By Gustavo de Arístegui,
March 13, 2026
I. BRIEF INTRODUCTION
March 13, 2026, marks the fourteenth day of Operation Epic Fury, the joint US-Israeli military offensive against the jihadist oligarchy in Tehran. The day has left a trail of extraordinarily serious incidents that confirm the conflict is expanding geographically and systemically far beyond Iran’s borders. A US Air Force KC-135 Stratotanker aerial refueling tanker crashed in western Iraq under circumstances that are still not entirely clear. A French soldier was killed in Erbil, in Iraqi Kurdistan, the victim of a drone strike attributed to pro-Iranian militias, making France the first NATO nation to suffer a fatality outside of Iran. Simultaneously, Iran’s new Supreme Leader, Mukhta Khamenei, issued his first public statement, reiterating the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and threatening to open new fronts. On the economic and strategic front, the Trump Administration granted a temporary sanctions waiver for the purchase of Russian oil offshore, confirming that pressure on energy markets is forcing decisions contrary to Western geopolitical coherence. Canada, for its part, announced an ambitious investment in Arctic defense, albeit years too late. Finally, Quds Day proved to be a mere act of diminished propaganda: the war has exposed the flaws in the hegemonic project of the Tehran theocracy.
II. MOST IMPORTANT NEWS OF THE LAST 24 HOURS
1. The KC-135 crash in Iraq: the human and operational cost of Operation Epic Fury
Facts
A U.S. Air Force KC-135 Stratotanker tanker crashed in western Iraq late Thursday night. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) confirmed the loss of the aircraft and stated that search and rescue operations were underway. The aircraft was carrying at least five or six crew members. CENTCOM’s official statement was emphatic in asserting that the crash was not the result of hostile or friendly fire . A second KC-135 involved in the same operation landed safely. However, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI), an umbrella group for pro-Iranian terrorist militias in the country, claimed to have shot down the aircraft with “the appropriate weapon,” in blatant contradiction to the official U.S. version of events.
Implications
This incident, whatever its ultimate technical cause, represents the most serious accident suffered by US aviation since the start of Operation Epic Fury on February 28, 2026. The KC-135 is the backbone of the US Air Force’s aerial refueling, and its loss in such an active theater of operations inevitably casts a shadow over the air campaign’s logistics chain. The ambiguity surrounding the causes of the crash—given the immediate claim of responsibility by a pro-Iranian terrorist militia and the denial by CENTCOM—creates a space of informational uncertainty that Tehran will exploit for propaganda purposes. It is worth recalling that in the early days of the conflict, three F-15 Eagle fighter jets were already lost to friendly fire from Kuwaiti air defenses, meaning that the accidental cost of the operation is beginning to have political relevance in the US Congress and among a public opinion that YouGov polls show to be largely skeptical about the war.
Perspectives and scenarios
If the CENTCOM investigation confirms that the loss was purely accidental, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth will have to appear before Congress with solid arguments amidst the escalating situation. If, on the other hand, any direct or indirect responsibility on the part of Iranian-backed militias in Iraq were to emerge, the White House’s political leadership would be pressured to respond militarily within Iraqi territory, further complicating Baghdad’s position and the anti-jihadist coalition’s mission. In any case, the accumulated human toll of the operation—seven killed in combat, 140 wounded, and now the potential losses of this aircraft—demonstrates that President Trump’s triumphalist rhetoric (“we won”) is not reflected in the operational reality on the ground.
