By Gustavo de Arístegui,
March 6, 2026
I. BRIEF INTRODUCTION
The world awoke this Friday, March 6, 2026, to the armed conflict between the United States and Israel and the jihadist oligarchy of Tehran, now in its seventh day of hostilities, with no sign of immediate de-escalation and a geopolitical landscape being reconfigured at a breathtaking pace. Operation Epic Fury has achieved what seemed impossible: annihilating the naval capabilities of the Iranian regime—both those of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the regular navy—physically eliminating Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on February 28, and creating a power vacuum in Tehran whose dimensions we cannot yet accurately gauge.
Four major news stories have dominated the news agenda in the last 24 hours. First: President Trump told Reuters that the United States “must have a role in choosing Iran’s next leader,” explicitly ruling out Khamenei’s son, Mukhtaba. Second: China is negotiating with Tehran for a safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz for its oil tankers, while Beijing’s scandalous prior agreement to sell Iran CM-302 supersonic anti-ship missiles has been revealed more clearly—a major unfriendly gesture toward Washington in the midst of the war. Third: President Trump has dismissed Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem and replaced her with Oklahoma Senator Markwayne Mullin, the first move in his repositioning strategy ahead of the midterm elections. Fourth: the diplomatic crisis between Spain and its allies is aggravated by the position of Pedro Sánchez, which the Wall Street Journal has defined with surgical precision by pointing out that “the Iranian regime can still count on useful idiots”, placing Spain as the only NATO ally that has actively denied the use of its bases and that refuses to meet the defense spending target of 5% of GDP.
II. MOST IMPORTANT NEWS OF THE LAST 24 HOURS
1. Trump claims a decisive role in the selection of Khamenei’s successor
Facts
President Donald Trump told Reuters in a telephone interview on Thursday, March 5, that the United States “must be involved in the process of choosing the person who is going to lead Iran into the future.” In equally explicit terms, Trump told Axios that the son of the late Supreme Leader, Mukhtaba Khamenei—identified by multiple sources as the frontrunner before the Assembly of Experts, composed of 88 Shia clerics—was “unacceptable” to Washington. “Khamenei Jr. is a second-rate figure. I have to be involved in the appointment, just like we did with Delcy,” Trump declared, drawing a comparison to the Venezuelan case, where Delcy Rodríguez, Maduro’s vice president, assumed power after his capture with the apparent approval of the White House. Trump added, “We don’t want to have to do this again every five years. We want somebody that’s good for the Iranian people and for the country.”
The Assembly of Experts, which according to the Iranian constitution is the body with the sole power to designate the successor to the Supreme Leader, is holding virtual meetings after its headquarters in Qom was hit by airstrikes in recent days. Israel, for its part, has warned that any designated successor would be “an unambiguous target,” further complicating any transition process. The US Senate and House of Representatives have rejected, in separate votes, the war powers resolutions sponsored by Democrats and Republican Rand Paul: in the Senate the vote was 47 to 53; in the House, Republicans also managed to block the initiative.
Implications
Trump’s statements reveal the true nature of Operation Epic Fury’s objectives: it is not merely about destroying the Iranian nuclear program or degrading the regime’s ballistic and naval capabilities—objectives already largely achieved, according to the Pentagon—but about reshaping the Islamic Republic’s internal political order in the image of American and Israeli strategic interests. The explicit reference to the Venezuelan case is geopolitically revealing: Trump is exploring the possibility of a “Delcy model” in Iran, that is, the co-opting of a sector of the regime’s apparatus willing to cooperate with Washington in exchange for preserving its share of power. However, the analogy has obvious structural limitations: Iran is not Venezuela, its theocratic system has no equivalent in the Western Hemisphere, and the Assembly of Experts is a body of clerics trained in Khomeini’s dogma who are unlikely to accept any tutelage from a Presbyterian American president.
