Gustavo de Arístegui,
May 18, 2026
I. BRIEF INTRODUCTION
May 18, 2026, embodies a density of interconnected crises that define, with brutal clarity, the state of the international order in this second half of the decade. The Iran-Iraq War—which began on February 28 with the US and Israeli attacks—has already transcended the category of a regional conflict to become a global economic shock of the first magnitude: according to an analysis published today by Reuters, companies worldwide have already accumulated at least $25 billion in direct losses, and the bill continues to rise. At the same time, a drone that penetrated Emirati air defenses and impacted the outer perimeter of the Barakah nuclear facility—the only nuclear power plant in the Arab world—demonstrates that the ceasefire with Iran is a dangerous fiction and that the jihadist oligarchy in Tehran and its terrorist proxies continue to pursue escalation. Thousands of miles away, the World Health Organization yesterday declared the highest level of international health emergency due to the outbreak of the Bundibugyo variant of Ebola—for which there is no vaccine or approved treatment—which is spreading from the Democratic Republic of Congo toward Uganda. In the Pacific, Reuters’ analysis of the Trump-Xi summit summarizes what happened in Beijing with a formula that this analyst fully endorses: apparent stability and structural paralysis. And in Westminster, Mr. Starmer’s Labour government is rapidly crumbling: a coalition of 97 MPs from his own party is publicly demanding his resignation, while Nigel Farage’s populist right-wing party sweeps the local elections and the United Kingdom accelerates its internal disintegration.
Five news items. Five facets of the same diagnosis: the international system, built on rules, multilateralism, and peaceful economic interdependence, is being subjected to simultaneous tensions that no existing institution can absorb in isolation. The task of rigorous analysis—the only honest response to this scenario—demands calling things by their names, with the precision that the gravity of the moment demands.
II. MOST IMPORTANT NEWS OF THE LAST 24 HOURS
1. The Iran war is costing the world at least $25 billion — and the tally keeps rising
Facts
A comprehensive analysis published today by Reuters—based on a review of corporate statements from publicly traded companies in the United States, Europe, and Asia since the start of the conflict—estimates at least $25 billion in direct losses accumulated by companies worldwide as a result of the Iran-Contra conflict. At least 279 companies have cited the conflict as the trigger for defensive measures to mitigate the financial impact, including price increases, production cuts, suspension of dividends and share buybacks, workforce reduction plans, fuel surcharges, and requests for emergency government aid. The transmission of the economic damage is threefold: energy price increases—the price of gas in the US exceeded $4 per gallon on March 31 after a 30% increase—, the increased cost and disruption of shipping routes due to the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, and the collapse of global supply chains. The CEO of Vitol, the world’s largest crude oil trader, has estimated that a total of one billion barrels of oil production will be lost as a result of the conflict. Goldman Sachs anticipates pressure on European corporate margins that will begin to be fully felt in the second half of 2026, once hedging expires. The Suez Canal is experiencing a drastic reduction in traffic, with losses estimated by the World Bank at $10 billion for Egypt. Qatar, whose liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant in Ras Laffan was damaged in an Iranian attack, declared force majeure on its contracts with buyers, leading to a 140% increase in LNG spot prices in Asia.
Implications
The $25 billion figure quantified by Reuters is almost certainly a conservative estimate: it represents exclusively the direct losses reported by publicly traded companies in their earnings reports and stock market filings. It does not include the aggregate macroeconomic cost—the International Monetary Fund projects that the combined tariffs and energy disruption could subtract between one and two percentage points from global growth in 2026—nor the impact on small and medium-sized enterprises, nor the deferred costs of rebuilding supply chains. The magnitude of the economic damage makes the absence of a coherent resolution plan from the Trump administration even more incomprehensible. A war that was presented as a strategic pressure tool designed to change the behavior of the Iranian regime has become, more than two months later, a global economic hemorrhage with no end in sight. European allies—including Spain, whose ports and energy companies are exposed to the impact of LNG prices—are absorbing substantial collateral damage without having been consulted at any stage of the process.
Perspectives and scenarios
The accumulated economic cost is putting increasing pressure on the Trump administration to reach some kind of agreement with Iran before the macroeconomic deterioration—already visible in the downward revisions of the S&P 500 and Eurostoxx 600 margins—begins to translate into domestic electoral impact. If the Hormuz blockade continues beyond the summer, Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan models anticipate a mild recession in Europe and a noticeable slowdown in the US. The paradox is clear: Trump launched the war to demonstrate strategic strength, but every week that passes without an agreement demonstrates the limitations of military power as an instrument of political resolution in a regime that does not respond to the logic of rational incentives.