2. NATO’s first death: a French alpine hunter falls in Erbil
Facts
President Emmanuel Macron publicly confirmed on Friday the death of Sergeant Major Arnaud Frion, of the 7th Alpine Rifle Battalion in Varces, during a drone attack in the Erbil region of Iraqi Kurdistan. The attack, carried out by at least two drones against the Mala Qara base, located about 40 kilometers from the regional capital, also left six French soldiers wounded. Macron called the attack “unacceptable” and stressed that the French presence in Iraq has been “strictly focused on the fight against terrorism” since 2015, and that “the war in Iran cannot justify these attacks.” The Iraqi pro-Iranian group Ashab Ahl al-Kahf (Companions of the Cave Dwellers) posted on Telegram that French interests “in Iraq and the region are under fire,” linking the attack to the arrival of the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle in the CENTCOM area of operations. Meanwhile, an Italian base in Erbil was hit by an air strike without causing casualties; Rome responded by temporarily withdrawing its military.
Implications
This death is a major milestone in the development of the conflict: it constitutes the first fatality of a NATO member outside Iranian soil since the start of Operation Epic Fury, and raises a crucial question of international law regarding collective defense. The pro-Iranian terrorist militias in Iraq have deliberately decided to expand their sphere of influence, attacking not only American targets—already affected from day one—but also European allies whose presence in the country is mandated by the anti-ISIS coalition. The explicit threat by the Ashab Ahl al-Kahf group against French interests, coordinated with the deployment of the Charles de Gaulle, is a direct response to the France-CENTCOM strategic axis and a declaration of hostilities that compels Paris to reconsider its position. Macron has insisted that the French position is “strictly defensive,” but internal pressure and the explicit threat against his troops place him in a highly uncomfortable political dilemma.
Perspectives and scenarios
France faces three real options. First: maintain its defensive posture and absorb the political cost of the casualties without responding independently. Second: invoke NATO’s solidarity mechanism, although the nature of the attack—non-state militias on Iraqi soil—complicates the literal application of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Third: respond militarily in a limited and coordinated manner with CENTCOM against the infrastructure of pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, with the risk of further internationalizing the conflict. What is undeniable is that the jihadist oligarchy in Tehran has given precise instructions to its Iraqi proxies to expand the European front. The message to the coalition allies is crystal clear: no state that supports the US operation, even logistically or symbolically, will be safe from reprisals by Iranian proxies.
3. Mokhtaba Khamenei’s first message: the Strait of Hormuz will remain closed
Facts
On Wednesday, March 12, Iranian state television broadcast what it presented as the first public statement by the new Supreme Leader, Mukhta Khamenei, elected the previous Sunday, March 8, by the Assembly of Experts to succeed his father, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who was killed during the initial airstrikes of Operation Epic Fury. Significantly, the message was not read by Mukhta Khamenei himself, but by a television announcer, while a still photograph of the new leader was displayed on screen. No video or audio of Khamenei himself has been released in the two weeks since the start of the conflict, fueling reports of a possible serious injury—including the amputation of a leg—sustained in the attacks that killed his father, wife, and sister. In his declaration, the new supreme leader stated that the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz must continue as a “lever of pressure” against the enemy, threatened to attack US military bases in neighboring countries if they do not close them voluntarily, announced the possibility of opening “new fronts” in areas where the enemy “has little experience and is very vulnerable,” and demanded war reparations from the United States.
Implications
Far from the sign of moderation the White House expected from a new Iranian leadership less ideologically entrenched than its father—Trump himself had hinted that Iran would follow “the Venezuelan path” by choosing someone willing to negotiate—Mukhta Khamenei has opted for maximum intransigence in his first message. The declaration coincides with the day Brent crude once again surpassed $100 a barrel in Asian markets, giving the threat over the Strait of Hormuz a dimension of global energy blackmail of the highest order. The strait is not technically closed—Iranian oil continues to flow to China at a rate of 1.5 million barrels per day, and Beijing effectively enjoys the geopolitical cushion provided by an Iran at war—but the pressure on third-country tanker traffic has dramatically reduced the volume of crude passing through, threatening the greatest energy disruption in modern history, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA).
