Gustavo de Arístegui,
May 6, 2026
I. BRIEF INTRODUCTION
The day’s events have yielded a headline that, if confirmed in the next forty-eight hours, could reshape the Middle Eastern landscape: the United States and Iran are closer than ever—since the first day of the war on February 28—to a one-page, fourteen-point Memorandum of Understanding, negotiated by Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner with Iranian interlocutors, both directly and through Pakistani mediation. The leak, published exclusively by Axios and quickly picked up by Reuters, The Jerusalem Post, and Al-Monitor, marks a turning point in one of those “temperature-shifting wars” I’ve been describing—the classic formula for 21st-century conflicts—and forces us to read all other current events in a new light.
Because what is decisive is not only the document itself, but what it entails: the internal fracture within the Iranian jihadist oligarchy, which has become public with unusual clarity; the new attacks by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) against the United Arab Emirates, which appear to be a deliberate act of sabotage against the negotiations themselves; and the competing ceasefires between Russia and Ukraine, which illustrate the contrast between active diplomacy in the Strait of Hormuz and a Ukrainian front devoid of mediation. Each of these elements now carries a different weight. What seemed like an unstable balance of simultaneous pressures is suddenly rearranged around the question of whether the Iranian regime—headless, fractured, and utterly corrupt—can or wants to sign the document. And, above all, looms the enigma of the “day-after problem,” which I have been pointing out since March and which no fourteen-point memorandum can resolve on its own.
II. MOST IMPORTANT NEWS OF THE LAST 24 HOURS
1. The Axios leak: the fourteen-point Memorandum of Understanding between Washington and Tehran
Facts.
According to information published by Barak Ravid in Axios this Wednesday, May 6, citing two senior US officials and two other sources familiar with the matter, the White House believes it is close to reaching a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Iran, in a one-page, fourteen-point format. The negotiations are being conducted between special envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, representing the US side, and several Iranian officials—both directly and through Pakistani mediation. Washington expects an Iranian response within the next forty-eight hours. The essential terms under discussion are as follows: a formal declaration ending the war; the opening of a thirty-day period for detailed negotiations, potentially to be held in Islamabad or Geneva; and a moratorium on uranium enrichment, the exact duration of which is still being debated—Iran proposes five years, the United States demands twenty, and sources suggest a compromise around twelve or fifteen years. Iran’s commitment never to pursue a nuclear weapon or engage in weapons development; a clause prohibiting operations at underground nuclear facilities; a strengthened inspection regime, including UN “snap inspections”; the removal of highly enriched uranium from Iranian territory—a critical US demand; the gradual lifting of the US naval blockade of Iranian ports and Iranian restrictions on transit through the Strait of Hormuz; the gradual lifting of US sanctions; and the gradual release of billions of dollars in Iranian assets frozen worldwide. If the negotiations collapse within the 30-day period, the United States reserves the right to reinstate the blockade and resume military action. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on Tuesday that “we don’t need to have the agreement written in a single day. It is highly complex and technical.” Iran, for its part, indicated on Wednesday that it will only accept a peace agreement if it is “fair.” In a sign consistent with the diplomatic opening, President Trump has temporarily suspended the “Project Freedom” operation to escort merchant ships in Hormuz —launched just on Monday—, while maintaining the naval blockade on Iranian ports in full force.
Implications.
