Gustavo de Arístegui,
July 8, 2026
I. INTRODUCTION
I am writing this edition as two clocks tick in opposite directions on global geopolitics. In Ankara, the Atlantic Alliance is holding its second day under the shadow of mistrust—a “deeply disappointed” US president who is threatening to walk away while demanding loyalty and who this very morning declared the ceasefire with Iran “over”—; in the Strait of Hormuz, the United States and Iran are once again exchanging blows in one of those wars of variable temperature —low-resolution conflicts with extremely high levels of destruction that no one can win or afford to lose—that I have been describing since February. Both scenes share a common thread, which today forms the core of this report: a lack of leadership . It exists in Tehran, where a brutal hawk dominates without governing; and it exists in a Europe that continues to take neither its defense nor its destiny seriously.
Everything that follows has been verified with multiple top-tier sources during the writing process. There are no conjectures disguised as news, nor are there any probability projections about past events: only what has been verified, read afterward through the lens—committed, never aseptic—that characterizes my editorial line.
II. THE MOST IMPORTANT NEWS OF THE LAST 24 HOURS
1. Hormuz in flames: US strikes more than 80 targets in Iran and Tehran responds against the Gulf
Facts
On the night of July 7-8, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) executed what it described as “a series of powerful strikes” against more than 80 targets in Iranian territory: air defense systems, command and control networks, coastal radars, anti-ship missile capabilities, and more than 60 fast patrol boats belonging to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in and around the Strait of Hormuz. The operation was presented as direct retaliation for the Iranian attack on three merchant ships—including the Qatari LNG carrier Al-Rekayyat, which suffered an engine room fire that nearly caused it to explode, and the Saudi-flagged supertanker Wedyan.
Meanwhile, the Treasury Department revoked the waiver that allowed Iran to sell its crude oil, granted for sixty days as part of the June memorandum of understanding (MOU). Tehran’s response was swift: the IRGC claimed to have attacked eighty-five US military sites in Bahrain—the port of Salman, home to the Fifth Fleet—and Kuwait—the Ali al-Salem Air Base. Chief negotiator and Speaker of Parliament, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, accused Washington of violating the MOU: “The era of bullying and extortion is over… we will not back down.” Trump, incidentally, approved the plan from Ankara, meeting with Rubio, Hegseth, Bessent, and General Dan Caine.
The escalation culminated this morning in Ankara itself. Seated next to NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, Trump declared the ceasefire dead: “As far as I’m concerned, it’s over,” he stated, adding that negotiating with Tehran is “a waste of time” and dismissing the Iranian leaders with vocabulary unbecoming of the world’s leading power—”scum,” “sick people,” “liars and cheats.” Rutte, far from offering any nuance, described the nighttime attacks as “absolutely necessary”; the European High Representative, Kaja Kallas, condemned the Iranian attacks on Bahrain and Kuwait as “unacceptable” and convened a meeting of European and Gulf ministers on freedom of navigation for Monday. Trump, however, left a sliver of hope: his negotiators can continue talking, “even if they waste time.”
Implications
We are witnessing yet another episode of chaotic instability in the Strait of Hormuz, that succession of blows and counter-blows that keeps the world on edge over 20% of global maritime crude. The category that best describes the situation remains that of a contained systemic fracture : both sides have a legitimate interest in not escalating the conflict, but—and here lies the problem—on the Iranian side, there is currently no one who can guarantee compliance with anything. I elaborate on this in news item 4.
That said, I will not spare Washington’s due criticism. The military response to the IRGC attacks on merchant ships—proportionate, surgical, and, in my view, fully justified—is one thing; the president’s rhetorical reaction is quite another. To declare the ceasefire dead in a fit of rage, before the cameras and without any deliberation, is an excessive reaction that hands Vahidi exactly what he wants—the closure of the diplomatic avenue, which he neither wants nor can guarantee—and that undermines a memorandum that the Administration itself signed just a month ago. Anger, however understandable it may be against a regime that never honors its word, is not a sound foreign policy.