Perspectives and scenarios
Mujtaba Khamenei’s first message paints a picture of protracted conflict, not resolution. The fact that it was read by a third party and not broadcast directly via video or audio raises serious doubts about the new leader’s health and actual control over the jihadist oligarchy’s apparatus. It is worth considering whether we are witnessing an Iran where the dynastic succession has truly been consolidated or an IRGC ( Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) speaking on behalf of an incapacitated leader. In any case, the rhetoric of opening new fronts—possibly cyberattacks on critical infrastructure or the activation of sleeper cells in Europe and Central Asia—must be taken with the utmost seriousness. The flank of the Leviathan and Karish gas fields in the Eastern Mediterranean, threatened by the IRGC itself, adds an energy risk dimension on which the European Union must urgently address.
4. The exemption of sanctions for Russian oil: when consistency bends in the face of the energy bill
Facts
US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced on Wednesday, March 12, a temporary 30-day waiver of sanctions on Russian oil, allowing importing countries to purchase Russian crude oil and petroleum product shipments currently at sea. The measure, technical in nature but highly symbolic, is valid until April 11, 2026, and explicitly aims to “promote stability in global energy markets” in the face of the shock caused by the de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Asian stock markets closed lower on Friday after it was revealed that Brent crude, the global benchmark, remained above $100 a barrel despite the waiver and the historic release of 400 million barrels by the IEA and its member countries.
Implications
This decision is politically and strategically devastating, though economically understandable in the short term. It confirms a pattern already established by the Biden Administration—which partially lifted sanctions on Venezuela and Iran in 2022 to contain the rise in oil prices after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—and which the Trump Administration is now replicating with respect to Moscow itself, a belligerent party in a war that Washington’s allies continue to suffer. Sending a signal of sanctions flexibility at a time when the West is militarily engaged in the Persian Gulf amounts to validating Russia’s strategy of using oil as a geopolitical weapon. Vladimir Putin will observe this exemption with enormous satisfaction: his crude oil is once again flowing into the global market, his revenues are recovering, and the price he pays—without any concessions—is practically zero. The most serious consequence is that, as initial market data indicate, the measure has not visibly curbed the escalating price of oil, leaving the Trump Administration in the worst possible situation: the political cost without the immediate economic benefit.
Perspectives and scenarios
The waiver expires on April 11. If by then the conflict with Iran has not found a negotiated solution and the Strait of Hormuz remains effectively blocked, the pressure on energy markets will not have eased, and the Trump Administration will face the dilemma of renewing the waiver—further undermining the sanctions regime—or letting it expire and accepting another surge in oil prices. Neither option is favorable for Washington. The Russian energy lever will have once again demonstrated its effectiveness in dividing the West in times of crisis. The fundamental issue is that the strategic design of the operation against Iran did not sufficiently consider the impact on energy markets, and this omission is now being paid for with decisions that contradict the very principles of the sanctions order that the democratic world has painstakingly built since 2022.
5. Canada bets on the Arctic: 25.7 billion, too little, too late?
Facts
Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney announced in Oslo, during a trilateral meeting with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and his Norwegian counterpart, an additional investment of $25.7 billion in defense and infrastructure in the Arctic. “We are taking full responsibility for defending our sovereignty,” Carney declared, in a message that directly addresses both Russian threats in the region and President Trump’s expansionist rhetoric regarding Greenland and the Canadian Arctic. The meeting in Oslo between the leaders of Canada, Germany, and Norway is itself a major geopolitical statement, given the growing strategic importance of the Arctic region and the three countries’ ties to NATO.
Implications
Carney’s initiative comes amid a renewed and urgent focus on the Arctic by Western allies, spurred by both Russian aggression since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine and President Trump’s pronouncements on “acquiring” Greenland and controlling Arctic shipping lanes. The Arctic is ceasing to be a geostrategic periphery and becoming a top-tier arena of competition: accelerated ice melt is opening new shipping routes, making valuable reserves of strategic hydrocarbons and minerals accessible, and transforming the Arctic states—Russia, Canada, the United States, Norway, Denmark/Greenland, and Finland—into key players in global competition. That Canada and Germany are meeting in Oslo with Norway to coordinate a joint Arctic response is, in itself, a positive step in the right direction for rearmament and the reaffirmation of allied sovereignty.