This is the first serious exit strategy document from the war since February 28, and its scope must be assessed with extreme precision. First, the format is revealing: a single page of fourteen points is not a peace agreement, but a political framework that opens a thirty-day window for genuine technical negotiations. The precedent is clearly found in the great diplomatic achievements of the 20th century—from the Camp David Accords to the pre-clauses of the JCPOA—and the choice of format points to Witkoff and Kushner’s desire to protect the document from parliamentary scrutiny and cross-vetoes. Second, the substantive content, on paper, represents a considerable diplomatic success for the Rubio-Witkoff-Kushner team. The removal of highly enriched uranium from Iranian territory—if confirmed—would constitute the most significant concession obtained since the inception of the nuclear program in the 1970s. The twelve- to fifteen-year moratorium, the snap inspections, the ban on underground installations, the commitment to non-armament: all of this, if implemented, points to a major strategic setback for the regime. The suspension of “Project Freedom”—reinterpreted in this light—is not a capitulation, but rather the first operational gesture embedded within the MOU: the deliberate decision to eliminate the most explosive scenario—the daily clashes in the Strait—in order to create the diplomatic space in which the document can be signed, without thereby lifting the iron grip of the naval blockade. It is the formula of classic “coercive diplomacy”: the economic siege is maintained, and the operational grip is loosened. Thirdly, however, the shadows run deep. The gradual lifting of sanctions and the release of frozen funds—billions of dollars—will inject financial oxygen into a cosmically corrupt oligarchy whose main structural vulnerability is precisely economic suffocation. This is where the “decapitation paradox” becomes inescapable: with whom, exactly, is Witkoff negotiating? With President Pezeshkian, publicly furious with the Revolutionary Guard and virtually powerless over actual military decisions? With Minister Araghchi, suspected of acting as General Vahidi’s aide? Or with the Vahidi-Zolghadr-Rezaei triumvirate itself at the head of the IRGC? The document will only be as valid as the chain of command that executes it. And the real Iranian chain of command is broken.
Perspectives and scenarios.
Three scenarios are emerging for the next seven to ten days. In the first, the most optimistic but perfectly plausible, Tehran responds positively within the next 48 hours with limited concessions on the timetable and duration of the moratorium, the MOU is signed before the weekend, and the 30-day negotiating period based in Islamabad begins. This would be the most substantial diplomatic outcome achieved regarding the Iranian issue since the start of the war, attributable to the work of the Witkoff-Kushner team under the technical leadership of Secretary of State Marco Rubio. In the second, the most likely according to my analysis, the Iranian demands—particularly regarding the duration of the moratorium, the removal of enriched uranium, and the issue of underground facilities—prove unacceptable to Washington, or internal divisions in Tehran prevent Pezeshkian from engaging the IRGC. The document remains in limbo; the April 8 ceasefire formally remains in effect, but incidents accumulate, and the war drags on indefinitely in its “variable temperature” mode. In the third scenario, the most somber, a unilateral action by the IRGC—a new attack on Fujairah, a missile strike on a US base, an attack on a merchant ship—derails the negotiations and reopens main combat operations with incalculable consequences. The difference between the first and third scenarios will ultimately be decided not by Witkoff’s diplomacy, but by the internal drive of the Iranian jihadist apparatus. And that, it is worth remembering, is what no memorandum can control.
2. Pezeshkian lashes out at the Pasdaran: the Iranian fracture and the real obstacle to the memorandum
Facts.
Iran International, citing reliable sources close to the presidency, has reported that President Masoud Pezeshkian is “extraordinarily furious” with the commander of the Revolutionary Guard Corps (RPC), General Ahmed Vahidi, over the ballistic missile, cruise missile, and drone attacks against the United Arab Emirates—specifically the oil-rich area of Fujairah—carried out without prior notification to the civilian government. Pezeshkian reportedly described the operation as “completely irresponsible” and “madness,” warning of “potentially irreversible consequences,” and has requested an urgent meeting with Mukhta Khamenei—son of the late Supreme Leader and current de facto strongman—to halt the IRGC’s unilateral actions. Both Pezeshkian and the Speaker of Parliament, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, are also reportedly at odds with Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, whom they accuse of acting as Vahidi’s henchman instead of following the directives of the civilian cabinet. Official spokesman Mohsen Haji Mirzaei tried on Tuesday to deny any discrepancies on state television, declaring that “all decisions have been made unanimously”—a denial whose clumsiness serves as confirmation.
Implications.