The Senate and House’s refusal to activate war powers strengthens Trump’s position domestically, although it does not resolve the underlying constitutional issue or the lack of a UN Security Council mandate. The conflict continues without a clear international legal basis, which fuels the narrative of Sánchez, Scholz, and those opposed to the operation in Western Europe, though it is not sufficient grounds to justify abandoning the alliance.
Perspectives and scenarios
Scenario A—the most likely in the short term—: The Assembly of Experts appoints Mukhtaba Khamenei as Supreme Leader under pressure from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Israel threatens him with “elimination,” and the conflict drags on with a regime decapitated but not overthrown. Scenario B—desirable but difficult to achieve—: A moderate or technocratic faction emerges within the Iranian apparatus, willing to negotiate a ceasefire with guarantees regarding the nuclear program, similar to the 1981 Algiers Agreement. Scenario C—the most dangerous—: The disintegration of the Iranian state creates a power vacuum that is exploited by IRGC militias, Kurdish groups, and regional powers, leading to the Somalization of a country of 88 million inhabitants bordering the Caspian Sea, Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf.
2. Beijing’s double game: Hormuz and the anti-ship missiles
Facts
According to Reuters, citing three diplomatic sources, China is actively engaged in talks with the Tehran regime to ensure the safe passage of oil and gas tankers through the Strait of Hormuz, the energy artery through which up to 20% of the world’s crude oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) supply passes. China obtains approximately 45% of its oil imports through this waterway. Since the start of Operation Epic Fury on February 28, tanker traffic through the strait has plummeted from an average of 24 vessels per day to just four on March 1, with nearly 300 tankers still trapped inside the Strait, according to the tracking platforms Vortexa and Kpler.
The Tehran regime has declared it will not allow passage to ships belonging to the United States, Israel, Europe, or their allies, but has remained silent regarding China. In fact, a ship called the Iron Maiden managed to transit the strait after changing its signal to “Chinese property.” At the same time, and as a serious aggravation of China’s position, several media outlets— Reuters, Fox News, and Newsweek— have confirmed that Iran is very close to finalizing an agreement to acquire Chinese-made CM-302 supersonic anti-ship missiles, known as “carrier killers,” with a range of 290 kilometers, the ability to fly at sea level at Mach 3, and designed to evade naval defense systems. Beijing has formally denied any knowledge of the operation.
Implications
Beijing’s double game could not be more blatant or more unfriendly: on the one hand, it is negotiating a safe passage for its own ships with Tehran, which amounts to recognizing and legitimizing Iran’s ability to selectively close the Strait—a precedent with systemic consequences for international freedom of navigation; on the other hand, it nearly provided the Ayatollahs’ regime with a weapon that could have turned the Strait into a death trap for the US aircraft carriers Gerald R. Ford and Abraham Lincoln. Had the CM-302s been delivered before the start of hostilities, the cost of Operation Epic Fury in American lives could have been significantly higher.
China’s stance confirms that Beijing views the Iranian conflict not as a humanitarian or regional security issue, but as a strategic opportunity: to pressure the energy supplies of US allies, weaken Washington’s credibility as a guarantor of freedom of navigation, and maintain Iran as a buffer state against any Western advance in the Middle East. The fact that the CM-302 missiles are essentially the export version of the YJ-12—a system also designed for the Pacific theater against the US Navy—reveals Beijing’s strategic coherence: what it concedes to Iran is also a test of capabilities against the United States in another theater of operations.
Perspectives and scenarios
In the short term, the agreement on safe passage for Chinese ships could partially alleviate pressure on energy markets—crude oil has risen more than 15% since the start of the conflict—but it sets a very serious precedent: the Strait of Hormuz would become a toll road managed unilaterally by Tehran with Beijing’s implicit approval. Washington will have to decide whether to tolerate this precedent or force the Strait’s full opening through direct naval action, which would entail a confrontation with China with unpredictable consequences. The international community, and in particular the Gulf powers—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar—are watching with growing alarm as their energy security is left in the hands of a Sino-Iranian negotiation outside any multilateral framework.