Perspectives and scenarios
The legitimate question is whether 25.7 billion Canadian dollars, spread over a multi-year budget period, is enough to remedy decades of systematic underinvestment in Ottawa’s Arctic capabilities. Canada has for years postponed decisions to acquire submarines capable of operating under polar ice, Arctic-capable frigates, advanced logistics bases in the north of the country, and satellite surveillance equipment. The Canadian Arctic is a space of nominal sovereignty that the Canadian state has not effectively occupied militarily for decades. Furthermore, Carney’s initiative comes at a time of double pressure: Trump’s rhetoric about Canada “buying up” has forced Ottawa to demonstrate defensive credibility to Washington, and the war in Iran has reminded all allies that security vacuums come at a high price. The decision is welcome, but history will judge whether it came before or after the damage was irreversible.
6. Al-Quds Day: A Show of Diminishing Force and the London Ban
Facts
March 13, 2026, coincides with Al-Quds Day , the annual demonstration promoted by Tehran’s jihadist oligarchy since 1979 to mobilize Muslims worldwide in support of the Palestinian cause and against Israel. This year, however, the event is particularly revealing of the internal divisions within the Iranian regime: the new Supreme Leader, Mukhta Khamenei, is forced into hiding for security reasons and is unable to preside over the events. In the United Kingdom, Home Secretary Shabana Mahmood banned the Al-Quds March in London—originally scheduled for March 15—at the request of the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, citing the risk of “serious public disorder.” The march, which has been held in London for over forty years, was banned with a restriction in place from March 11 to April 11. In Iran itself, the demonstrations were noticeably smaller compared to previous years.
Implications
The contrast between Tehran’s propaganda rhetoric—which presented Al-Quds Day as “the largest annual mobilization in support of the Palestinian cause”—and the reality of diminished events, held without the visible presence of its new supreme leader, in a country living under an active air war and a deep internal fracture, is politically devastating for the regime. Even Wikipedia’s real-time data on the 2025-2026 Iranian internal protests documents a repression of unprecedented violence—between 7,000 and 32,000 deaths acknowledged by various sources, with a widely cited figure of 12,000—which has generated a mobilized Iranian diaspora worldwide precisely against the regime, not in its favor. That Mahmood’s Labour government was forced to ban an Al-Quds march in London, denounced by MPs across the political spectrum as a “hate march” by supporters of a dictatorship “that has massacred 36,000 of its own citizens,” according to Lord Austin, is an indicator of how much the political climate in Western Europe has changed.
Perspectives and scenarios
The progressive erosion of Quds Day as an instrument of Iranian soft power—at a time when Tehran is literally at war and its legitimizing power structure has fragmented—is a positive sign, but it should not lead to underestimating the capacity of jihadist radicalization networks to regroup in the long term. The Iranian diaspora movement, with demonstrations of 350,000 people in Los Angeles and Toronto and 250,000 in Munich on February 14, constitutes the genuine antithesis to the regime’s narrative and deserves the support of Western democratic governments. It is time for European democracies, including Spain, to recognize that supporting the Iranian people in their legitimate aspiration for freedom is not interference: it is consistency.
III. MEDIA RACK
International media coverage over the past twenty-four hours reflects profound differences in approach and emphasis depending on the editorial lines and geopolitical proximity of each publication to the conflict.