This news, read in light of the Witkoff-Kushner Memorandum, takes on its true dimension: it is not an isolated incident, but the real structural obstacle to any agreement. The Iranian regime—let us always remember this—is not a theocracy, nor a monolithic regime, nor a homogeneous, rational actor, but a militarized, vicious, and cosmically corrupt jihadist oligarchy, in which the IRGC functions as a political-military-economic conglomerate, and where the base of the Revolutionary Guard is largely made up of conscripts—not ideologically driven volunteers. The elimination of pragmatic figures carried out in March by the allied campaign—I have maintained ever since that Larijani was never a moderate, but rather the inventor of the strategy of stalling while gas centrifuges were being installed—has consolidated the “decapitation paradox”: the most radical wing, embodied in the Vahidi-Zolghadr-Rezaei triumvirate, now controls the real levers of power, while the civilian president is reduced to the status of a figurehead. This is the central question that neither Axios nor Trump’s envoys answer: if Pezeshkian lacks real authority over the IRGC, and if Araghchi obeys Vahidi, who, exactly, is authorized to commit the regime to the Memorandum? And, above all, who will have the operational capacity to prevent a Revolutionary Guard commander, in an intermediate command position in the Strait of Hormuz, from deciding to bomb Fujairah again the day after the signing?
Perspectives and scenarios.
The fracture opens three paths fully intertwined with the fate of the Memorandum. The first: that Pezeshkian, with Mokhtaba Khamenei’s backing, manages to impose a tactical pause on the IRGC, authorizes Araghchi—or replaces him—to sign the MOU, and opens a genuine thirty-day window for negotiations. The second: that the IRGC, feeling cornered and aware that lifting sanctions would remove its ideological justification for the “imperialist encirclement,” deliberately sabotages any agreement through a new show of force—an attack on a ship, an incursion into allied territory, a targeted assassination. The third, more disturbing: that this same fracture ends up producing a chaotic succession crisis whose management neither the United States nor Israel has foreseen. The criticism of the lack of a Plan B, which I have been making since the beginning of the war, is more pertinent today than ever. A fourteen-point Memorandum does not resolve a chain of command problem. And diplomacy that ignores this reality is doomed to resounding failure.
3. New Iranian attacks on the Emirates: the IRGC’s sabotage of the memorandum itself
Facts.
For the second consecutive day, Iran launched a barrage of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones against the United Arab Emirates on Tuesday. The Emirati Ministry of Defense reported intercepting 15 missiles and four drones; however, one of them struck the Fujairah Oil Industry Zone—a terminal of the pipeline that bypasses the Strait of Hormuz—causing a large fire and injuring three Indian citizens. Fires were also reported on two cargo ships north of Dubai, and the airports in Dubai and Abu Dhabi experienced diversions for several hours. The Emirati Ministry of Education ordered a return to distance learning until May 8. Prime Minister Narendra Modi condemned the attacks as “unacceptable” and reaffirmed India’s “strong solidarity” with the UAE. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia issued similar condemnations. The “Project Freedom” merchant ship escort operation —launched on Monday by the United States and suspended on Tuesday night— sank, in its first twenty-four hours and using AH-64 Apache and MH-60 Seahawk helicopters, six Iranian boats that threatened ships under escort.
Implications.
If the Memorandum is the number one news story and the internal Iranian fracture is the number two, the attacks on Fujairah are its operational corollary: real-time proof that the IRGC is prepared to sabotage any agreement the Iranian civilian government might reach. Three interpretations converge here. The first, already substantiated: these attacks were decided upon and executed by the IRGC without coordination with Pezeshkian’s cabinet, confirming that the true center of gravity of the regime is Vahidi’s military oligarchy, not the Foreign Ministry negotiating in Islamabad. The second is the deliberate concentration of fire on Fujairah: it is not just any target, but the terminus of the Habshan-Fujairah oil pipeline that allows the Emirates to export crude oil bypassing the Strait of Hormuz. Iran has decided to close this escape valve as well, demonstrating its capacity and willingness to strangle any alternative to the main chokepoint. The third interpretation is the unequivocal stance taken by India and Pakistan—rival states that, nevertheless, agree in condemning the attacks—and by Saudi Arabia. The jihadist oligarchy in Tehran is managing, with remarkable skill, to alienate the Arab-Muslim world it claimed to lead and to weaken the negotiating position of its own diplomats at the Witkoff table.