Perspectives and scenarios
I maintain the most likely scenario—a relapse into the coup-retaliation cycle with a prolonged, intermittent closure of the Strait—at 40%. The containment scenario hinges on a swift return to the Doha talks; however, as long as the real interlocutor in Tehran is the military apparatus and not diplomacy, every agreement will be born with an expiration date. US military and operational planning deserves a 10; geostrategic planning—the planning for the day after—remains stuck at 0. And today, a third failing grade must be added: the White House’s emotional control, which has transformed a defensible reprisal into an outright rupture.
2. Ankara, day two: NATO considering canceling its summits to avoid upsetting Trump, and Spain under scrutiny
Facts
The 36th NATO Summit is entering its second day in Ankara. Trump—the only leader to receive a full ceremonial welcome, courtesy of his host Erdogan—declared himself “very disappointed with NATO” and even hinted that he would not have attended had it been held elsewhere. His main complaint is the lack of allied support for Operation Epic Fury against Iran: “Italy told us no. And Germany told us no, and France told us no.” The Alliance, aware of the risk, has fortified itself with figures: $40 billion in anti-drone capabilities over five years, more than $26 billion in integrated air and missile defense, and $1.6 billion in strike capabilities. Only five allies project reaching 3.5% of their GDP in core defense spending by 2026.
Adding to the tension is a revelation of institutional significance: according to Bloomberg and Reuters, the Alliance is considering abandoning the practice of holding annual summits to avoid further clashes with Trump in the final stretch of his term. The draft declaration from Ankara omits any reference to Albania as the host of the 2027 summit—despite the explicit commitment made in The Hague—and is considering a biennial format. No meeting is even being considered for 2028, an election year in the United States. The reluctance of the US administration and Tirana’s low defense spending, which could “irritate” the president and generate negative press, are factors in the decision; the final choice rests with Rutte. “Better fewer summits than bad summits,” summarizes one allied diplomat.
And then Spain arrives. Pedro Sánchez showed up in Ankara with a financial fix under his arm: a €6.287 billion credit transfer to the Ministry of Defense, approved by the Council of Ministers less than 24 hours before the summit. With this, the Moncloa Palace intends to argue that 2.1% of GDP is sufficient to meet capability targets. The Prime Minister reiterated that he will not spend more “without cutting an inch” from the welfare state, maintains his refusal to allow the Rota and Morón air bases to be used in operations linked to Iran, and accepts Trump’s threats—from the trade embargo to the withdrawal of troops and the closure of both bases— with what his own delegation calls “sportsmanship.” The US ambassador to NATO has stated unequivocally that Trump is “disappointed” with Spain; the exclusion from the Berlin mini-summit sealed the deal. Even the group photo was symbolic: Begoña Gómez could not accompany the Prime Minister because the investigating judge denied her authorization to travel to Ankara.
The backdrop is an unprecedented US withdrawal—a phased withdrawal of aircraft, destroyers, and submarines, a six-month “NATO 3.0” review of force posture, and plans to remove between 9,000 and 13,000 troops from Europe—which, in the words of Torrey Taussig (Atlantic Council), is fueling a “crisis of confidence” regarding the commitment to Article 5. Added to this are the friction with Denmark over Greenland—Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen reiterated that the island “is not for sale”—and a series of bilateral agreements signed by Zelensky with Estonia, the Netherlands, and Denmark.
Implications
Here I must remain true to what I have been unequivocally maintaining. Spain’s absence from the informal European leadership—the Berlin E5—is fully justified, “with good reason”: a country with the lowest defense spending in the Alliance cannot be surprised that it is not invited to the table where decisions are made. The situation is the same as always: “from irrelevance to suspicion.” Spain is no longer just a secondary partner, but an ally whose reliability is being questioned, with a deep distrust of all allies that will be very difficult to rebuild. The same leadership vacuum that Tehran suffers—a void at the top—has its European counterpart here: an empty chair and an absent leadership.
I will be blunt because the facts demand it. A serious country does not finance its defense with credit transfers approved the day before a summit—the umpteenth trick of someone who has governed without a national budget since 2023—but with multi-year planning and budgetary transparency. A reliable ally does not deny its bases to the partner that guarantees its security while boasting of fulfilling “capabilities” on paper. And a responsible government does not turn foreign policy into domestic cabotage, more concerned with not upsetting its parliamentary partners than with Spain’s international credibility: this neutrality bordering on irresponsibility—more hostile toward Washington than toward Tehran—now has a name, surname, and price tag. As for the Alliance, the fact that it is considering canceling its own summits so as not to upset the temperament of a single man is the other side of the same disease: appeasement elevated to an institutional method. No organization is strengthened by hiding from itself.