2. Drone crashes into Barakah nuclear power plant: the ceasefire with Iran is a dangerous fiction
Facts
A drone struck an electrical generator on the outer perimeter of the Barakah nuclear power plant in Abu Dhabi on Sunday, May 17, causing a fire. It was the first time the $20 billion plant—built with South Korean assistance and operational since 2020—had been attacked since the start of the war. Emirati authorities confirmed that radiological levels were unaffected and there were no casualties. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), headed by Rafael Grossi, reported that emergency diesel generators were supplying power to reactor number 3 and called for “maximum military restraint” in the vicinity of any nuclear facility, expressing “grave concern.” The UAE Federal Nuclear Regulation Authority confirmed that the plant continued operating normally. Three drones had entered the UAE’s western border with Saudi Arabia; two were intercepted by air defenses, and one reached its target. No one immediately claimed responsibility for the attack, and Abu Dhabi did not officially name any perpetrators, although it has a history of accusations of attacks by Iran and pro-Iranian Shiite terrorist militias in Iraq. Saudi Arabia, for its part, intercepted three drones that same day coming from Iraqi airspace. The Emirati president’s diplomatic advisor, Anwar Gargash, called the attack a “dangerous escalation,” whether carried out by “the main actor or through one of its proxies.” Trump posted on social media that Iran “must act FAST, or they will have nothing left.”
Implications
The attack on Barakah is an exceptionally dangerous milestone in the Iran-Iraq War for at least three reasons. First, it is the first time a civilian nuclear facility in the Arab world has been the target of a direct armed attack, constituting a flagrant violation of international law, the UN Charter, and international humanitarian law, regardless of the fact that there were no casualties or radiological leaks. Second, the UAE has a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States—the so-called “Agreement 123,” which expressly prohibits uranium enrichment and reprocessing—that entails a security and safeguards framework that Washington can hardly ignore. Third, the drones’ trajectory—originating from the UAE’s western border, that is, from Saudi Arabian or Iraqi territory—raises questions about the logistical sophistication of pro-Iranian terrorist proxies, which appear capable of operating in geographical corridors that complicate direct attribution to Tehran. In any case—and this is what matters strategically—the Iranian regime and its satellite terrorist organizations have crossed a line unprecedented in this conflict. If Tehran—directly or through its proxies in Iraq—can attack with impunity the only nuclear facility in the Arab world, the scenario of escalation toward installations of greater strategic importance—oil export ports, telecommunications infrastructure, US military bases—is entirely plausible.
Perspectives and scenarios
The paradox of decapitation takes on a new dimension here: Iran’s terrorist proxies—the Shiite militias in Iraq, which the UAE and Saudi Arabia implicitly point to—operate with increasing tactical autonomy in the power vacuum created by the IRGC’s military weakening. If the IRGC cannot or will not discipline its satellite militias, the proxy war could escalate without an Iranian command center capable of ordering a ceasefire. This is the strategic nightmare of a conflict with no plan for the aftermath: the secondary actors that were thought to be controllable from Tehran are now making their own operational decisions. The UAE has warned that it will respond, introducing a new direct actor into an already extraordinarily volatile equation.
3. The WHO declares an international health emergency due to the Ebola outbreak in Bundibugyo, Congo, and Uganda
Facts
The Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO), Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, declared a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) on Sunday, May 17—the highest level of alert under the International Health Regulations, the same regulations used during the COVID-19 pandemic—due to the outbreak of Ebola caused by the Bundibugyo variant (Bundibugyo ebolavirus, BVD) in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda. The outbreak was detected on May 5 in the Mongbwalu Health Zone, Ituri Province, DRC, with deaths among healthcare workers. As of May 16, there were eight laboratory-confirmed cases, 246 suspected cases, and at least 80 suspected deaths in Ituri, with the outbreak spreading to at least three different health zones. In Kampala—the Ugandan capital, with 2.5 million inhabitants and excellent international air connections—two confirmed cases with no apparent link were identified on May 15 and 16, both originating from the DRC. The Bundibugyo variant is particularly serious because, unlike the Zaire variant—responsible for previous large outbreaks and for which there are approved vaccines and treatments—it lacks any licensed therapeutic or preventative countermeasures. Case fatality rates in the two historical BVD outbreaks ranged from 30% to 50%. The WHO has indicated that the outbreak does not reach the threshold for a pandemic emergency and has expressly advised against closing international borders.