Perspectives and scenarios.
The UAE, which effectively left OPEC earlier this year, is emerging as the regional actor with the greatest incentive for a stronger response, and has expressly reserved “its full and legitimate right to reply.” If the IRGC’s actions persist, it is possible that Abu Dhabi will demand a collective response from the Gulf Cooperation Council, and may even request an expansion of operational involvement by the United States, France—with Rafale fighter jets already deployed at Camp de la Paix—or the UK. Crucially, in terms of the Memorandum negotiations, is whether Witkoff and Kushner agree to include a security guarantee clause for the Gulf States in the text, or whether the signing of the MOU itself will be perceived by Abu Dhabi as a Western capitulation that leaves them at the mercy of the IRGC’s next whim. Each new salvo brings the possibility of a resumption of the main conflict closer, turning Pakistan’s quiet diplomacy into a veritable race against time.
4. Russia and Ukraine declare ceasefires: competitors contrasted with the Hormuz diplomacy
Facts.
Vladimir Putin announced a unilateral ceasefire on Monday for May 8-9, to mark the 81st anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany—Victory Day. The Russian declaration was accompanied, however, by a warning of a “massive missile strike against the center of Kyiv” if Ukraine attempted to disrupt the celebrations, and even a recommendation to foreign diplomatic missions to “leave the city promptly.” Volodymyr Zelensky responded with his own ceasefire, announced early for the night of May 5-6, stating that “human life is incomparably more valuable than the celebration of any anniversary.” Meanwhile, Russian attacks in Merefa, near Kharkiv, left at least seven civilians dead and dozens wounded—including a two-year-old child—and two more dead in the Zaporizhzhia region. For the first time in many years, Moscow decided not to display military equipment at the May 9 parade, amid fears of Ukrainian drones. Diplomatic negotiations are at a standstill: Witkoff and Kushner, preoccupied with the Iranian front, have not traveled to kyiv since Orthodox Easter, and Ukrainian sources are already considering scenarios without US involvement, with Turkey as a potential venue.
Implications.
The contrast between Witkoff and Kushner’s active diplomacy on the Iranian issue and their sustained absence on the Ukrainian issue is one of the most revealing anomalies of the moment. The Trump administration has decided—tacitly but clearly—to concentrate all its diplomatic capital on the Hormuz Memorandum, leaving the Ukrainian front in tactical hibernation. The immediate consequence is redoubled cynicism from the Kremlin: declaring a truce for a commemorative event while attacking energy infrastructure and residential neighborhoods, and threatening a massive attack against the capital of the aggressor country if it “disrupts” the aggressor’s parade. It is the classic formula of Soviet cynicism, modernized and escalated. That the May 9th parade is being held, for the first time in decades, without military equipment is an admission, before the entire world, of the real weakness of the Russian military apparatus, and a small symbolic—but significant—victory for the Ukrainian drone war. On the other hand, Trump’s inaction in the face of the true nature of Russian aggression, the shift of the diplomatic center of gravity toward Turkey, and Kyiv’s growing weariness with Washington are eroding what remained of the Atlantic peace. I remain resolutely opposed to Russian aggression against Ukraine, and to the very idea that force can serve as a legitimate instrument for acquiring territory.
Perspectives and scenarios.
