Gustavo de Arístegui,
May 28, 2026
I. BRIEF INTRODUCTION
The world awoke on May 28, 2026, at a crossroads of simultaneous tensions that challenge the international security architecture so painstakingly built after 1945. Five vectors of crisis converged in the last twenty-four hours: negotiations between Washington and Tehran on the Strait of Hormuz and the Iranian nuclear arsenal remain bogged down despite the optimistic pronouncements of a President Trump who, once again, prioritized media impact over diplomatic substance; Moscow deliberately and menacingly escalated its campaign of destruction against Kyiv, ordering the evacuation of foreign diplomats in a move that analysts identify as calculated intimidation in the face of the failure of its military objectives on the ground; the Trump-Xi summit held in Beijing in the middle of the month left a bittersweet aftertaste, with more staging than real content; The debate on defense spending within NATO highlights the credibility gap that separates southern Europe—led by a Spain governed with an irresponsibility that no longer surprises but continues to outrage—from the allies who have taken their own security seriously; and Lebanon remains in a fragile holding pattern as Hezbollah, the terrorist organization and armed wing of Tehran’s jihadist oligarchy, refuses to abide by ceasefire commitments.
This analyst has been warning for months that the Middle East is undergoing a tectonic reconfiguration unprecedented since the fall of the Ottoman Empire. What we are witnessing today is not just another crisis: it is the moment when order or chaos will prevail, and when the timidity of the West—not all of it, but certainly some of its most irresponsible members—could prove irreparably costly.
II. MOST IMPORTANT NEWS OF THE LAST 24 HOURS
1. US-Iran negotiations on Hormuz and the nuclear program remain at a critical impasse
Facts
President Donald Trump declared on Saturday, May 23, in a social media post, that a peace agreement with Iran that would reopen the Strait of Hormuz was “largely negotiated” and would be announced shortly. However, the Iranian news agency Fars immediately refuted these claims, calling them “incomplete and inconsistent with reality.” Tehran confirmed that the Strait would remain under Iranian control and that the nuclear issue—a central concern for Washington—was not part of any preliminary agreement. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, speaking from the NATO summit in Sweden the previous Friday, acknowledged that there was “slight movement” in the Pakistan-mediated talks but was careful not to exaggerate the progress. Rubio reiterated that the agreement’s criteria include a permanent ban on Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon, the reopening of the strait without tolls, and the surrender of enriched uranium. The US naval blockade of Iranian ports has already resulted in over 100 ships being intercepted or redirected since its imposition in April. The crisis affects the flow of twenty million barrels of oil per day —approximately twenty percent of global maritime crude trade— that pass through that strategic bottleneck.
Implications
The divergence between Trump’s triumphalist narrative and the reality on the ground—shamelessly denounced by Iran’s own semi-official news agency—illustrates, once again, the US president’s tendency to mistake announcement for achievement. Tehran’s jihadist oligarchy has learned to manipulate timing and rhetoric, and the triumvirate of the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps)—led by General Ahmed Vahidi, alongside Zolghadr and Rezaei—knows perfectly well that every day the strait remains closed is a day of economic pressure on the world, but also a day of leverage for the regime. The paradox of the decapitation—with no internal arbiter capable of imposing discipline after Khamenei’s death—turns these negotiations into a labyrinth of contradictory signals in which no one in Tehran can make a definitive commitment. The nuclear issue, deliberately set aside by Iran from the preliminary agreement on Hormuz, is the piece that Washington cannot concede without compromising the very essence of its war aims.
Perspectives and scenarios
Scenario A—a complete agreement with verifiable denuclearization—remains the least likely in the short term (estimated probability: 15%). Scenario B—a partial agreement on the Strait of Hormuz with an indefinite postponement of the nuclear issue—is gaining traction (40%), but would entail a strategic victory for Tehran that Trump would find difficult to sell politically. Scenario C—a breakdown of the ceasefire with a resumption of hostilities—remains disturbingly alive (35%), especially if the IRGC’s hardliners decide that tactical pressure outweighs the risk of renewed bombing. This analyst believes that the lack of a plan for the day after—the unforgivable Achilles’ heel of this operation from the outset—will continue to undermine any agreement reached, turning what could be a historic victory into a fleeting triumph.