Implications
The combination of three factors makes this outbreak a high-risk scenario that deserves priority attention: the variant with no available countermeasures, the operational environment of Ituri—one of the most unstable provinces in the DRC, with devastated health infrastructure, multiple armed groups, and massive influxes of displaced people that hinder contact tracing—and the confirmed presence of cases in Kampala, a city with regular flights to Europe, Asia, and the rest of Africa. The lesson from previous epidemics—from the 2014–2016 West African Ebola outbreak that cost more than 11,000 lives after being ignored in its early weeks, to the COVID-19 pandemic itself—is crystal clear: the cost of acting too late is exponentially greater than the cost of acting early. The WHO also faces the chronic problem of underfunding and the limited capacity of the DRC’s health systems for an effective, autonomous response. The fact that the outbreak is affecting Ituri Province —where dozens of armed groups operate simultaneously and where humanitarian access is systematically obstructed— makes containment on the ground extraordinarily difficult, even with sufficient resources.
Perspectives and scenarios
The declaration of a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) activates the mechanism for mobilizing international resources and coordinating among Member States. Immediate priorities include deploying rapid response teams to Ituri, thoroughly tracing the contacts of the two cases in Kampala, and initiating accelerated clinical trials of potential experimental therapies. If the outbreak is not contained within the next two to four weeks, the risk of its spread to other countries in Central and East Africa is real. The international community—and in particular European governments and major donors to the WHO system—must respond with the urgency and resources that the situation demands, without waiting for the risk to escalate uncontrollably. The world cannot afford to discover too late that ignoring a health emergency in the heart of Africa ultimately proves far more costly than preventing it.
4. The United Kingdom breaks apart: the terminal crisis of Labour and the rise of Reform
Facts
Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s government is facing its most serious political crisis since the Labour Party came to power in the July 2014 general election with a 172-seat majority. Following the devastating results of the local elections held on May 7—in which Labour lost control of more than 35 councils and nearly 1,500 councilors, while Nigel Farage’s right-wing populist Reform UK party gained more than 1,400 seats—the party’s internal crisis has reached existential proportions. A total of 97 Labour MPs have publicly demanded Starmer’s resignation or that he set a timetable for his departure. Four ministers have resigned, including Health Secretary Wes Streeting—a leading figure considered a natural successor—who, in his resignation letter of May 14, stated that he had “lost confidence” in Starmer. Potential successors include former deputy general secretary Andy Burnham, Angela Rayner, and Streeting himself. In Wales, the Labour disaster is historic: after a century of uninterrupted dominance, the party has fallen to third place in the Senedd, behind the pro-independence government Plaid Cymru and Reform UK, and Welsh First Minister Eluned Morgan lost her own seat—an unprecedented event in British political history. Starmer refuses to resign and maintains that he will continue “governing.” The picture emerging from the polls is devastating: only 17% of the national vote would go to Labour today, tied for third place with the Conservatives.
Implications
What is happening in the United Kingdom is not merely a leadership crisis—those are contingent and surmountable—but a symptom of something deeper: the accelerated fragmentation of the traditional two-party system and the emergence of a new political map in which Reform UK has filled the void left by the collapsing Conservative Party, and nationalist and separatist parties dominate Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. The result is a country in which none of the four territories that make up the United Kingdom has the central government as its leading political force. This situation, unprecedented in modern British history, adds pressure to the territorial integrity of the state. The rise of Reform UK—an ideological ally of Trump, founded on Brexit, and articulated around Farage’s anti-immigration and anti-establishment rhetoric—is part of the same populist phenomenon that has reshaped politics in the US, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Germany. The difference is that, in the British case, the single-constituency majority electoral system could transform Reform’s current electoral capital into massive parliamentary representation in the next general election, which must be held before May 2029. The Starmer crisis further exacerbates the UK’s weakened position on the geopolitical stage: a country with a government in a state of political limbo makes it difficult to make decisions on the Ukrainian front, in negotiations with the EU, and regarding its stance on the Iran war.
