By Gustavo de Arístegui.
9 September 2025
Critical Report on the Anti-Israeli Measures of the Social-Communist Government in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
A. Introduction and analytical framework
The analysis of the measures proposed by the Spanish government of Pedro Sánchez is situated within a context of escalation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In May 2024, Spain unilaterally recognized the Palestinian state alongside Ireland and Norway. This decision, welcomed by sectors supportive of the Palestinian cause, was criticized in multiple international forums for its potentially counterproductive effects.
B. ANALYSIS OF THE THE ECONOMIST ARTICLE
This criticism has been reinforced by The Economist article entitled “In recognising Palestine, Britain and France won’t advance peace” (30 July 2025). The weekly argues that such symbolic gestures, although well-intentioned, do not advance peace: they harden positions, undermine negotiations, and alienate Israel, while failing to address unavoidable realities such as Hamas terrorism (Islamic Resistance Movement, designated as a terrorist organization by the European Union and the United States) or the systematic obstruction of regional stability carried out by Iran, Hezbollah, and the Houthis.
In this vein, The Economist warns that unilateral recognition by the United Kingdom and France (July 2025) could delay the objective of “two states for two peoples” by reducing incentives for bilateral dialogue, ignoring the ongoing war in Gaza, and being perceived as a unilateral reward to the Palestinians. The conclusion is unequivocal: “we worry that recognition on the terms set out by Britain and France could get in the way.” This pattern—symbolic gestures that fail in practice and deepen divisions—is the guiding thread of this critical report.
C. Evaluation of measures
1. National arms embargo on Israel
● Viability: High (Spain controls its export licensing).
● Timeliness: Low; it focuses exclusively on Israel while ignoring threats from Iran and Hezbollah.
● Effectiveness: Limited; Spanish exports are marginal (€43 million between 2018–2022, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute – SIPRI).
● Political cost: Reinforces accusations of anti-Israeli bias.
● EU status: No common embargo exists; only common criteria (Common Position 2008/944/CFSP).
● Verdict: A symbolic measure with little real utility. Moreover, Israel is one of the world’s leading defense-industry powers; Spain could instead face a blockade of Israeli technology vital to its own security and defense, which would need to be reversed once a change of government occurs.
2. Prohibition of port transit for vessels carrying fuel for the Israeli armed forces
● Viability: Medium; Spain has port sovereignty, but the measure is legally weak and difficult to verify.
● Timeliness: Low; ignores similar threats posed by actors such as Iran or the Houthis.
● Effectiveness: Very low; traffic would easily be diverted to other ports.
● Political cost: Alienation of European and NATO partners.
● EU status: No equivalent measure exists.
● Verdict: High diplomatic cost, minimal utility.
3. Denial of overflight to state aircraft carrying weapons to Israel
● Viability: High (Spain controls its airspace).
● Timeliness: Low; selectively targets Israel while ignoring regional threats.
● Effectiveness: Moderate; increases costs without blocking logistics. Israel can easily change routes.
● EU status: No common measure exists.
● Verdict: Only useful if coordinated multilaterally. If applied unilaterally, it generates conflict without producing any real obstacle for Israel. A completely ineffective, purely performative measure.
4. Entry ban on individuals involved in “genocide”
● Viability: Medium; requires solid evidence and is better applied at EU level through common sanctions.
● Timeliness: Low; politicized use of the term “genocide” fuels controversy and feeds antisemitic narratives (according to the Anti-Defamation League – ADL).
● Effectiveness: Low if unilateral; higher if part of an EU-wide listing.
● EU status: Sanctions exist against violent settlers, not for “genocide.” These sanctions target known settlers or groups proven and documented to have committed crimes and have been sanctioned by the EU and even the United States.
● Verdict: Preferable to pursue this approach in Brussels to avoid accusations of selectivity.
5. Ban on imports from illegal settlements
● Viability: Very low; trade policy is an exclusive EU competence (Article 207 TFEU).
● Effectiveness: Limited; a national ban would be legally challenged.
● Risk: Also harms Palestinian workers employed in settlements.
● EU status: Mandatory labeling since 2015 (Interpretative Notice + Psagot ruling, 2019).
● Verdict: Unfeasible unilaterally; the viable approach is to enforce labeling requirements to clearly identify product origin—for example, as some states do with wines from the Golan Heights, which is territory occupied from Syria.
6. Restriction of consular services to residents of settlements
● Viability: Very low; discriminatory and contrary to international obligations.
● Effectiveness: None.
● EU status: No common measure exists.
● Verdict: Inapplicable and deeply counterproductive.
7. Reinforcement of the European mission in Rafah (EUBAM)
● Viability: High; Spain already participates in the European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM Rafah).
● Timeliness: Medium; depends on consensus with Israel and Egypt.
● Effectiveness: Medium-high; facilitates humanitarian logistics and border control.
● EU status: An EU mission already exists.
● Verdict: Reasonably constructive and aligned with European policy.
8. Expansion of Spain’s contribution to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA)
● Viability: High in budgetary terms.
● Core problem: UNRWA, with 30,000 employees in Gaza, is widely accused of Hamas infiltration. Multiple reports (UN, media outlets, Human Rights Watch – HRW) document misuse of facilities and staff links to terrorism.
● Timeliness: Low; increasing funds without conditions reinforces accusations of antisemitism and anti-Israeli bias against the social-communist government.
● Effectiveness: Theoretical, but limited in practice; aid diverted or instrumentalized by Hamas.
● More credible alternative: Redirect contributions toward more neutral and reputable agencies:
○ World Food Programme (WFP)
○ United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)
○ World Health Organization (WHO)
○ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
○ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
○ International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
● Verdict: Increasing funds to UNRWA without strict controls is reckless; the responsible approach is to diversify toward more reliable agencies.
9. Increase in humanitarian aid and cooperation to Gaza
● Viability: High; fully compatible with European mechanisms (EU Directorate-General for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations – ECHO).
● Timeliness: High; imminent famine.
● Effectiveness: High if channeled through reliable agencies; risk of diversion by Hamas.
Verdict: A priority and relatively uncontroversial measure.
D. Critical assessment
● Constructive measures: #7 (EUBAM Rafah), #9 (humanitarian aid), and #8 only if redirected toward reliable agencies.
● Measures of limited value: #1, #3, #4 (symbolic, partial impact).
● Unviable or counterproductive measures: #2, #5, and #6, as well as #8 in its original form (without conditionality).
Overall, the package reveals a pattern of political gesturing rather than effective strategy. As The Economist warns, such decisions reduce incentives to negotiate, reinforce maximalist positions, and may perpetuate Hamas’ grip on power and Iranian interference without advancing a viable two-state solution.
Iran remains on the sidelines without visible initiatives, but it is only a matter of time before it finds a way to reinsert itself into the conflict.
The criticism of the Sánchez government is clear: its foreign policy suffers from a genuine sectarian bias that isolates Spain within NATO and among the EU’s principal actors. Indeed, Spain is not invited to any major decision-making forums, not even those related to Ukraine, despite the extensive assistance provided. This deeply sectarian foreign policy undermines Spain’s international credibility—not merely that of the Sánchez government. Ideology and symbolism are prioritized over pragmatism and the effective fight against terrorism.