The likelihood of the May 8-9 truce being fully respected is slim, given the incongruity between Moscow’s words and the facts on the ground. If Witkoff finalizes the Iranian Memorandum in the next two weeks, he could free up diplomatic capital to revive the Ukrainian issue by mid- or late May. If, on the other hand, negotiations with Tehran drag on or collapse, Ukraine—supported by the “coalition of volunteers” led by Macron and Starmer, with the planned Franco-British logistical bases on Ukrainian territory—could definitively opt for a Turkish channel that would exclude Washington from the process. This would be a geopolitical defeat of major proportions and would also open a serious rift in the Western position, one that the mediocre European political class of the 21st century would be—as so often—incapable of closing.
5. Lebanon in a holding pattern: Hezbollah’s disarmament, the May parliamentary elections and the shadow of the Iranian memorandum
Facts.
Lebanon is approaching crucial parliamentary elections, scheduled for May, which will test the political viability of the disarmament process of the Hezbollah terrorist organization, spearheaded by President Joseph Aoun—in office since January 9, 2025—and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam—since January 13 of the same year. The so-called “Homeland Shield Plan,” adopted in September 2025, envisions the gradual restoration of the Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) state monopoly on the use of force, with five sectoral phases: south of the Litani River, between the Litani and Awwali Rivers, the southern suburbs of Beirut, the northern Bekaa Valley, and Beirut itself. The first phase, south of the Litani River, is virtually complete. Israel maintains a presence in five high ground positions on the border and continues almost daily airstrikes on targeted objectives, while the United Nations Security Council anticipates the termination of UNIFIL’s mandate by December 31, 2026. A recent Gallup poll shows that 79 percent of Lebanese support the army’s monopoly on weapons, 86 percent reject a war with Israel over Palestine, and President Aoun enjoys an 81 percent approval rating.
Implications.
Lebanon’s fate is now closely intertwined with that of the Iranian Memorandum. Hezbollah—a terrorist organization by any legal or moral standard, not a “militia,” not a “resistance movement,” not a “party”—is, in its military dimension, an operational franchise of the Iranian IRGC. If the MOU is signed and imposes the gradual lifting of sanctions on Tehran, financial oxygen will also indirectly reach Hezbollah’s funding networks, weakening Beirut’s negotiating position with the organization. If, on the other hand, the MOU fails and the United States tightens the economic noose, Hezbollah’s financial strangulation—already well underway after the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 and the collapse of the Syrian land supply corridor—could accelerate, facilitating the completion of Operation Homeland Shield. The paradox is this: what benefits diplomacy in the Strait of Hormuz may harm disarmament in Lebanon, and vice versa. And the Lebanese electoral calendar, with legislative elections this May, leaves no room for uncertainty. If Hezbollah and its allies—led by the highly experienced Nabih Berri at the head of the Amal Movement—achieve a resounding victory, the disarmament plan will effectively grind to a halt, with consequences that will reverberate for years to come.
Perspectives and scenarios.
Three possible outcomes are emerging. The first, and most favorable, is a victory for the pro-independence forces—Christians from Samir Geagea’s Lebanese Forces, Sunnis aligned with Salam, Druze supporters of Walid Jumblatt, and Shia factions disaffected with the Hezbollah-Amal alliance—which would provide political support for Operation Shield and allow phases two through five to be completed before UNIFIL’s mandate ends in December. The second outcome is an ambiguous result that keeps the country in institutional paralysis, with disarmament stalled at the Litani-Awwali phase and an insufficiently equipped army—the $200 million in US military aid pledged by the Barrack-Ortagus team is, frankly, inadequate—to impose a monopoly on weapons in southern Beirut or the Bekaa Valley. The third, and most somber, scenario: a resurgence of Hezbollah taking advantage of the hypothetical financial benefits of the Iranian MOU, a new escalation with Israel, and a repeat—on a smaller scale but equally tragic—of the 2024 war. Lebanon, that “martyr state” that deserves so much attention, continues to depend on variables decided outside its borders.
