terrorism a matter of state policy—Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria, the Houthis in Yemen, Hamas, the pro-Iranian terrorist militias in Iraq, and their puppets in Central Asia. Defending freedom of navigation in a waterway through which 20% of the world’s oil passes is not an option, it is a civilizational obligation. What this analyst laments—and has lamented since Operation Epic Fury began on February 28—is the persistent absence of a serious plan for the aftermath. The removal of Khamenei and Larijani has left Tehran without a negotiating leader; the military triumvirate that has filled the vacuum is not an interlocutor, it is an obstacle. The White House, while surgical in its execution, remains imprecise in its postwar planning. This is the same criticism, structurally identical, that I leveled at the Bush administration regarding Iraq in 2003, and at the Obama administration regarding Libya in 2011.
In the Levant, the unfolding of the Israel-Lebanon process in Washington deserves explicit approval. It is difficult to overstate the symbolic and practical importance of two ambassadors speaking face-to-face in the Oval Office of the American president while Hezbollah—rejecting the process—confirms its status as a terrorist organization in the service of Tehran. Lexical precision matters: Hezbollah is not a “militia,” not a “resistance movement,” not a “non-state actor”; it is a terrorist organization. Any analysis that does not begin with this premise is tainted by the moral relativism I so vehemently reject. JD Vance and Mike Huckabee have spoken with the clarity the moment demands: the problem is Hezbollah. The challenge is for Beirut to transform the process into something more than a three-week truce, and to do so, it will need the Lebanese state—so weakened that the verb “to exist” seems too grand for it—to agree to the disarmament of the terrorist party-militia. But Lebanon lacks the necessary resources; it would require substantial and intensive international support in the form of weapons, training, and financial assistance. The risk is significant: that the West could once again find itself embroiled in the unpredictable Lebanese quagmire.
Regarding China. The announcement of construction on “more than eleven thousand islands” should be read not as an expansionist whim, but as what this analyst has described for years: a coherent project of asymmetric hegemony over the Indo-Pacific, combined with the acquisition of strategic raw materials and rare earth elements in Africa and Latin America. Beijing operates with a strategic consistency that makes 21st-century Europe—self-satisfied, fragmented, and short-sighted—look ridiculous. Japan’s crossing of the red line by sending troops to the Balikatan is the best strategic news of the week: Tokyo is assuming its role within the strengthened QUAD framework (or the nascent, expanded AUKUS) with a level-headedness that too many European capitals lack.
And now I come to the matter that concerns me most as a Spaniard and as an analyst. The internal Pentagon email, revealed today by Reuters, which considers suspending Spain from NATO, should not be dismissed as a trial balloon from a frustrated bureaucrat. It is the confirmation—already formalized at the operational level of the “Department of War”—that the Pedro Sánchez government has led Spain to an untenable international position. Let me list them with the clarity that the moment demands: Spain is currently the only member of the Alliance that has formally rejected the target of 5% of GDP for defense by 2035 agreed upon in The Hague; the only one whose Prime Minister dedicated a public letter to Secretary General Rutte calling that allied commitment “unreasonable and counterproductive”; one of the few that has not granted full rights of access, base, and overflight to US operations against the Iranian jihadist oligarchy; And, simultaneously, Spain continues to host the most important air and naval logistics base in the western Mediterranean and the mid-Atlantic at Rota, and a strategic air replenishment platform in Morón for US missions in the Mediterranean-African theater. The contradiction between the government’s public discourse and the operational reality on Spanish soil is simply indefensible. This isn’t maximalism; it’s consistency. The bases continue to operate, the planes continue to take off, the ships of the Sixth Fleet continue to call at Rota; but Moncloa continues to speak of neutrality. The consequence was predictable: Washington has taken note.
It is not lost on me that Spain’s formal suspension from NATO lacks a legal mechanism. But that is not the point. The point is the cumulative effect on the country’s international credibility: exclusions from high-level meetings—like the one Sánchez suffered in August regarding Ukraine—silent demotions of Spanish commanders in allied structures, differential trade tariffs, and withdrawals of diplomatic support in multilateral forums. It is isolation through demotion, which is always worse than isolation through exclusion because it never has a clear breaking point and, therefore, never a clear moment of reaction. Spain, with one of the best armies in Western Europe, with a remarkably solid Atlanticist tradition, and with a unique African, Mediterranean, and Latin American projection, deserves better than the strategic incoherence into which the current government has plunged it. That Madrid appears in the same Pentagon punitive package as Keir Starmer’s United Kingdom—over the Falklands—is not a consolation; it is a shared humiliation. This is the price of allowing ourselves to be governed by coalitions that do not take the country’s security seriously.