2. Russia threatens “systematic attacks” on kyiv and orders the evacuation of foreign diplomats
Facts
In an escalation of extraordinary gravity, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement on Monday, May 25, warning that the Russian Armed Forces would launch “systematic and sequential attacks” on military and industrial facilities in Kyiv, urging all foreign nationals—including personnel from diplomatic missions and international organizations—to leave the Ukrainian capital “as soon as possible.” Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov personally conveyed this warning to Secretary of State Marco Rubio in a phone call, requesting that he evacuate the staff of the U.S. Embassy. Rubio confirmed he was aware of the warning—addressed to all embassies—and noted that Lavrov had informed him directly that “Kyiv is going to be a very dangerous place.” The threat comes a day after one of the most devastating Russian attacks on the Ukrainian capital since 2022, which left two dead and more than ninety wounded. Moscow justified the escalation as retaliation for a Ukrainian drone attack on a student dormitory in Starobilsk—an occupied city in the Luhansk region—which reportedly killed at least eighteen people. According to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), Russian forces suffered a net loss of 100 square miles of Ukrainian territory between April 28 and May 26, 2026.
Implications
The Russian threat to evacuate embassies and systematically attack Kyiv is, above all, an instrument of psychological and diplomatic warfare. Analysts at the German Marshall Fund in Warsaw rightly point out that Russia resorts to this intimidation tactic precisely because its military objectives “are not being met on the ground” and Ukraine has gained the tactical initiative. Putin needs to change the narrative, pressure the West to abandon Kyiv to its fate, and extract concessions at a negotiating table that, as yet, does not exist—Rubio confirmed that no peace talks are scheduled. The threat also has a dimension specifically aimed at Washington: at a time when Trump’s attention is completely absorbed by the Iranian drama, Moscow is trying to remind everyone that it remains an actor capable of setting the agenda. The volatile wars of this historical period are never fought on a single front: the synergy between Russian pressure in Ukraine and the Iranian conflict is part of a strategic coordination between Moscow and Tehran that this analyst has been documenting for years.
Perspectives and scenarios
The Russian threat could materialize in new waves of high-intensity missile and drone strikes against Kyiv, with the aim of paralyzing Ukrainian institutions and forcing the evacuation of diplomatic missions, thus depriving Zelensky of the legitimizing Western presence in his capital. What Moscow cannot buy with bombs—the collapse of the Ukrainian resistance—it attempts to achieve through psychological terror. Europe, whose mediocre and short-sighted political class still fails to grasp the existential dimension of this conflict, must respond with more support for Ukraine, not with calls for negotiations that only benefit the aggressor.
3. The Trump-Xi summit in Beijing: lots of stagecraft, little substance
Facts
On May 14 and 15, 2016, Donald Trump made his first state visit to China since 2017 in Beijing , culminating in a summit that generated enormous international interest. Trump arrived accompanied by some of the top executives in the American technology and business sectors, including Elon Musk and Jensen Huang, CEO of Nvidia. The most concrete agreement reached was China’s commitment to purchase 200 Boeing aircraft—a figure far below the 500 Trump had promised before the trip—which caused a 4% drop in the company’s stock price. Both sides agreed to develop “closer cooperative ties” within the framework of a “constructive and stable strategic relationship,” a diplomatic formula vague enough to be interpreted in radically different ways in Washington and Beijing. Trump claimed to have resolved “many different problems,” while independent analyses by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Brookings, and the Atlantic Council concurred in describing the results as “modest,” “lacking in substance,” and “focused on optics rather than outcomes.” Xi secured a rhetorical concession from Trump on Taiwan. There was no explicit extension of the trade truce. China retains its strong position in rare earth elements and semiconductors.
Implications
The Beijing summit confirms what this analyst has repeatedly described as the systemic rivalry between the established power and the rising power, with incompatible models of political and economic organization. China arrives at this negotiating table in an objectively stronger position than it was twelve months ago: it controls between 75 and 80 percent of the world’s rare earth production and 95 percent of its refining capacity; Beijing has dominated the continental quantum communications network and its satellites; and the yuan is gaining ground in the international payments system. The “small garden, high fence” policy—the US policy of selective restrictions on critical technologies—remains Washington’s most consistent approach, but it demands coherence and continuity that Trump’s erratic foreign policy does not always guarantee. The Thucydides Trap—coined by Graham T. Allison—is more real than ever, and the Beijing summit has not defused it: it has merely suspended it temporarily, which is not the same thing.