III. MEDIA RACK
United States. Axios, in an exclusive report by Barak Ravid, leads the day with the scoop on the fourteen-point Memorandum: the story is immediately picked up by Reuters, The Jerusalem Post, Al-Monitor, US News & World Report, and MarketScreener. The New York Times connects the decision regarding the Strait of Hormuz with the MV Hondius cruise ship incident and the Met Gala in New York. The Washington Post focuses on the domestic dimension of the war. The Wall Street Journal, in its editorial, argues that the Iranian regime “has ended the ceasefire” and supports maintaining the blockade—an interpretation that the Memorandum, if confirmed, will force a revision. CNN, NBC News, and NPR provide minute-by-minute coverage of “Project Freedom” and its suspension. Fox News highlights Trump’s “blown off the face of the earth” comment. CBS News focuses on the health implications of the Hondius incident. CNBC, Bloomberg, and The Hill report on the congressional debate surrounding the president’s war powers. Politico anticipates a possible joint Security Council resolution on Hormuz. Newsweek and The National Interest analyze Iran’s internal divisions. USA Today focuses on the domestic dimension.
United Kingdom. The Times of London and The Daily Telegraph provide in-depth coverage of the conflict’s Atlantic shift and British support for the Franco-British logistical deployment in Ukraine. The Guardian publishes analyses of civilian casualties in Lebanon and the IRGC offensive. The Financial Times maintains the best technical coverage of the Iranian nuclear issue. British media outlets agree on the fragility of the ceasefire and, even now, on the transformative potential of the Memorandum if it is confirmed.
France. Le Monde and Le Figaro analyze in detail the deployment of French Rafale fighter jets following the attacks on Camp de la Paix and Al Dhafra. LCI and BFM cover the parades following the UAE attacks. Le Point, L’Express, La Croix, Libération, and Le Nouvel Observateur offer an ideologically diverse yet convergent mosaic of critical analysis of Trump’s unilateralism. France Info reports on the security measures for French positions in the Gulf. French coverage is, without a doubt, among the most analytically sound.
Germany, Italy, and other Europeans. The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Die Welt, and Die Zeit underscore the inflationary risk to the German economy and the urgency of advancing European energy independence. Corriere della Sera focuses on Italy’s diplomatic role and the Vatican’s position—L’Osservatore Romano published an editorial two days ago calling for moderation from all sides. Helsingin Sanomat reports on President Stubb’s statements regarding the possibility of resuming dialogue with Moscow if Washington diverges. The Tribune de Genève covers the discreet Swiss mediation, especially relevant if Geneva is ultimately chosen to host the thirty-day negotiating phase. Gazeta Wyborcza analyzes the impact on Poland. Politico Europe offers remarkably in-depth institutional intelligence analysis.
Arab world and Israel. Al-Jazeera maintains its usual editorial line, hostile to the US position, but with a recent shift in openly criticizing the IRGC’s actions after the attacks on Fujairah. Al-Arabiya, Asharq al-Awsat, Al-Riyadh, Saudi Gazette, Arab News, Khaleej Times, Gulf News, Gulf Today, and Al-Ittihad all condemn the Iranian attacks and support the Emirati defensive response. The Peninsula Qatar and Times of Oman offer more nuanced perspectives. An-Nahar Beirut, L’Orient Le Jour, and The Daily Star cover the ongoing disarmament process of the terrorist organization Hezbollah under President Aoun, with an eye toward the upcoming elections. Jordan Times and Al-Rai report on Amman’s cautious stance. Yedioth Ahronoth, Israel Hayom, The Jerusalem Post—which already picked up Axios’s scoop on the MOU—Maariv, and Haaretz cover Israel’s preparations for a possible resumption of hostilities. Al-Quds al-Arabi and Al-Hayat al-Jadida offer the Palestinian perspective. Hürriyet documents Turkish maneuvers to position itself as an alternative mediator on the Ukrainian front.