3. Trump fires Kristi Noem: repositioning ahead of the midterms
Facts
President Donald Trump announced on Thursday, March 5, through Truth Social, the dismissal of Kristi Noem as Secretary of Homeland Security, the first Cabinet member to be removed from the post in his second term. Noem, the former governor of South Dakota, will assume a newly created position called “Special Envoy for the Shield of the Americas,” a hemispheric security initiative that Trump plans to unveil this weekend in Doral, Florida. Trump has nominated Oklahoma Senator Markwayne Mullin—the first native-born American in the Senate in decades and an undefeated former professional mixed martial arts (MMA) fighter—as her successor at the head of the Department, effective March 31, pending Senate confirmation.
Noem’s departure comes after two days of particularly tough parliamentary questioning in the Senate and the House, where she was challenged about a $220 million public-funded advertising campaign in which she herself was featured, awarded without public bidding to companies with ties to the Republican establishment. Several Republican senators, including the usually loyal Thom Tillis, described her handling of the campaign as a “disaster.” Trump told Reuters that he “never knew anything” about the campaign, directly contradicting Noem, who had assured Congress that the president had approved it.
Implications
Noem’s dismissal is, above all, an electoral maneuver: Trump is removing the most controversial face of his immigration agenda and replacing it with someone known for their loyalty and media presence—Mullin is a regular on cable television—before the campaign heats up for the November 2026 midterm elections. The departure of Corey Lewandowski—Noem’s advisor and a controversial figure within the department—also clears the air of rumors about the personal relationship between the two, which had begun to leak to the media. In short, it’s a cleanup operation on a political flank that Trump considered unnecessarily exposed.
Mullin’s appointment also responds to the need to bolster the image of a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that operated with remarkable ineptitude in Minneapolis, where two American citizens—Renee Good and Alex Pretti—died during mass deportation operations, and Noem publicly labeled them “domestic terrorists,” contradicting available video footage. The selection of a senator with an action-oriented image but a moderate style reflects Trump’s need to maintain pressure on immigration without generating headlines that would fuel the Democratic narrative leading up to the midterm elections.
Perspectives and scenarios
Mullin’s confirmation in the Senate is not guaranteed: the Democratic leadership has announced its opposition, although Senator John Fetterman—a Pennsylvania Democrat known for his unorthodox positions—has expressed his willingness to vote in favor. The department is going through a period of high turnover and institutional fragility, and the appointment of a politician with no experience managing large bureaucratic organizations in the midst of an operational crisis raises legitimate questions about the department’s ability to implement changes. In any case, Trump’s political message is unequivocal: the DHS is being reinvented in the lead-up to the midterm elections.
4. Sánchez’s diplomatic crisis and its cost to NATO
Facts
The crisis between Pedro Sánchez’s government and its allies in NATO, the European Union, and especially the United States, worsened considerably in the last 24 hours. The Ministry of Defense, through Minister Margarita Robles, categorically denied the claims made by White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt, who had stated on Wednesday that Spain had “changed its position” and agreed to cooperate with US forces. The minister was emphatic: “The Spanish government’s position has not changed one iota.” Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent called the Spanish government a “terrible actor” and reminded everyone that Spain was the only NATO member that refused to subscribe to the Alliance’s agreed-upon defense spending target of 5% of GDP, labeling it a “free rider.”
The controversy reached its editorial peak with an article in the Wall Street Journal—the most influential business and financial newspaper in the English-speaking world—which, on its editorial page, stated that the Iranian regime “still has useful idiots to rely on,” a clear allusion to Sánchez’s position. The New York daily described Spain as the exception among all of Washington’s allies and as “NATO’s laggard.” Meanwhile, the air war continues to expand: the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, northern Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey have suffered hits from Iranian missiles and drones; Italy, France, Greece, and the Netherlands have announced the deployment of naval assets in the Eastern Mediterranean. Spain, for its part, has sent its most advanced frigate, the Cristóbal Colón, to the Mediterranean, although on a mission defined strictly as defensive.