Anglo-Saxon press
The Washington Post and the Wall Street Journal lead their online editions with the KC-135 crash in Iraq as their top story, highlighting the ambiguity between CENTCOM’s official version and the claim of responsibility by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq. The WSJ underscores the impact of crude oil prices on Asian financial markets, with Brent crude nearing $103 at the close in Tokyo. The New York Times dedicates its front-page analysis to Mukhta Khamenei’s first statement, questioning his true state of health and the extent of his control over the Iranian military apparatus. The Times and The Telegraph of London prominently feature the ban on Quds Day in the British capital, with editorials supporting Mahmood’s decision. The Guardian adopts a more critical tone regarding the military operation as a whole and gives space to voices questioning the withdrawal strategy. The Financial Times focuses its front-page analysis on the contradiction between the exemption of Russian oil from sanctions and the stated objectives of the energy and sanctions policy of the G7 countries.
French and German press
Le Monde leads with the death of alpine hunter Arnaud Frion as its main story, featuring a correspondent’s report from Erbil and an interview with the spokesperson for the Quai d’Orsay regarding France’s position. Le Figaro published a scathing editorial against the Ashab Ahl al-Kahf group and called for a strong response from the coalition. Libération, predictably, focused its criticism on Trump’s military strategy and the lack of an exit plan. The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) and Die Welt highlighted the Oslo meeting between Carney and Merz as a positive sign of transatlantic defense coordination, although both publications questioned the adequacy of the funds pledged by Ottawa. Die Zeit offered an in-depth analysis of the risk of an energy recession in Germany if the Strait of Hormuz remains blocked for more than four weeks.
Arab and Israeli media
The Jerusalem Post and Yedioth Ahronoth reported in detail on the more than 200 Iranian targets struck by the Israeli Air Force (IAF) in the past 24 hours, including ballistic missile launchers and air defense systems. Israel Hayom emphasized Netanyahu’s statement—his first press conference since the start of the war—regarding the goal of helping the Iranian people overthrow the regime. Haaretz maintained its critical stance toward the Netanyahu government, pointing to the collateral damage and questioning the effectiveness of the air campaign in bringing about regime change. Al Jazeera, predictably, presented the downing of the KC-135 as a “victory for the resistance” and devoted considerable space to Mukhta Khamenei’s statement, presenting it as proof of “Iranian resilience.” Al-Arabiya and Asharq Al-Awsat, which are closer to the perspective of the Gulf countries, highlighted the continuous exchanges of drones and missiles over Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Oman, with special attention to the explosions heard in the financial center of Dubai on Friday morning.
Russian, Chinese and other media
Russia Today (RT) and TASS seized upon the waiver of sanctions on Russian oil, arguing that “the Western sanctions regime is a selective political instrument, not a principled policy.” Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post and the China Daily highlighted that Iranian oil continues to flow to China at 1.5 million barrels per day despite the conflict, implicitly validating Beijing’s decision to remain neutral while still securing its energy advantages. Ukrainian Pravda and the Kyiv Post expressed concern about the impact of the Russian oil sanctions waiver on economic pressure against Moscow, fearing that the Iranian conflict could become an escape route for the Kremlin. Reuters, AFP, and AP provided factual coverage throughout the day with hourly updates on the various fronts of the conflict.
IV. RISK TRAFFIC LIGHT
| 🔴 CRITICAL | • Escalation of the US-Israel-Iran conflict towards a total regional war (Persian Gulf, Lebanon, Iraq).• Permanent closure of the Strait of Hormuz: a direct threat to the global supply of crude oil.• Allied (NATO) casualties in Iraq: France and the risk of triggering Article 5. |
| 🟠 STOP | • Oil prices could rise above $120-150/barrel if the Hormuz blockade continues.• Attacks by pro-Iranian militias against more bases of the anti-jihadist coalition in Iraq and Syria.• Mojtaba Khamenei’s decision to open “new fronts” in areas of high enemy vulnerability. |
| 🟡 MODERATE | • Populist use of Quds Day to project internal cohesion in a actually fractured Iran.• Geopolitical contamination of the conflict on Asian and European financial markets.• Impact of the exemption of sanctions on Russian oil on the credibility of the sanctions regime. |
| 🟢 SURVEILLANCE | • Canada’s position in the Arctic: late investment but a positive sign of allied sovereignty.• Internal divisions within Trumpism regarding the war (Tucker Carlson vs. Hegseth/Netanyahu). |
V. EDITORIAL COMMENTARY
March 13, 2026 closes with a painful certainty: Operation Epic Fury, fourteen days after its launch, has entered a phase of geographical and systemic expansion that its architects did not calculate, or calculated poorly, in their original planning.