Asia and elsewhere. The Times of India, Hindustan Times, and Indian Express devote primary coverage to Modi’s condemnation of the Iranian attacks and the impact on Indian workers in Fujairah. The Straits Times covers the impact on Asian trade. The South China Morning Post and China Daily report on Minister Araghchi’s trip to Beijing and on US warnings to China regarding Iranian funding—a key piece of the puzzle if the Memorandum includes, as expected, demands on Chinese trade in Iranian crude. The Yomiuri Shimbun and Tokyo Times analyze the impact on Japan. WION and Daily Jang document Pakistan’s mediating role, more relevant than ever. Russia Today, TASS, and Vesti echo the official Moscow line. Ukrainska Pravda, Kyiv Post, The Kyiv Independent, Ukrinform, and Fakty i Kommentarii cover the competing ceasefires with notable skepticism. In Latin America, Clarín, El Mercurio of Chile, and Reforma of Mexico analyze the global dimension of the Memorandum. Foreign Affairs, The Economist and The Economist Intelligence Unit, together with the newsletters of RUSI, IISS, CSIS and IFRI, offer top-level strategic analysis on the Iranian fracture and the growing European weakness.
IV. RISK TRAFFIC LIGHT
The color coding reflects, according to the usual methodology of this report, the intensity and imminence of the risk: red for immediate or critical threat, orange for moderate escalation with an upward trend, yellow for high tension without imminent triggering, and green for relative stabilization or low risk on the horizon of the next 48-72 hours.
🔴 Negotiations of the US-Iran Memorandum. Critical risk—in its historically pivotal dimension. The next 48 hours are decisive: Iran’s response is pending, there’s a tug-of-war over the duration of the enrichment moratorium, and the removal of highly enriched uranium is a firm US demand. If the negotiations succeed, the regional landscape will be radically transformed; if they collapse, full-scale hostilities will resume immediately.
🔴 Internal structure of the Iranian regime and the IRGC. Critical risk. The rift between Pezeshkian and the Vahidi-Zolghadr-Rezaei triumvirate has become public and jeopardizes the operational viability of any agreement. Possibility of deliberate sabotage of the Memorandum by unilateral action of the IRGC.
🟠 Strait of Hormuz / United Arab Emirates. Moderately escalating risk with an upward trend. The pause in “Project Freedom” reduces the immediate risk of a direct clash at water, but sustained IRGC attacks on Fujairah and the Emirati warning of a full-scale response keep the situation on a knife’s edge.
🟠 Ukrainian front. Risk of moderate escalation. Competing ceasefires with little probability of full compliance, Russian attacks on energy infrastructure and civilian casualties in Kharkiv, stagnation of Witkoff-Kushner diplomacy—currently focused on the Iranian issue—, risk of the negotiating axis shifting towards Turkey.
🟠 Lebanon. Tensions escalating moderately due to the electoral calendar. May parliamentary elections are crucial for the viability of Hezbollah’s disarmament; there is cross-pressure on the Homeland Shield Plan; Israeli presence in five border positions and sustained airstrikes.
🟡 South China Sea / Indo-Pacific. High tension. Minister Araghchi’s presence in Beijing and US warnings to China about Iranian funding place the Iranian issue back within the systemic rivalry between Washington and Beijing. Maximum vigilance regarding Chinese expansionism and its control of rare earth elements.
🟡 Health crisis on the MV Hondius / Atlantic. Localized but significant risk. Spain assumes responsibility for receiving the cruise ship due to International Humanitarian Law; hantavirus outbreak with suspected human-to-human transmission, three confirmed deaths, incubation period of up to eight weeks.
🟢 Trump-European allies front around Ukraine. Relative stabilization. The “coalition of volunteers” maintains military and logistical support; the Franco-British barracks planned for the post-ceasefire scenario are being established.
V. EDITORIAL COMMENTARY
Let me close this report with three observations that I consider unavoidable in light of today’s headline, and which are nothing more than the natural—daily, sustained, and tested—defining of the principles that have governed this analysis since the very beginning of the conflict.