Implications
Sánchez’s position is politically understandable—he is appealing to a left-wing electorate that largely rejects the operation—but strategically suicidal. Spain has already paid a very high diplomatic price: the United States repositioned 15 aircraft, including aerial refueling tankers, from the Rota and Morón de la Frontera bases to Ramstein Air Base (Germany), which reduces, in real terms, Spain’s power projection as a valuable ally in the Mediterranean and Atlantic context. If Trump were to materialize—even partially—his threat of trade retaliation, the consequences for the Spanish economy would be considerable, although trade policy is the responsibility of the European Union as a whole.
Sánchez’s isolation within NATO is growing: Secretary General Mark Rutte has expressly supported the operation; the United Kingdom has authorized the use of its bases for defensive purposes; France, Germany, and Italy, despite their nuanced differences, have not adopted a stance of direct confrontation with Washington. Only Sánchez—supported by his far-left coalition partners and pressure from pro-Iranian movements within his electoral base—maintains a position that dangerously borders on complicity with those who have attacked European Union territories, such as Cyprus, where the British base at Akrotiri was hit, and Azerbaijan. Sánchez’s narrative—”no to war,” echoing the 2003 slogan against the invasion of Iraq—has populist internal coherence but ignores that that war was an invasion without a casus belli. The operation against Iran, on the other hand, has precedents in the action against Nazi Germany or against Al Qaeda: a state that massacred its own citizens, financed global terror and pursued nuclear weapons.
Perspectives and scenarios
If Spain maintains its opposition to the use of bases for the duration of the conflict, the reputational and operational costs will be long-lasting. Washington has a long institutional memory; decisions to reallocate military resources and assets tend to be structural, not circumstantial. If, as some analysts suggest, Trump decides to reduce the Navy’s permanent presence in Rota in favor of other Mediterranean ports—Naples, Souda Bay in Crete, or even Haifa—the damage to Spain’s strategic projection and to the economies of the provinces of Cádiz and Seville would be difficult to reverse in the short term. The People’s Party has an obligation to articulate a credible foreign policy alternative that does not sacrifice Atlantic solidarity on the altar of electoral opportunism. The Spanish transition was built, among other things, on joining NATO: abandoning that legacy hand in hand with Sánchez’s far-left partners would be a betrayal of that heritage.
5. Expansion of the conflict: Day 7 of Operation Epic Fury
Facts
The armed conflict entered its seventh day with an intensification of exchanges of attacks in multiple theaters. The commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) warned that the coming days would bring “more intense and widespread” attacks. Iran rammed an American-flagged oil tanker in the northern Persian Gulf, setting it ablaze. Azerbaijan summoned the Iranian ambassador after a drone strike hit Nakhchivan airport in its exclave bordering Iran, Armenia, and Turkey, injuring six Pakistani and Nepalese citizens. Israel intensified its bombing campaign in southern Lebanon, Beirut, and the Bekaa Valley, killing Hezbollah’s intelligence chief, Hussein Makled. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) also activated an evacuation warning for the southern suburbs of Beirut. The American Senate rejected the war powers resolution (47-53) and the House followed the same path, although with a greater margin of uncertainty.
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) estimated that some 20,000 sailors and 15,000 cruise ship passengers are stranded in the Persian Gulf. Qatar Airways, Emirates, and Etihad have suspended operations. The Iraqi chairman of the Iranian Assembly of Experts, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, asserted that the United States is experiencing a shortage of ammunition for its air defense systems, a claim that Western analysts consider propaganda, although it raises concerns about the rate at which the Gulf allies are using interceptors. More than 920 Iranian civilians have died, according to the Iranian Ministry of Health, since the start of the operation.