Perspectives and scenarios
For a formal leadership race to begin, at least 81 Labour MPs must back an alternative candidate. The arithmetic threshold has been virtually reached, but the problem is the lack of consensus on the candidate: Burnham, the favorite in public opinion polls, currently holds no parliamentary seat; Streeting has the support of the party’s right wing but is unpopular with the rank and file; Rayner has union backing but carries his own baggage of scandals. In this context of fragmented potential successors, Starmer may survive politically longer than his critics would like—but it is hardly conceivable that he will lead the party in the next general election. The United Kingdom is heading towards a period of weak government, endless Labour internal debate, and the continued rise of Reform. The unanswered question is what the political model is for a party that governed Britain for a century in Wales and now lacks a cohesive project to win back the trust of its historical voters.
5. Trump returns from China with stability and paralysis: Reuters analysis
Facts
The analysis published on May 16 by Reuters—authored by Michael Martina, David Brunnstrom, David Lawder, and Mei Mei Chu from Washington and Beijing—summarizes the outcome of the Trump-Xi summit in Beijing (May 14-15) in a memorable phrase: “stability and a stalemate.” Two days of talks between Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping yielded modest results by any historical standard for Sino-American summits. The only agreement specifically confirmed was China’s commitment to buy 200 Boeing aircraft—a far cry from the 500 anticipated and the 300 agreed upon during Trump’s 2017 visit to Beijing, which at the time generated contracts and memoranda worth $250 billion. There was no progress on the sale of Nvidia H200 chips to China, much to the relief of Republican and Democratic hawks in Congress. Xi warned Trump in no uncertain terms that mishandling Taiwan could lead to “clashes and even conflicts.” Trump did not confirm the $14 billion arms sale to Taiwan, stating that he would make a decision “in a relatively short period of time.” Craig Singleton, a China expert at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, summarized the outcome as follows: “The summit projected stability, but left the gridlock intact. It produced modest, marketable, and manageable results, which is all the US-China relationship can sustain right now.”
Implications
Reuters and the entire Anglo-Saxon academic and think-tank establishment converge on a diagnosis that this analyst shares: the Beijing summit was an exercise in managing the status quo of systemic rivalry, not an opening toward a new architecture of strategic cooperation. Both leaders needed something to show their respective domestic audiences. Trump secured an order for 200 Boeing aircraft and Xi’s declaration that China will not arm Iran—if this commitment holds, it is the most significant strategic gain of the trip, but it will need to be rigorously monitored. Xi obtained Washington’s implicit recognition that the bilateral relationship is the structuring axis of the international system, not a relationship between equal and subordinate, but between two first-rate powers. Trump’s ambiguity on Taiwan, however, is deeply troubling: in the equation of deterrence, ambiguity is not synonymous with strategic flexibility—it is a potential invitation to miscalculation. Tokyo, Seoul, Manila, and Canberra are watching with growing concern.
Perspectives and scenarios
The extension of the October 2025 trade truce will remain in effect without formal consolidation. China possesses the most powerful instrument of asymmetric pressure in the Sino-American rivalry: control of 75-80% of global rare earth production and 95% of refining capacity—without which advanced semiconductors, magnets for electric motors, missile guidance systems, and batteries cannot be manufactured. Beijing has learned from the experience of Trump’s 2025 tariffs—declared unconstitutional by the US Supreme Court in February 2026—that direct trade pressure triggers judicial and legislative countermeasures in Washington that limit it. Its preferred strategy—positioning China as an indispensable trading partner for a global economy that needs its exports and raw materials—is considerably more sophisticated. Xi is visiting Washington in the fall: then we will know if Trump’s “fantastic deals” have any concrete documentary basis.
III. MEDIA RACK
Reuters / AP / AFP / Bloomberg (agencies and financial media)
Reuters is today’s go-to source with three key pieces: an analysis of the $25 billion cost to global businesses, coverage of the attack on Al Barakah, and a “stability and stalemate” analysis of the Beijing summit. Bloomberg expands its economic analysis of the Iran war with data on LNG prices in Asia and the pressure on European corporate margins. AFP provides detailed coverage of the WHO’s HRIS declaration.
The New York Times / Washington Post / PBS / CNN (USA)
The New York Times dedicates its front page to the attack on Al Barakah, emphasizing that it is the first time an Arab nuclear facility has been targeted. The Washington Post analyzes the political significance of the attack for the prospects of the Iran nuclear deal. CNN provides real-time coverage of the British Labour crisis. PBS dedicates a special report to the Ebola outbreak and its implications for global public health.