The first focus is on the Memorandum itself and the team that made it possible. If the Axios report is confirmed, and if the Iranian response within the next 48 hours allows for the signing of the document, we will be witnessing a major diplomatic breakthrough, attributable—and this must be emphasized precisely—to the quiet work of the Witkoff-Kushner team under the technical guidance of Secretary of State Marco Rubio, whose diplomatic expertise I have been highlighting for months. The formula of the 14-point, one-page MOU is ingenious: it protects the document from parliamentary scrutiny, opens a 30-day technical window, and creates a framework for the gradual lifting of sanctions and the embargo, thus reducing implementation costs. What we cannot ignore, however, is the structural shadow I have been pointing out since March: the complete lack of a plan B for the “day after” in the event of the Iranian regime’s implosion, and the systematic underestimation of the internal rift between Pezeshkian’s civilian government and the IRGC’s military-economic apparatus under Vahidi. A memorandum does not solve a chain of command problem. And the chain of command problem, in Tehran, is the problem.
The second observation concerns Spain’s position and, more generally, the mediocrity and strategic myopia of the 21st-century European political class. Pedro Sánchez’s government maintains a stance that can only be described as neutrality bordering on irresponsibility: it declares its “no to war,” closes its airspace to US aircraft involved in operations against Iran, denies the use of Rota and Morón for offensive missions, withdraws ambassadors, and condemns allied actions as “illegal.” Meanwhile, it depends on the allied blockade to guarantee the flow of energy to Europe, desperately seeks new gas contracts with Algeria to compensate for what no longer arrives from the Gulf, accepts—out of humanitarian imperative and legal obligation, not through its own merit—the reception of the MV Hondius in the Canary Islands, and benefits, without acknowledging it, from the preferential agreements granted by the Iranian oligarchy itself as a reward for its position. The inconsistency is blatant. If the Memorandum is signed, Minister Albares and Vice President Yolanda Díaz will have no qualms about presenting the outcome as a victory for their “no to war” stance, ignoring that the true driving force behind the agreement has been the combination of allied military force and coercive American diplomacy—exactly what Spain rejected from day one. If the Memorandum fails, they will opt for silence. Spain, which once spearheaded one of the world’s most admired democratic transitions under the indispensable figure of King Juan Carlos I—the architect of our democracy—today indulges in projecting an image of international inconsistency that directly harms its strategic interests and its credibility as a reliable ally. It is a shame. And above all, it is a mistake we will pay dearly for.
The third observation, finally, looks at the international order as a whole. We are living in a time when representative liberal democracies are simultaneously facing the pressure of Chinese expansionism, Russian aggression against Ukraine—which we unequivocally oppose, just as we oppose the use of force to acquire territories—the Iranian jihadist oligarchy, Chavista narco-terrorism, the barbarity of jihadist terrorism in its many forms—Daesh, Al Qaeda, Al Shabab, Hamas, Houthis, Boko Haram, the Taliban, Pakistani and Afghan terrorism, Indonesian jihadism—and the cultural battle against Wokism, relativism, and radical gender ideology, which seeks to replace genuine equality between men and women with an ideological caricature. The Memorandum, if signed, would be an extraordinarily significant step forward, and it is worth emphasizing that its true success will depend as much on the technical expertise of the Rubio-Witkoff-Kushner team as on President Trump’s own ability to rein in his impulses toward excess and outbursts, and to finally devise a serious Plan B for the aftermath in Iran and for a fully democratic Venezuelan transition that goes beyond the sinister Rodríguez brothers. Atlanticists at heart, staunch Europeanists, sensible and proponents of common sense in the culture war, those of us who write from this editorial perspective maintain that the only way to confront this historic moment is through unwavering fidelity to the values of liberal democracy, the market economy, a well-managed welfare state—not the proven ruin of the European left—the staunch defense of freedom and non-discrimination, and the explicit condemnation of racism, Islamophobia, and anti-Semitism. Anything else is noise. Or, worse still, complicity.