Perspectives and scenarios
The period of “constructive stability” agreed upon by Trump and Xi is, above all, a waiting game that both leaders need: Trump to manage the Iranian conflict and the midterm elections; Xi to consolidate his position domestically and advance military modernization. China’s transactional partners—Russia and Iran—remain partners, not allies, which provides Washington with some room to maneuver. But no serious analyst can ignore that Beijing is leaving the conference with more than it entered, while Trump is leaving with photo ops and a smaller aircraft order than promised.
4. Lebanon and the fragility of the ceasefire: Hezbollah remains the Gordian knot
Facts
Israel and Lebanon agreed on May 15, after two days of direct talks in Washington—historically unprecedented between the ambassadors of both countries—to a 45-day extension of the ceasefire, with a view to negotiating a lasting peace agreement that includes full recognition of mutual sovereignty and security along their shared border. The US State Department described the talks as “highly productive.” However, the Soufan Center—one of the most rigorous think tanks on counterterrorism—warned on May 22 that the conflict “remains active despite the ceasefire,” with Hezbollah systematically improving its drone warfare capabilities against Israeli forces. The Tehran-backed terrorist organization rejects the direct negotiations between Beirut and Tel Aviv as a “capitulation” by the Lebanese government. Lebanon, for its part, refuses to directly order its armed forces to fight Hezbollah—which would reveal the true power structure in the country—while demanding that Israel withdraw from the south and respect the ceasefire. In this context of deliberate ambiguity, Hezbollah remains a state within a state, loyal to its masters in Tehran with the devotion of those who know their survival depends solely on them.
Implications
The Lebanese dilemma is, at its core, yet another manifestation of the underlying systemic fracture that characterizes the entire arc of instability stretching from the Persian Gulf to the eastern Mediterranean. Hezbollah is not a militia: it is a terrorist organization with first-rate military capabilities, financed, armed, and directed by the jihadist oligarchy in Tehran. Every one of its members, from the rank-and-file fighter to the political cadre, is individually a terrorist. Iran’s attempt to link any agreement in Lebanon to a settlement on the broader Iranian conflict has been rightly rejected by Washington and Israel: yielding on this point would amount to granting Hezbollah veto power over the regional security architecture, a power no democratic state can accept.
Perspectives and scenarios
The disarmament of Hezbollah—demanded by both UN Security Council Resolution 1559 and, at least nominally, by the Lebanese government—is the sine qua non for any lasting peace. Recent history demonstrates that without this condition, ceasefires are nothing more than tactical pauses that the party of God uses to rearm and reorganize. This analyst harbors no great illusions about the current Beirut government’s ability to impose disarmament: the Lebanese state has been, for decades, a hostage to Hezbollah’s parallel power. What could happen, and on which the success or failure of the process depends, is that the combined pressure of the US, France, and Saudi Arabia on the Sunni and Christian factions in Beirut will generate an internal political dynamic that isolates Hezbollah and erodes its legitimacy.
5. NATO: All allies spend over 2% of GDP on defense; Spain remains in the dock of irresponsibility
Facts
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte’s annual report, presented in Brussels on March 26, 2026, confirmed that for the first time in the Alliance’s history, all allies exceeded the target of 2% of GDP in defense spending, with a 20% increase in European and Canadian spending compared to 2024. Norway became the first European ally to surpass the United States in per capita defense spending. At the Hague Summit in June 2025, the allies agreed to a commitment to reach 5% of GDP on defense and security by 2035. Spain obtained a formal exemption from this commitment, the only such case in the entire Alliance. Poland leads in relative spending at 4.48% of GDP, followed by the Baltic states: Lithuania (4%), Latvia (3.73%), and Estonia (3.38%). Meanwhile, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has urged Spain to increase its spending to 3 or 3.5%, in line with NATO agreements. At the same time, Trump has threatened Spain with trade sanctions for its refusal to allow the use of the Rota and Morón air bases for operations against Iran, a scandal that has led influential figures within the Republican sphere to call for Spain’s expulsion from the Alliance.