Implications
The opening of the Lebanese front with the full reactivation of Hezbollah—whose return to war Lebanon has formally banned but cannot prevent in practice—expands the perimeter of the conflict alarmingly. While the elimination of Hezbollah cadres is progressing, the organization possesses tens of thousands of rockets and missiles aimed at northern Israel. The expansion of Iranian attacks on Azerbaijan—a member state of the Non-Aligned Movement but closely linked to Turkey and Israel—introduces a new variable of potential division within the Islamic world regarding its stance on the conflict. The UMO and the paralysis of maritime traffic in the Gulf add a humanitarian and economic dimension to the conflict that could accelerate international diplomatic pressure for a ceasefire.
Perspectives and scenarios
Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s statement—promising attacks “of increasing scope and intensity” in the coming hours and days—suggests that Washington is not yet considering any negotiated solution in the short term. The fundamental question analysts are asking is whether the real objective is regime change—which would imply a long-term operation—or the neutralization of nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities, an objective already partially achieved. Trump has stated that Iran “has been decimated for ten years” and that “many say it’s over”; his temperament pushes him toward a quick solution, but Netanyahu has more ambitious goals. This potential divergence in timelines and objectives between Washington and Tel Aviv is the most underestimated risk at the moment.
III. MEDIA RACK
Below is a representative selection of the positioning of the main international media outlets in the last 24 hours:
| HALF | POSITION | EDITORIAL FOCUS |
| Reuters | Neutral / Factual | Comprehensive coverage of the interview with Trump on the Iranian successor and the Sino-Iranian negotiations over the Strait of Hormuz. World exclusives on both counts. |
| The Wall Street Journal | Pro-operation / Critical of Sánchez | An editorial describes the Iranian regime as having “useful idiots,” a direct reference to Spain. Extensive coverage of risks to the markets and crude oil. |
| The New York Times | Critical of the strategy / Cautious | Analysis of the risks of a protracted conflict and the Iranian succession dilemma. It points out that the removal of Khamenei does not equate to the collapse of the regime. |
| The Washington Post | Liberal / Moderately critical | Coverage of Noem’s dismissal and the Spain-US crisis. A critical profile of the Trump administration’s shifting justifications for the war. |
| BBC World Service | Neutral / Multidimensional | Extensive coverage of the humanitarian impacts in Iran, the closure of Gulf airspace and the situation of sailors trapped in the Strait of Hormuz. |
| Financial Times | Economical / Moderately alarmist | Energy impact analysis: crude oil price rise +15%, Qatari LNG production halted, global inflationary pressures. Coverage of the Sino-Iranian agreements with a focus on the markets. |
| The Guardian | Progressive / Anti-war | Coverage focused on Iranian civilian casualties and the lack of a congressional mandate for the war. Editorial sympathy with Sánchez’s position. |
| Le Monde | European centrist / Critic | Analysis of the Atlantic divide between Spain and Washington. It highlights Sánchez’s isolation within the EU and the impact on France’s credibility as a mediator. |
| Le Figaro | Conservative-Atlanticist | Implicit support for the operation, veiled criticism of Sánchez for weakening European cohesion. Coverage of French naval deployments in the Mediterranean. |
| FAZ / Die Welt | Atlanticist / Pro-NATO | Analysis of Germany’s role as a logistical support provider from Ramstein. Concern about the economic impact on German industry dependent on Qatari LNG. |
| Corriere della Sera | European / Pragmatic | Coverage of the Italian naval deployment and economic uncertainty. Discomfort with the Spanish position, which isolates southern Europe. |
| Al Jazeera | Pro-Iranian / Critical of the U.S. | Intensive coverage of civilian casualties, criticism of Trump for interfering in the Iranian succession. Narrative framework of a “Western war of aggression.” |
| Al Arabiya / Asharq Al Awsat | Pro-Western / Saudi | Favorable coverage of the operation, concern over Iranian attacks on Gulf energy infrastructure. Detailed monitoring of Iranian retaliation against Saudi Arabia and the UAE. |