Perspectives and scenarios
Money flows; politics doesn’t. The doubt hanging over Ankara—as pointed out by everyone from Özgür Ünlühisarcikli (German Marshall Fund) to Swedish minister Pål Jonson—is not how much is being spent, but whether that spending will quickly translate into real capabilities and a European autonomy that ceases to be mere rhetoric. I am an Atlanticist at heart and a committed European; precisely for this reason, I demand that Europe grow once and for all.
3. Kyiv under fire: Russia’s biggest attack of the year and the Patriot interceptor shortage
Facts
In the early hours of July 6, Russia launched approximately 351 drones and 68 missiles against Ukraine, killing at least 22 people—15 in Kyiv itself—and wounding more than 50. The devastating fact: 29 of the missiles hit their targets and none were shot down. The attack, preceded on July 2 by another that left around 30 dead, is part of Russia’s retaliation for the long-range Ukrainian attacks on refineries—which are causing fuel shortages and putting Putin under unprecedented pressure. The global shortage of Patriot interceptors, exacerbated by the Middle East war, leaves Ukrainian cities dangerously vulnerable.
Implications
The interdependence of theaters of war is starkly evident: the Gulf War is cannibalizing the global supply of interceptors that Ukraine needs to survive. I reiterate my principled position—unequivocally opposed to Russian aggression and the use of force to acquire territory—: territory can only change through the free will of peoples, never through the coercion of arms. It is also worth highlighting the diagnosis of the Institute for the Study of War (ISW): the Russian spring-summer offensive of 2026 has failed, with the rate of advance in June a fraction of what it was a year earlier.
Perspectives and scenarios
Zelensky arrives in Ankara with a single demand—air defense, and more air defense—and a bilateral meeting with Trump scheduled for today. US pressure is pushing for negotiations; the risk is that this haste to reach an agreement will result in a peace without a foundation, the same original sin I already denounced in the Iranian case.
4. The rise of General Vahidi: the paradox of decapitation at its most acute.
Facts
The six-day funeral for Ali Khamenei—killed on February 28 in the joint US-Israeli attacks—served as the stage for the public reappearance of General Ahmad Vahidi, commander-in-chief of the IRGC since March 1, who had been absent from the public eye for months. Vahidi is no ordinary military officer: a former Minister of Defense under Ahmadinejad and Minister of the Interior under Raisi, he is subject to an Interpol Red Notice for the AMIA terrorist attack (Buenos Aires, 1994). Analysts like Mohammad Ali Shabani (director of Amwaj Media) describe him bluntly as “brutal,” while his predecessors were “schoolteachers compared to him.” He was among those who pushed for the appointment of Mukhta Khamenei as “supreme” and Zolghadr as head of the National Security Council, while systematically blocking President Pezeshkian.
Implications
It is worth clarifying, once again, the paradox of the decapitation . It does not consist—it never consisted—of the elimination of moderates, because there were none. We are now in a new phase: Vahidi is, de facto, the primus inter pares of the IRGC triumvirate—completed by Mohammad B. Zolghadr, secretary of the National Security Council and head of the Al-Quds Brigades, and by Rezaei, the leader’s interim military advisor. But a primus inter pares is not an absolute arbiter in the manner of Khamenei: his primacy rests on force, fear, and fanaticism, not on the ideological, institutional, and religious authority that allowed the old leader to impose internal discipline and extract concessions from the apparatus.
Hence, the paradox is not resolved, but rather intensified: the one who prevails is precisely the most ruthless and brutal of the three—”by far the worst of the options”—capable of steering and dominating the negotiations, but incapable—and unwilling—to guarantee compliance. The regime finally has a dominant figure, but still lacks a reliable guarantor of the concessions. It is no longer “equals without an arbiter,” but “a dominant hawk without the legitimate authority—or the will—to comply.” A paradox of governance, not of moderation. And therein lies the explanation for the chaotic intermittency of the Strait that opened this report. Mokhtaba Khamenei, inexplicably called “supreme,” is nothing more than a puppet leader and has disappeared.