Implications
Spain’s position within NATO is, at this point, a scandalous anomaly that reflects the level of historical irresponsibility of the Sánchez government. The Rota and Morón air bases are not Spanish bases loaned to the Americans: they are facilities of the Atlantic Alliance, strategic assets of the free world that the Sánchez government has used as leverage for ideological pressure and alignment with narratives hostile to the West. The American tanker aircraft that operated from these bases were withdrawn due to Spanish refusal. The inconsistency is as blatant as it is disturbing: the bases continue to form part of NATO’s operational logistical support—including the missile defense system with Rota as a key node—while the government maintains a discourse of neutrality that its own allies describe as, in the words of US Senator Lindsey Graham, “the epitome of pathetically weak European leadership.”
Perspectives and scenarios
Spain’s exemption from the 5% commitment is not a diplomatic triumph: it is a stain on the Atlanticist record of a country that should be a key player in the security of Southern Europe. Trump’s pressure, although expressed with his characteristic exaggeration, points to an objective reality: one cannot be a member of the Alliance and behave as if collective security were a dispensable option. The consistency this analyst demands is not maximalism: it is the minimum ethical standard expected of a loyal partner. Spain must credibly and urgently increase its defense spending to 3% of GDP, and must clarify once and for all the use of its bases within the context of the Alliance’s obligations. Until that happens, the damage to Spain’s credibility will be cumulative and irreparable.
6. Ukraine, under Russian pressure on the ground while Trump looks towards Iran
Facts
According to the latest report from Russia Matters (Harvard Kennedy School) dated May 27, 2026, based on ISW data, Russian forces experienced a net loss of 100 square miles of Ukrainian territory between April 28 and May 26. However, the Ukrainian source DeepState offers a slightly different reading, with a net Russian gain of 20.9 square miles over the same period, reflecting the volatility and dynamism of the front. Power outages caused by Russian attacks have reduced Ukraine’s economic growth by 2.5 percentage points so far in 2026. Rubio confirmed that no peace negotiations are scheduled, while Putin is using the escalation on Kyiv—including the order to evacuate diplomats—as a tool of psychological pressure. Moscow and Minsk conducted joint strategic nuclear exercises, with the respective leaders participating via videoconference. North Korea continues to send soldiers to Ukraine, in what Kim Jong Un has publicly described as “maximum loyalty.”
Implications
The war in Ukraine is entering a phase of tactical exhaustion, in which neither side has managed to achieve a decisive breakthrough, but in which Russia is attempting to compensate for its military failures with a strategy of economic destruction and psychological terror. Trump’s distraction with the Iranian conflict is a window of opportunity that Putin will not let slip by: every week that passes without American pressure on Moscow is a week the Kremlin uses to consolidate its position, fuel its war economy, and tempt Kyiv’s allies to reduce their support. The nuclear exercises with Belarus and the presence of North Korean troops are unmistakable signs that Moscow is building a multilateral support structure that deserves urgent attention. The inconsistency of supporting Ukraine—as the EU is doing—while allowing pressure to ease—as those who see no further than the next election do—is precisely the kind of mistake that history does not forgive.
Perspectives and scenarios
The winter of 2026-2027 will be decisive. Russia is betting that accumulated power outages and the weariness of its European allies will create a fissure in Western support, allowing it to negotiate from a position of strength. This calculation can only be thwarted if Europe—all of Europe, including its most hesitant capitals!—doubles down on its military and financial commitment to Kyiv. The exhaustion of Ukraine is Putin’s central strategic objective; preventing it should be the West’s central strategic objective. Nothing more needs to be said.
III. MEDIA RACK
The New York Times and the Washington Post dedicate extensive analyses to the contradictions between Trump’s declared optimism about the Iran deal and the Iranian version from the Fars News Agency, which refutes it point by point. Both newspapers point to the lack of progress on the nuclear issue—the true core of the conflict—as the factor that makes any lasting agreement unfeasible in the short term.
