By Gustavo de Arístegui, as published by Vielle.

28.11.2025

The American peace plan for Ukraine is not a simple technical document. It is a historical test: a test of the West’s ability to strike a balance between realism and justice, a test of Europe’s strategic lucidity, and finally a test of the political and social resilience of an exhausted but determined Ukraine. The transition from a 28-point text to a version reduced to 18–19 provisions following the Geneva talks between Washington and Kyiv is not cosmetic. It reveals a silent tug-of-war between three strategic lines: the Russian line, the American “transactional” line, and Europe’s still hesitant line.

Press leaks and a provision-by-provision analysis of the plan by several think tanks (notably CSIS) make it possible to reconstruct the architecture of the original 28-point text:

1. Territorial concessions

• De facto, or even de jure, recognition of Russia’s annexation of Crimea.
  
• Lasting cession—through an ambiguous status—of a substantial part of the Donbas and of areas currently occupying southern Ukraine.

2. Strategic neutralization of Ukraine

• Constitutional commitment to renounce NATO and any permanent Western military presence.
  
• A cap on Ukrainian armed forces at a level deemed “acceptable” by Moscow (leaked versions speak of an initial ceiling of 600,000, later raised in revised versions).

3. Security architecture and guarantees

• Ceasefire arrangements, demilitarized zones, and still vague verification mechanisms.
  
• Reference to “robust security guarantees” provided by a combination of Western states, without any formal equivalent to NATO’s Article 5.

4. Sanctions, reconstruction,

and frozen Russian assets

• A gradual timetable for the suspension of sanctions based on implementation of the plan.
  
• Use of approximately $100 billion in frozen Russian assets in a reconstruction fund, with governance strongly favoring American interests.

5. Ukraine’s internal political dimension

• Organization of elections in occupied territories under “international” supervision—an especially sensitive issue for Kyiv.
  
• References to the protection of linguistic and cultural rights of Russian speakers, potentially exploitable by Moscow.
  

The 10 points removed in the transition to a shorter 18–19-point text appear, according to European counterproposals and Ukrainian statements, to concern mainly:

• The most maximalist demands regarding territorial concessions and legal recognition of annexations.
  
• The most drastic limitations on Ukrainian armed forces.
  
• Certain clauses on governance of reconstruction funds that clearly marginalized the EU.
  
• Provisions deemed unacceptable concerning the rapid resumption of energy trade with Russia and an overly generous sanctions-lifting timetable for the Kremlin.
  

In summary, the problematic core of the plan—the trade-off of “territories for peace”—has not disappeared, but several pro-Russian excesses have been trimmed to make the text presentable to Kyiv and Brussels.

“It is a historical test: a test of the West’s ability

to strike a balance between realism and justice,

a test of Europe’s strategic lucidity,

and finally a test of the political and social resilience

of an exhausted but determined Ukraine.”

Crossed reactions: Kyiv, Moscow,

Washington, Europe, NATO

Ukraine: between moral refusal and survival calculus

President Zelensky cannot politically accept a text that enshrines the lasting annexation of territories after years of—justified—rhetoric on territorial integrity. Leaks indicate that he declares himself ready to “discuss sensitive points” but insists on the inclusion of European allies and on stronger security guarantees.

Kyiv finds itself caught between genuine war fatigue within society, American pressure to “reach a deal,” and a patriotism intensified by destruction and Russian war crimes.

Any territorial concession risks being experienced as a betrayal—a “stab in the back”—by a significant part of the population, and especially by the military.

Russia: icy satisfaction and a posture of toughness

Vladimir Putin publicly presents the plan as a “possible starting point,” while demanding Ukrainian withdrawal from regions he only partially controls and continuing to label the Ukrainian leadership “illegitimate.”

Moscow is playing a classic double game: on the one hand, it validates the fact that a document of American origin largely adopts its demands; on the other, it escalates them in order to retain military initiative and seize more territory before any signing.

United States: the temptation of the “grand transaction”

The White House appears driven by a deal-making logic: ending a costly war, freeing up resources for rivalry with China, and showcasing a diplomatic victory. Several American experts emphasize that the initial text was clearly inspired by a Russian “non-paper,” which explains its unbalanced tone.

Europe and NATO: a late but real awakening

The main European countries—the United Kingdom, France, Germany—have drawn up a 28-point counterplan correcting some of the most problematic provisions, notably a less severe limitation of the Ukrainian army, a refusal of new territorial concessions, and clarification of security guarantees.

For the first time in a long while, part of the European strategic establishment understands that an agreement which rewards the aggressor does not freeze the conflict; it exports it.

“For the first time in a long while,

part of the European strategic establishment understands that:

an agreement which rewards the aggressor

does not freeze the conflict, it exports it.”

NATO, for its part, remains cautious in its communication, but several capitals—Warsaw, Vilnius, Tallinn—have already warned that a “bad deal” in Ukraine would mean a massive and immediate increase in their military budgets.