Perspectives and scenarios
I maintain Scenario B at 40%. And I return to the leitmotif that runs through today’s edition: the lack of leadership . It exists in Tehran, where Vahidi rules by force but doesn’t arbitrate; and it exists in Madrid, with its empty seat on the European board. Two power vacuums, ideologically opposed, which nevertheless share the same consequence: the impossibility of making credible commitments.
5. Oil prices tighten: Hormuz moves markets again
Facts
Markets reacted nervously to the new escalation. Brent crude—the international benchmark—closed on July 7 with a rise of nearly 3%, reaching $74.16 per barrel, and West Texas Intermediate (WTI) rose 2.8% to $70.44. After the revocation of Iran’s oil license was announced, the rally intensified in after-hours trading: Brent reached $76.04 (+5.6%) and WTI $72.25 (+5.4%). The day of July 8 turned the trend into a stampede: after Trump declared the ceasefire “over,” Brent surged more than 5%, approaching $78.40, and WTI followed suit, reaching around $74.60. It’s worth recalling that the International Energy Agency (IEA) went so far as to describe the Strait of Hormuz crisis as “the biggest supply disruption in the history of the oil market.”
Implications
The geoeconomic component is paramount. The United States, an energy powerhouse, benefits relatively from high prices; Europe and Asia, as importers, are exposed to a global inflationary shock—estimated at around eight-tenths of a percent if the disruption persists—which drags down fertilizer prices (urea) and, consequently, food security. It is also significant that Iran prioritized the passage of Chinese ships through the Strait of Hormuz: Asia’s energy dependence on the Strait of Hormuz is a lever that Beijing knows how to use.
Perspectives and scenarios
Until sustained flows are restored, analysts like Rory Johnston (founder of Commodity Context) place Brent crude in the $80-$90 range. Volatility, rather than price stability, will be the norm: every headline about Hormuz will move the price of a barrel several points within hours.
6. Trump and Al-Sharaa in Ankara: Syrian realignment and the shadow of Hezbollah
Facts
On the sidelines of the summit, Trump is meeting today, July 8, with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa—formerly Abu Mohamed al-Jolani, the ex-leader of al-Nusra, al-Qaeda’s Syrian branch—in their third meeting. The agenda is packed: the lifting of sanctions—the State Department has extended their suspension for another 180 days, although the toughest ones, the Caesar Act, require congressional approval—; containing ISIS (Islamic State) through Damascus’s entry into the anti-ISIS coalition; and relations with Israel. Trump insists that Syria “take care of Hezbollah” in Lebanon—an idea Damascus repeatedly rejects. Two explosions rocked the Syrian capital on July 7, injuring 18 people, and Macron is preparing a visit to Damascus. To begin with, the new Syrian regime has to deal with the brutal enemies it has at home: DAECH, Hezbollah of Syria, and the pro-Iranian terrorist militias of Syria and Iraq.
Implications
I speak of Lebanon with firsthand knowledge and from the heart, and that’s why I don’t shy away from the uncomfortable situation: American realpolitik is rehabilitating a former Al-Qaeda affiliate who has become a preferred interlocutor. I can understand the calculation—stabilizing Syria, closing the camps that breed jihadism, containing a Hezbollah terrorist group weakened after the war—but I will not stop keeping a close eye on someone who once belonged to the international network of terror. The Syrian reconstruction, which the World Bank estimates at more than $200 billion, will be the true test of this gamble.
Perspectives and scenarios
Syria will not enter Lebanon militarily—al-Sharaa has categorically ruled it out—and rightly so: dragging Damascus into the Lebanese war would destabilize a government that still needs to consolidate itself. The vacuum left by Hezbollah, however, is reshaping the entire Levant, and much of the regional balance of power for the next decade will be at stake there.
III. MEDIA RACK
A snapshot of the dominant media coverage by region. Russian and Iranian state media are presented as symptomatic of the regime’s narrative, never as a reliable source.