Financial Times / The Economist / The Times / The Telegraph / The Guardian (UK)
The British media is entirely dominated by the Starmer crisis. The Times and The Telegraph are publishing analyses of succession scenarios. The Labour-leaning Guardian emphasizes that the crisis is one of leadership, not ideology, and that the party has a sufficient parliamentary majority to govern. The Economist is covering the Barakah and the Iran war with its characteristic analytical depth.
Le Monde / Le Figaro / Libération / LCI / BFM (France)
The French press is paying particular attention to the economic cost of the Iran war for European companies, with special emphasis on the impact on the French energy and aerospace sectors. Le Monde is publishing an analysis of the implications of the attack on Barakah for international nuclear law. BFM and LCI are providing live coverage of the British political crisis, highlighting its impact on Franco-British bilateral relations.
FAZ / Die Welt / Die Zeit (Germany)
FAZ publishes an analysis of the implications of the attack on al-Barakah for the security of civilian nuclear facilities in conflict zones, in the context of the German debate on a return to nuclear power. Die Welt covers the Starmer-Reform crisis as part of the European populist phenomenon. Die Zeit dedicates an analysis to the global economic cost of the Iran war.
Al Jazeera / Al Arabiya / The National (UAE) / Asharq Al Awsat (Arab and Gulf world)
UAE media outlets—The National, Gulf News, and Khaleej Times—dedicated front-page coverage to the attack on Al Barakah, with a tone of restrained indignation and demands for a response. Al Jazeera, true to its usual approach, downplayed the severity of the attack and questioned its attribution to Iran. Al Arabiya and Asharq Al Awsat, with a Saudi focus, covered both the attack on Al Barakah and the drone interception in Saudi Arabia, expressing explicit concern about the escalation.
South China Morning Post / China Daily / Xinhua / WION (Asia-Pacific)
The SCMP and China Daily hailed the Beijing summit as a stabilizing success, emphasizing the warm personal relationship between Xi and Trump. Xinhua published the Chinese statement in full, calling the talks “historic” and “constructive.” WION highlighted the impact of the Strait of Hormuz blockade on India’s energy supply, from which India obtains nearly 60% of its oil.
Kyiv Independent / Ukrinform (Ukraine)
The Ukrainian press is watching with concern the shift in US diplomatic focus toward China and Iran, noting that the war in Ukraine is receiving less and less attention from the Trump administration each week. They highlight SIPRI data on Russian military spending—$190 billion, or 7.5% of GDP—as evidence that Moscow has no intention of negotiating.
IAEA / WHO / IISS / RUSI / CSIS (international organizations and think tanks)
The IAEA has issued urgent statements regarding the attack on Al Barakah, demanding maximum military restraint at nuclear facilities and offering technical assistance to the UAE. The WHO has activated its Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) protocols, publishing real-time updates on its health alert portal. The IISS and RUSI are monitoring naval movements in the Strait of Hormuz. The CSIS has published an analysis of the fragility of the Iranian ceasefire in light of the attack on Al Barakah.
IV. RISK TRAFFIC LIGHT
🔴 EXTREME RISK — Attack on the Barakah Nuclear Facility / Gulf Escalation: The drone attack on the only Arab nuclear facility—a first in the history of the conflict—is an unprecedented red line crossing. The Iranian regime and its terrorist proxies have demonstrated both the willingness and capability to attack civilian nuclear infrastructure. The announced Emirati response could introduce a new direct actor into the conflict and precipitate an unwanted escalation.
🔴 EXTREME RISK — Global economic cost of the Iran war: $25 billion in direct business losses—and rising—constitute a major economic shock. The Hormuz blockade affects 20% of the world’s oil supply. Pressure on European and American profit margins in the second half of the year could lead to a technical recession in some economies.
🟠 HIGH RISK — Ebola outbreak in Bundibugyo (DRC-Uganda): WHO’s highest level of public health emergency. No vaccine or treatment. Cases already confirmed in Kampala. The operational environment in Ituri—ongoing armed conflict, destroyed health infrastructure—makes containment extraordinarily difficult. The risk of international spread via African air routes is not negligible.