| Jerusalem Post / Israel Hayom | Pro-Israeli / Favorable | Editorial enthusiasm for the progress of the operation. Follow-up on the fronts in Lebanon and the Iranian succession dilemma. Coverage of the debate in the US Congress. |
| Haaretz | Israeli Liberal / Critic | Questions about the exit strategy from the conflict. Warnings about the human cost and the risk of a political boomerang for Netanyahu. |
| South China Morning Post | Anglo-Chinese / Nuanced | Defense of China’s position on Hormuz as “reasonable pressure for peace.” Editorial silence on the CM-302 missile agreement. |
| Russia Today / TASS | Pro-Moscow propaganda | Framing the conflict as “imperialist aggression.” Covering up Iranian civilian casualties and amplifying Sánchez’s position as a demonstration of “European resistance.” |
| The Times of India / Hindustan Times | Equidistant / Pragmatic | Concern over the energy impact on India, an importer of Iranian crude. Coverage of the sinking of an Iranian warship by an American submarine off Sri Lanka. |
| CNN/CBS News | American liberal / Nuanced critic | Balanced coverage of the conflict. CBS conducted the interview with Israeli President Herzog. CNN is providing live coverage of the conflict’s spread to Azerbaijan and Beirut. |
| Fox News | Pro-Trump / Favorable to the operation | Enthusiastic coverage of the operation and Noem’s dismissal. Follow-up on the votes in Congress against the war powers resolutions. |
| Kyiv Post / Kyiv Independent | Ukrainian / Pro-Western | Analysis of the impact of the Iran war on arms supplies to Ukraine. Concern over the American strategic distraction from the European theater. |
| Clarin (Buenos Aires) | Latin American / Diverse | Monitoring the Trump-Venezuela comparison in relation to the Iranian case. Coverage of Delcy Rodríguez’s role as a symbol of the “Trump model” of regime change. |
IV. RISK TRAFFIC LIGHT
Assessment of the level of geopolitical risk in the main conflict zones as of today, March 6, 2026:
| 🔴 CRITICAL | IRAN-US-ISRAEL CONFLICT: Day 7 of hostilities with no signs of de-escalation. Expansion into Lebanon, Azerbaijan, Iraq, and the Persian Gulf. Strait of Hormuz virtually closed. Risk of an accident or unintentional escalation with American casualties that could force a qualitative leap in the intensity of the conflict. |
| 🔴 CRITICAL | GLOBAL ENERGY CRISIS: The price of crude oil has risen by more than 15% since trading began. Qatari LNG production halted. 300 tankers stranded. Risk of structural inflation in economies dependent on imported energy (Europe, India, Japan, South Korea). |
| 🟠 STOP | SUCCESSION IN IRAN: The Assembly of Experts deliberates under literal fire and political pressure from the IRGC to appoint Mukhtaba Khamenei, who has been vetoed by Trump and Israel. Any appointment could accelerate attacks and complicate any negotiated solution. |
| 🟠 STOP | CHINA’S DOUBLE GAME: Beijing is using the conflict to advance its energy and arms agenda. The CM-302 missile agreement and the Hormuz negotiations reveal a strategy of maximizing advantages at the expense of Western allies. There is a risk of escalating US sanctions against China. |
| 🟠 STOP | ATLANTIC CRISIS BETWEEN SPAIN AND NATO: Sánchez’s isolation within the Alliance is growing, and its consequences for the American military presence on the Iberian Peninsula could be long-lasting. Risk of American trade retaliation. |
| 🟡 MEDIUM | AMERICAN POLITICAL STABILITY: Noem’s dismissal and Mullin’s pending confirmation introduce uncertainty into the management of DHS at a time of high immigration and security tensions. The November 2026 midterm elections add pressure to every decision the administration makes. |
| 🟡 MEDIUM | LEBANESE FRONT: The reactivation of Hezbollah adds a new front to the conflict with the potential for massive escalation. If Israel expands its ground operation in southern Lebanon, the conflict could enter a phase of far greater complexity and a higher death toll. |
| 🟢 SURVEILLANCE | UKRAINE: The Iranian conflict is diverting media and political attention from Washington, but it has not yet altered arms flows to Kyiv. The risk is attention fatigue, which could reduce political pressure on the US Congress to maintain military aid. |
V. EDITORIAL COMMENTARY
There are moments in history when upheavals occur so rapidly that the observer is tempted to dwell on the anecdote—the dismissal of Noem, Trump’s statement about the Iranian successor—and loses sight of the tectonic architecture being rearranged beneath their feet. This is one of those moments. It is wise to rise above the noise and look at the bigger picture.