USA
NYT · Washington Post
They open with the CENTCOM attacks and the Iranian retaliation against Gulf bases; they frame the episode as a critical test of the ceasefire and the June MOU.
WSJ · CNBC · Bloomberg
Geoeconomic focus: revocation of the oil license, rebound of Brent and WTI, risk of reopening the energy shock.
CNN · CBS · ABC
Live coverage of the exchange of blows and Khamenei’s funeral; they report the Iranian warning of a “crushing response”.
Fox News
He emphasizes that Trump ordered the plan from Ankara and presents the action as a response to “terrorism” against civilian vessels.
Politico · The Hill · Axios
Focus on the summit: Trump’s disappointment with allies and the internal rift over spending and the power play.
UNITED KINGDOM
Financial Times
Market analysis and systemic energy risk assessment; caution regarding the fragility of the agreement.
The Times · Telegraph
Emphasis on the military dimension of the US coup and the struggle over Hormuz.
The Guardian
Attention to civilian victims in Kyiv and the human cost of the escalation.
BBC · Reuters
Fact-based and verified coverage of the US-Iran exchange and Ankara’s agenda.
The Economist
Analytical framework: NATO “adrift” and the dilemma of European autonomy.
CONTINENTAL EUROPE
Le Monde · Le Figaro
NATO summit and transatlantic tensions; follow-up on Macron’s possible visit to Damascus.
FAZ · Die Welt · Die Zeit
German debate on spending, US withdrawal and the credibility of Article 5.
Corriere della Sera
Trump criticizes Italy for its refusal to participate in the Iran war.
The World · ABC · The Reason
Sánchez in Ankara: the transfer of 6.287 billion approved the day before, the refusal to spend more and the threats regarding Rota and Morón.
LCI · BFM · Libération
Ukraine and air defense; humanitarian angle of the attack on Kyiv.
L’Osservatore Romano
Call for restraint and protection of the civilian population.
ARAB WORLD AND THE MIDDLE EAST
Al Jazeera · Al Arabiya
Intensive coverage of Hormuz, the attack on the Qatari methane tanker, and the retaliation against Bahrain and Kuwait.
Asharq Al-Awsat · Arab News
Gulf concerns about navigational safety and the price of crude oil.
An-Nahar · L’Orient-Le Jour
Lebanon: fears of a new front and pressure for Syria to intervene against Hezbollah.
Jerusalem Post · Haaretz
Israeli reaction to the escalation and realignment with Damascus.
Gulf News · Khaleej Times
Direct impact on the Emirates and Qatar; call to preserve the agreement.
ASIA-PACIFIC
South China Morning Post
Read about the Hormuz crisis and its effect on Chinese energy security.
China Daily
A narrative of stability and veiled criticism of American “unilateralism” (a symptom of the official discourse).
Times of India · Hindustan Times
Interest in crude oil, fertilizers, and the diaspora in the Gulf.
Yomiuri Shimbun · Straits Times
Risk to supply chains and Asian LNG.
WION
Comprehensive monitoring of the NATO-Iran-Ukraine axis from the perspective of the Global South.
UKRAINE, RUSSIA AND THE POST-SOVIET SPACE
Kyiv Independent · Kyiv Post
Details of the bombing of Kyiv and calls for Patriot interceptors.
Ukrainska Pravda · Ukrinform
Casualty and damage assessment; request for air defense in Ankara.
RT · TASS (symptom)
They present the attacks as “legitimate” retaliation for the attacks on refineries: Kremlin propaganda, not a source.
Vesti (symptom)
It downplays the failure of the summer offensive documented by the ISW.
THINK TANKS AND SPECIALIZED ANALYSIS
Atlantic Council
“Crisis of confidence” on Article 5; recommendations to save the summit.
ISW
The Russian spring-summer offensive has failed; marginal advances in June.
RUSI · IISS · CSIS
Analysis of the US force posture in Europe and deterrence.
IFRI · The Economist Intelligence Unit
European strategic autonomy and energy risk as key variables.
Foreign Affairs · The National Interest
In-depth debate on the Iranian “day after” and the limits of Syrian realpolitik.