The Times of London and The Telegraph underscore the strategic gravity of the Russian threat to systematically attack Kyiv, with The Telegraph describing the diplomatic evacuation order as “an attempt at psychological capitulation by other means.” Both agree that Russia is acting from a position of tactical weakness but dangerous strategic impunity.
The Financial Times and the Wall Street Journal offer the most comprehensive analyses of the Trump-Xi summit, agreeing with CSIS, Brookings and the Atlantic Council that the results are “more optics than substance”—much Boeing promised, little delivered—and that China has obtained a rhetorical concession on Taiwan that Beijing will try to exploit.
Le Monde and Le Figaro, from different editorial perspectives but with identical analytical clarity, underscore the deterioration of the European position in the face of the new security architecture emerging from the Iranian conflict, paying particular attention to the scandal of the Spanish military bases. Le Figaro uses the term “abdication” to refer to the attitude of the Sánchez government.
The German newspapers FAZ and Die Welt reflect the new German consensus on defense spending: Chancellor Merz has made pressure on Spain a matter of principle, not diplomatic courtesy. Die Zeit provides a lengthy analysis of the danger that Washington’s Iranian distraction will irreparably weaken NATO’s eastern flank.
Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya offer divergent coverage: the former maintains its bias in favor of the resistance axis (read: Iran and its terrorist proxies); the latter, more aligned with Riyadh, emphasizes the economic cost of the Strait blockade and the urgency of an agreement. Asharq Al-Awsat—the leading Arabic-language publication in the Gulf region—publishes a comprehensive analysis of the internal fracturing of the Iranian IRGC following Khamenei’s death.
Reuters, AFP, and AP maintain the most rigorous factual coverage of all the simultaneous crises. It is noteworthy that Reuters quotes a “senior Iranian source” explicitly denying any agreement on enriched uranium, which contradicts Trump’s public statements.
Axios and Politico, both based in Washington, publish analyses of the chaotic state of Iranian diplomacy emanating from the White House, with particular attention to the gap between Trump’s and Rubio’s messaging. Axios reveals that Iran’s proposed partial agreement—focusing solely on the Strait of Gibraltar, without addressing the nuclear issue—is deeply dividing the American national security team.
TASS and Russia Today (RT) echo the Kremlin’s narrative about the “necessity” of the attacks on Kyiv as a response to “terrorism by the Kyiv regime,” in what constitutes a disinformation campaign as crude as it is systematic. Their mention here is for reference purposes only: they are instruments of state propaganda, not sources of information.
Corriere della Sera and L’Osservatore Romano devote attention to the humanitarian implications of the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, with L’Osservatore Romano echoing the position of the Pope, who has described as “immoral” the obstacles to the free passage of goods vital to the civilian population.
Ukrinform and Kyiv Independent maintain detailed and verified coverage of the situation on the front, refuting Russian claims about their territorial advances with geolocated data.
IV. RISK TRAFFIC LIGHT
🔴 EXTREME RISK — US-Iran Negotiations / Strait of Hormuz
The impasse between Washington and Tehran over the nuclear issue, in the context of talks to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, constitutes the greatest geopolitical risk on the international stage today. The gap between Trump’s statements—which predict an imminent agreement—and Iran’s position—which denies it—creates the perfect scenario for a sudden breakdown of the ceasefire and a resumption of hostilities with unpredictable consequences for global energy markets, global inflation, and the stability of the Gulf partners. The IRGC triumvirate—Vahidi, Zolghadr, and Rezaei—lacks Khamenei’s authority to impose internal discipline: the paradox of the decapitation renders any agreement structurally fragile, since none of the three has sufficient power to compel the others to abide by its terms.
🔴 EXTREME RISK — Russian escalation in Ukraine / Threat to Kiev
The threat of “systematic attacks” on Kyiv and the order to evacuate foreign diplomats constitute a deliberate and extremely dangerous escalation of Russia’s strategy of terror and psychological pressure. If Putin decides to materialize this threat with a campaign of mass destruction against the Ukrainian capital—preceded by the evacuation of inconvenient witnesses—the consequences for the credibility of the Atlantic Alliance and for the Ukrainian resistance could be devastating. Trump’s distraction with Iran only exacerbates this risk, sending Moscow the signal that the moment is ripe for action.