What is happening in the Persian Gulf is not simply a military operation against a regime that has financed jihadist terrorism worldwide for decades—although this alone would justify it. It is the first real test of the new multipolar international order: a test that pits America’s will to remain the ultimate guarantor of global security against China’s strategy of patient erosion and opportunistic gain, and against Russia’s obstinacy in capitalizing on any conflict that diverts Washington’s attention from Ukraine. Iran was the central node in this network of hostility toward the liberal order: a financier of Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and the pro-Iranian Iraqi militias. Its military and political decapitation is, in strategic terms, an event of the same magnitude as the fall of the Berlin Wall, although its ultimate impact will depend on what comes next.
Trump is right in his diagnosis—the Iranian regime was an existential threat to regional stability, a breeding ground for terrorism, and a budding nuclear power—but he still needs to demonstrate that he has an exit strategy. The comparison with Venezuela cannot be sustained indefinitely: Delcy Rodríguez governs a country with 30 million inhabitants and no ballistic missiles; Iran has 88 million citizens, a millennia-old culture of resistance to foreign occupation, and a theocratic structure that does not disappear with the physical elimination of its leaders. The risk of the Somalization of Iran is real and cannot be ignored. A tactical victory that generates decades of strategic chaos would not be a victory at all.
Regarding China’s conduct, it is necessary to call things by their name: Beijing is not a neutral interlocutor. It is a state that, while proclaiming peace and dialogue, has been on the verge of arming Iran with missiles designed to sink American aircraft carriers, and is now negotiating for itself an energy security corridor through the Strait of Hormuz, a global public good that the international community has been guaranteeing for decades. Washington’s response must be clear and firm: secondary sanctions against Chinese entities involved in the Iranian arms supply chain must be activated without delay.
And so, inevitably, we arrive at Sánchez. This isn’t a question of empathy for the Iranian civilian victims—who exist, are numerous, and deserve our utmost respect. It’s a question of intellectual honesty and consistency with the values Spain claims to defend. The same jihadist oligarchy in Tehran that Sánchez refuses to condemn with action—only verbally, when missiles strike Cyprus, a European Union territory—is the one that massacred more than 36,500 of its own citizens in January 2016. It’s the one that financed Hamas and its carnage of October 7th. It’s the one that supplied drones to Russia to kill Ukrainians. The Wall Street Journal has been more accurate than perhaps it intended: “The Iranian regime still has useful idiots it can rely on.” Spain, with its current government, has become one of them. The consequences—diplomatic, strategic, economic—will be paid by all Spaniards, not just the left-wing electorate that Sánchez is courting with this stance.
The Spain that joined NATO, that experienced its exemplary democratic transition under the aegis of King Juan Carlos I, that built its place in the concert of nations on the Atlantic and European pillars, deserves a foreign policy worthy of that legacy. The cost of the current irresponsibility is not measured solely by the aircraft the United States has withdrawn from Rota and Morón: it is measured by the lost credibility with allies who now look upon us with bewilderment, and with adversaries who observe us with satisfaction.