🟠 HIGH RISK — UK political crisis: A government in a state of political limbo with 97 MPs from its own party demanding the Prime Minister’s resignation. Unstoppable rise of Reform UK. Symbolic territorial disintegration — Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland governed by separatist or nationalist parties. Impact on London’s strategic decision-making capacity in foreign affairs.
🟠 HIGH RISK — Systemic US-China/Taiwan Rivalry: Xi’s warning about Taiwan and Trump’s ambiguity regarding arms sales to the island are signals that have not gone unnoticed in the Indo-Pacific. The Beijing summit has minimally stabilized the relationship but has not resolved any of the underlying contradictions. The lack of progress on the Nvidia H200 chips is the only strategic good news of the week.
🟡 MODERATE RISK — Atlanticist consistency and the Spanish stance: The Rota and Morón bases are operationally active, serving the logistical architecture of operations against Iran, while the Sánchez government proclaims neutrality. This inconsistency—already unacceptable—becomes even more costly as the overall economic cost of the Iran war becomes apparent and allies examine who contributed what to the collective effort.
V. EDITORIAL COMMENTARY
The five news items that make up today’s report share a characteristic that superficial analysis fails to grasp: all are direct or indirect consequences of the same decision—the attack on Iran on February 28 without a coherent plan for the aftermath. This observation is not a criticism of the strategic justification for the operation itself; the terrorist regime in Tehran deserved a forceful response after decades of exporting terrorism, regional destabilization, and an ongoing nuclear threat. The criticism—which I formulate unambiguously—is directed at the lack of a systemic vision, at improvisation elevated to the status of doctrine, and at the confusion between military force as a tactical instrument and military force as a substitute for politics.
The $25 billion figure quantified by Reuters—which, we reiterate, is a minimum—is the price of that improvisation. The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz was not an unforeseen scenario: it was the most obvious and the most costly in global economic terms. The fact that two and a half months after the start of the war the Strait remains closed—with a two-way blockade in which both sides apply their own restrictions—is an eloquent demonstration of the limits of military power when it is not backed by a coherent exit strategy. Trump launched the war to project strength; what he has demonstrated is the capacity to inflict damage without the capacity to resolve the situation.
The attack on al-Barakah adds a new and ominous dimension to this picture. For the first time in the history of 21st-century conflict, a civilian nuclear facility has been attacked with conventional weapons in the context of an ongoing war. The IAEA Director General has called for “maximum military restraint.” It is a diplomatically impeccable formulation, but it is also a formula that means nothing relevant to the IRGC terrorist proxies operating from Iraq with increasing autonomy.
The paradox of decapitation manifests itself here in its most dangerous form: it is no longer the IRGC generals—weakened, scattered, with chains of command disrupted by military attacks—who make the riskiest operational decisions, but rather their satellite militias in Iraq and Yemen, which operate with tactical autonomy without any Iranian center of authority being able or willing to restrain them. A war without a plan for the aftermath inevitably generates these kinds of uncontrollable secondary actors. And historically, uncontrollable secondary actors are the ones that provoke the escalations no one wanted.
On the Starmer crisis and the rise of Reform: what is happening in the United Kingdom is not exceptional—it is the most advanced case of a phenomenon that runs through all of Western democracy. Labour promised change and competition in 2024; it has delivered mediocre governance and textbook scandals. Reform promised textbook populism; it has delivered spectacular election results. The lesson is not that populism is right—it isn’t—but that liberal democracies cannot afford to govern badly. When center-left and center-right parties fail on the basics—cost of living, security, consistency between promises and deliveries—the space they leave vacant is inevitably filled by someone willing to exploit public frustration without proposing serious alternatives. Farage is the symptom, not the disease. The disease is the mediocre and self-satisfied political class that has spent decades promising changes that never materialize.
And regarding the Beijing summit: Reuters is right. “Stability and paralysis” is the most accurate description of what happened in Zhongnanhai. The systemic rivalry between the established power and the rising power—with incompatible models of political and economic organization—found no mechanism for resolution in Beijing: only managed postponement. Xi will return to Washington in the fall. Until then, all we have is the promise of 200 aircraft and the warning about Taiwan. The former may be verified in months; the latter will take years to manifest its consequences. But when it does, they will be consequences of historic proportions. The Indo-Pacific democracies—and the European allies who depend on the stability of global trade—should bear this in mind as they assess the true value of agreements announced with applause and without written documentation.