🟠 HIGH RISK — Lebanon: fragility of the ceasefire and Hezbollah’s irredentism
The 45-day extension of the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire, agreed upon on May 15, provides a window of opportunity, but Hezbollah—the Tehran-backed terrorist organization—continues to enhance its drone warfare capabilities and reject any disarmament process. The Lebanese state remains unable to assert its authority over the party of God in the south of the country. The risk of a ceasefire breakdown initiated by Hezbollah—to align itself with a potential resumption of the Iranian conflict—is real and should not be underestimated. The international community must demand the effective deployment of the Lebanese army in the south and compliance with Resolution 1701.
🟠 HIGH RISK — Systemic US-China rivalry: absence of solid post-summit agreements Beijing
The Trump-Xi summit of May 14-15 failed to produce the structural agreements necessary to stabilize the Sino-American relationship. Trump’s rhetorical concessions on Taiwan—without verifiable guarantees that Beijing will change its stance—the absence of an explicit extension of the trade truce, and China’s dominance in rare earth elements and advanced semiconductors create a scenario of structural vulnerability for the West. China is proceeding steadily with its long-term strategy, while Washington oscillates between triumphalism and a lack of foresight. This systemic rivalry—which is not a new Cold War, because it is qualitatively different—demands a coherent and sustained strategy that transactional Trumpism cannot guarantee.
🟡 MODERATE RISK — NATO: Credibility of Southern Europe and Spain’s Position
Spain’s exemption from the 5% of GDP defense commitment and the Sánchez government’s refusal to allow the use of Rota and Morón for operations related to the response to Iran are causing cumulative damage to Spain’s credibility within the Alliance. US and German pressure—Merz has explicitly asked Spain to increase its commitment to 3% or 3.5%—reflects a loss of trust among allies that could ultimately have institutional consequences. The short-term risk is moderate because NATO’s formal mechanisms have not been activated; the medium-term risk—if Spain continues to be the weak link in southern Europe—is considerably greater.
V. EDITORIAL COMMENTARY
There are days when international affairs seem like a random accumulation of crises. This May 28, 2026, is not one of those days: it is one in which the threads connecting each crisis become visible to anyone who bothers to look closely. The impasse over the Strait of Hormuz and the Iranian nuclear program, the Russian threat of systematic destruction of Kyiv, the tepid results of the Trump-Xi summit, and the ongoing scandal of Spain’s position in NATO are not isolated phenomena: they are chapters of the same story about the decline of the multilateral liberal order that the West built—with blood and effort—during the second half of the 20th century.
Trump is right in his diagnosis of Iran: the regime of the jihadist oligarchy in Tehran is a real, immediate, and permanent threat that cannot be ignored or appeased. But being right in the diagnosis and wrong in the treatment is not a virtue: it is a first-rate irresponsibility. A president who announces agreements that the adversary denies in real time; who has no plan whatsoever for the day after the agreement or the collapse of the regime; who confuses the media impact of a social media statement with the solidity of a diplomatic commitment—that president needs Marco Rubio more than ever, and Rubio needs his boss to let him work with the seriousness that the moment demands.
On Ukraine, it must be said without euphemism: the Russian threat to turn Kyiv into a wasteland is not an empty declaration. It is the manifestation of the desperation of a regime that cannot win on the battlefield and is trying to win at the negotiating table through terror. The West—including a European Union that has been languishing in the shadows of history for four years—must respond firmly, with weapons, with financial support, and with the political clarity that has been lacking thus far. Ukraine cannot lose because, if it does, Moldova will be next, then the Baltic states, and then Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty will cease to be the pillar of the European order and become a relic of a time when the West still took its own survival seriously.
And regarding Spain, with the pain of seeing a great country—with a brilliant diplomatic history, a Transition that was a universal model, and a first-rate strategic geographic position—reduced to the role of a suspect ally, an unreliable partner, a government whose neutrality toward the jihadist oligarchy in Tehran earned the gratitude of the Iranian embassy: the price for this irresponsibility will come sooner than Mr. Sánchez thinks. And all of Spain will pay it, not just those who incurred it.