The downing of the KC-135 in Iraq, the death of mountaineer Arnaud Frion in Erbil, the explosions in Dubai, the attacks against Saudi Arabia and Oman, the de facto blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, and Mukhta Khamenei’s first belligerent declaration paint a picture of conflict far removed from the image of a swift and clean victory that President Trump has sought to project. Declaring “we won” when allies continue to suffer casualties and the price of oil exceeds $100 a barrel is, at the very least, a rhetorical blunder with real consequences for the markets and the cohesion of the coalition.
The most revealing episode of the day, in terms of Western strategic coherence, is not military but economic: Scott Bessent’s waiver of sanctions on Russian oil is a partial capitulation to energy pressure that sets a highly dangerous precedent. Biden already did it with Venezuela and with Iran itself in 2022, and now Trump is repeating it with Russia in 2026. The message to hostile actors is invariably the same: if you put enough pressure on the price of oil, the West will blink. The sanctions architecture so painstakingly built since the Russian invasion of Ukraine is accumulating cracks that Moscow and Beijing observe with a satisfaction they make no attempt to conceal.
The death of the French soldier in Erbil is both a criminal act perpetrated by the terrorist tentacles of Tehran’s jihadist oligarchy and a demonstration that Macron’s “strictly defensive posture” strategy fails to protect his soldiers from attacks by Iranian proxies. The pro-Iranian terrorist militias in Iraq make no distinction between belligerents and non-belligerents: they attack anyone who, in their eyes, belongs to the opposing camp. The Charles de Gaulle has arrived in the CENTCOM area of operations; therefore, France is a target. This is the logic of jihadist terrorism, and pretending to rise above it with diplomatic pronouncements is self-deception that costs lives.
Mujtaba Khamenei’s first statement—read by a third party, without video or audio, accompanied only by a still photograph on screen as rumors about his health multiply—perfectly illustrates the true state of Tehran’s jihadist oligarchy: a power that speaks through intermediaries, hides underground for fear of bombings, threatens “new fronts” because the current ones are unfavorable, and uses the Strait of Hormuz as leverage for global energy extortion because it is the only thing left with real coercive power. The subdued Quds Day, with the new leader invisible and the streets of Tehran far from the fervor of previous years, confirms what images of internal protests already showed: that the Iranian population does not share the warlike enthusiasm the regime needs to project cohesion.
Canada took a step in the right direction today in Oslo by committing $25.7 billion to the Arctic. This is welcome, even if it comes late, and one wonders if it really took Trump threatening to “buy” Canada for Ottawa to rediscover its Arctic sovereignty. The Carney-Merz-Norwegian meeting is also a sign that the North Atlantic-European axis is realizing that the Arctic can no longer remain a space of nominal sovereignty. History—and current events—do not forgive power vacuums.
Meanwhile, Spain observes from a position of unacceptable ambiguity. The Sánchez-Albares government continues to fail to offer a clear stance of Atlantic solidarity with the allies who are paying in blood for the defense of an international order that also protects us. This “double standard”—verbal criticism of Iran combined with resistance to any operational commitment—is ostrich policy disguised as pragmatism. When a French alpine hunter dies in Erbil defending Europe from jihadist barbarity, Spain cannot continue to look the other way. The values of Atlanticism that we defend are not abstract: they are embodied in the soldiers of our allies who fall to the drones of the proxies of the Tehran oligarchy.