IV. RISK TRAFFIC LIGHT
● US-Iran escalation in the Strait of Hormuz — Trump declares the ceasefire “over” after the exchange of blows; the MOU is mortally wounded, and the Strait is intermittently closed. The trend is clearly upward.
● Authority vacuum in Tehran — The hawk Vahidi dominates but does not arbitrate or guarantee compliance — a paradox of the decapitation in its acute phase —. Maximum uncertainty.
● Ukraine’s air defense — Critical Patriot interceptor deficit exacerbated by the Gulf War; cities exposed to Russian ballistic missiles.
● NATO cohesion and US withdrawal — Withdrawal of US resources and troops, doubts about Article 5 and an Alliance considering canceling the 2027 summit so as not to irritate Trump; spending is rising, political confidence is not.
● Spain, from irrelevance to suspicion — Lowest defense spending in the Alliance, bases denied to the main ally and last-minute accounting patches; Madrid’s isolation is consolidated and allied trust will take years to rebuild.
● Energy shock and global inflation — Brent and WTI rebound, pressure on fertilizers and food security; volatility as the norm.
● Syrian realignment and pressure on Hezbollah — Rehabilitation of al-Sharaa and pulse for Lebanon; reconfiguration of the Levant with open ending.
● European investment in defense — Ankara’s announcements (anti-drone, air defense, strike capabilities) are a positive sign… if they translate into real and rapid capabilities.
V. EDITORIAL COMMENTARY
There are days when current events seem to revolve around a single idea, and today that idea is the lack of leadership. In Tehran, the death of Ali Khamenei has brought no moderation—it never would—but rather the rise of the most brutal member of a clique of fanatics: General Vahidi rules by force, fear, and fanaticism, but he does not govern, he does not arbitrate, and above all, he cannot guarantee anything. This is the ultimate reason why the Strait of Hormuz opens and closes on a whim: a regime that has a dominant hawk but lacks a reliable guarantor of its own concessions. The Iranian jihadist oligarchy—I will never call it a “theocracy”—thus displays its most dangerous nature: that of a cosmically corrupt terrorist state that is not even master of its own word.
In Ankara, the European mirror reflects an equally bleak image. I wholeheartedly applaud Trump’s foreign policy when it is pragmatic and realistic, guided by Marco Rubio’s level-headedness—and I acknowledge his considerable diplomatic successes—but I criticize him, with equal frankness, when he makes decisions based on intuition and impulsive outbursts. The blow to Iran illustrates both sides: impeccable militarily, geostrategically adrift. And what happened today in Ankara belongs, without qualification, to the second category: to declare the ceasefire “finished” in an outburst, calling an adversary with whom memoranda were being signed just a month ago “scum,” is an excessive reaction that confuses firmness with verbal incontinence and hands the initiative for escalation to the one who least deserves it: Vahidi. A plan without a structure for the day after is not a strategy, it’s a gamble. A diplomacy undermined by impulse is not even a gamble: it’s an abdication. I trust, as always, that the system—and Marco Rubio’s level-headedness—will ultimately prevail over impulse.
Spain remains, and my hand will not tremble. The spectacle in Ankara has been shameful: a president arriving at the summit with a €6.287 billion accounting patch approved the day before—the umpteenth credit transfer from someone who has governed without a budget since 2023—who denies access to Rota and Morón to his main ally while displaying “sportsmanship” in the face of threats of retaliation, and whose erosion is now so visible that even the family photo could not be completed. His neutrality bordering on irresponsibility—more hostile toward Washington than toward Tehran—and his defense spending, the lowest in the Alliance, have consequences: exclusion from the European directorate is fully deserved, “quite rightly.” We have gone “from irrelevance to suspicion,” and rebuilding the trust of the allies will be a monumental task that will far exceed this government’s capacity. I am an Atlanticist at heart and a staunch European, and that is precisely why it pains me: a Europe that does not take its defense, its security, or its destiny seriously is condemned to be the object, not the subject, of history. The same empty chair in Madrid and the same void at the top of Tehran are, at heart, two faces of the same disease: the inability to lead and to commit. Faced with this, I insist on what I have always said—reason, common sense, and firmness in the defense of liberal democracy. Anything else is simply going with the flow.